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 i 
Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses key social and technical capabilities and functions in Iran through the 
lens of the National Innovation System (NIS) model, focusing on processes influencing 
the on-going online encounter between the regime and local and expatriate pro-
democracy cyber-activists in the aftermath of the country's contested presidential 
elections in June 2009. Conceptually, it is located in Science and Technology Studies 
(STS), with an emphasis on constructivist theory including Social Shaping of Technology 
(SST) as its creative backbone. 
 
In the original Nordic conceptualisation of the NIS model, openness is considered a 
given. This prevents the model from adequately explaining the dynamics of innovation in 
repressive countries. In Iran, nationwide innovation processes are distorted by high level 
security officials' ideology-driven approach to the generation and diffusion of scientific 
knowledge and the influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) over 
Iran's national economy. Bifurcated due to significant political differences, the Iranian 
NIS has become dysfunctional in the absence of an integrated, democratic structure, 
making the country highly dependent on foreign expertise. 
 
The overreliance of Iran on cross-border technological contributions is reflected in the 
state's internet surveillance apparatus. Currently, major European information and 
communications technology (ICT) companies aid the core of the censorship infrastructure 
employed by the Iranian regime, while a great majority of the anti-filtering software used 
by the cyber-activists is developed by North American universities, research centres and 
human rights NGOs. This, in turn, highlights a limitation in the EU export policy 
regimen, which fails to promote the development of pro-democracy online innovations 
and remains relatively weak in terms of its ability to regulate the overseas trade of 
telecommunications technologies. 
 
Laying emphasis on the social responsibility of large international telecommunications 
companies based on the outcome of a combination of weblog content analysis, semi-
structured expert interviews and document reviews, the results of this project are 
expected to help improve Western policies on dual-use ICT exports to repressive 
countries. A focused attempt at the dynamisation of relevant legislation by the European 
Parliament (EP) can help more effectively foster egalitarian values in emerging 
economies through supporting legitimate, bottom-up dissent. 
 
The main body of data used by this research was collected through a longitudinal 
observation of 65 Persian activist weblogs evaluated against an inductively crafted 
checklist. The preliminary findings of the weblog content analysis were later on 
examined in relation to the scripts of direct discussions with 17 active scholars and 
practitioners sampled largely by snowballing, as well as to an extensive archive of legal 
and journalistic documents. 
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Abbreviations 
 
Cyber-activist Innovation System (CIS) is a term coined by this research, which refers to 
an interconnected network of computer-literate, pro-democracy, online activists focused 
on counter-censorship ICT innovations. 
 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) describes ICT-based attacks aimed to make an 
online network temporarily inaccessible to its potential users. 
 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) refers mainly to the integration of 
traditional communication techniques with online networks through cabled or cable-free 
connections. 
 
Innovation System (IS) refers to the systematic flow of information among actors needed 
in order to transform ideas into tangible results. 
 
Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) is an online-oriented division of the Iranian police founded 
in January 2011. 
 
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is a regime-subsidised Iranian corporation 
in control of all broadcast media. 
 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a giant, powerful organisation of nearly 
130,000 specialised personnel and parallel to Iran's military, which specifically aims to 
ensure the compliance of all the regime's general endeavours with the teachings of Islam. 
 
National Innovation System (NIS) refers to the flow of technological information among 
people, enterprises and institutions, the collaboration among which reflects a given 
country's innovation robustness and powers. 
 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a government-owned corporation run (and 
owned by) Iran's Oil & Petroleum Ministry. 
 
Science, Technology and Society (STS) is the study of the interplay between socio-
political (and sometimes cultural) values and technological innovations across one or 
more geographical regions. 
 
Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) is an STS theory arguing against 
technological determinism, introducing technology as the ultimate product of human 
choices/actions. 
 
Social Networking Services (SNSs) are online platforms aiming to enable conventional 
social relations among people favouring the same causes/interests. 
 
 viii 
Social Shaping of Technology (SST) is an STS model developed by MacKenzie and 
Wajcman in 1985 with a strong criticism of technological determinism, underlining the 
socio-political contexts influencing a nation's technological choices. 
 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) is the study of the relationship between social 
processes and scientific activity. 
 
Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution (SCCR) is a hard-line assembly based in the 
holy city of Qom, the main duty of which is ensuring full alignment of all cultural and 
educational productions and services with the core teachings of Islam and free from any 
Western influences. 
 
Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) is an assembly chaired by the Iranian president 
and responsible for regulating the online sphere. 
 
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is a security-oriented, policy-focused 
assembly as demanded by the Islamic Republic's s constitution, which aims to safeguard 
the regime in the matters of national security, defence and inland or foreign threats. 
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Is a tractor bad? Is the power that turns the long furrows wrong? If this 
tractor were ours, it would be good—not mine, but ours. We could love 
that tractor then as we have loved this land when it was ours. But this 
tractor does two things—it turns the land and turns us off the land. 
There is little difference between this tractor and a tank. The people 
were driven, intimidated, hurt by both. We must think about this. 
—John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath, 1939 
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Chapter i: Introduction 
 
Preface 
 
Digital technologies have been influencing social change in Iran since 2009. Following the 
physical oppression of the street protesters in the aftermath of the contested presidential 
elections in June 2009, there was a gradual boost in the politically motivated use of 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) within the opposition camp. This was 
immediately confronted by a drastic enhancement of online censorship by the relevant 
government agencies. Each party is driven to invest a great deal of resources in establishing a 
steady leverage in this potent online world. Every new technology implementation by the one 
is routinely met with the launch of a timely (though not necessarily indigenous) counter 
innovation by the other. This project has attempted to combine and apply the National 
Innovation System (NIS) and Social Shaping of Technology (SST) models, in a bid to 
explain the socio-technical dynamics behind online innovations in Iran. It has subsequently 
developed an analytical framework to help improve Western technology export policies 
useful for fostering democracy, as well as for the promotion of pro-democracy innovation, in 
Iran and in other repressive countries. The notions of democracy and repressiveness 
employed by this thesis have been constructed largely based on those argued by Arendt 
(1951) and Habermas (1994; 2006) respectively. 
 
Intellectual Inspirations 
 
This project has been inspired by the idea that identifying and explaining the weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities of a dysfunctional NIS, and the implications such flaws raise for Western 
policy development, can help democratically reform the political structure under which that 
NIS operates. I have chosen Iran as the main case study, due to my direct knowledge about 
the country and my ability to read Farsi.  
 
Iran is not a democracy. A religious elite governs, imposing its ideologies on the rest of the 
society. Further, a vibrant pro-democracy current, Iran's Green Movement has, according to 
the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research (BISR) (2012), played a prominent role in 
inspiring successive pro-democracy protests in the Middle East, and thus deserves an in-
depth scrutiny. 
 
The correlation between online innovations and the dynamics of democratic transition in 
repressive states is underrepresented in the mainstream Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) literature. Conversely, while an array of largely techno-utopian arguments have been 
made by 'futurist' experts such as Pesce (2010) and technical journalists in publications like 
PCWorld, CNet and Engadget, not many reliable, scholarly conclusions have been reached to 
date. There are currently significant geographically patterned differences among researchers' 
intellectual focus in relation to the public use of ICTs. In Western, developed countries, the 
scope of socio-technical research is often limited to the efficiency of e-government attempts 
that affect the capacity of online technologies to enhance the level of interaction between the 
government and the citizens in an industrialised democracy. Meanwhile, sensationalist terms 
such as 'Twitter revolution' and 'Facebook revolution' have been an integral cog in the 
construction of a sort of 'cyberbole' in media accounts on the Middle Eastern and North 
African (MENA) revolts since the late-2000s. Journalistic coverage aside, a wealth of 
academic literature has been produced surrounding the subject over the same time period by 
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social scientists worldwide. These range from the highly sceptical critiques of 'solutionism' 
by Morozov (2011) and Veksler (2007) to the far more optimistic Cognitive Surplus theory of 
Shirky (2010) and the Make and Connect Agenda of Gauntlett (2011). But whose argument is 
based more on substantial evidence and/or proven theory? Currently, most of the research 
conducted in the field do not go beyond technologically deterministic assumptions, and have 
little or no consideration of the still under-theorised interplay between ICTs and power in 
autocracies. 
 
Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the dynamics of innovation and how they influence 
the power struggle between the Iranian cyber-police and the country's online pro-democracy 
activists. 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to explain the innovation processes used by the Iranian 
regime and the country's local and expatriate cyber-activists in order to identify the 
effectiveness of forces enabling repression, as well as those facilitating democracy. The 
results of this research will be relevant to the development of democratic discourse and the 
control of ICT-mediated repression. 
 
Hypothesis and Key Research Questions 
 
My hypothesis is that there are two separate systems of innovation in place in Iran, both of 
which are heavily reliant on foreign telecommunications technologies. I identify and describe 
these two separate systems and how they interrelate yet remain distinct. This continued 
separation is primarily due to the Iranian regime's focus on militaristic and ideological 
objectives, which distorts nationwide innovation processes, preventing the two systems from 
uniting and forming an integrated system that serves the public's legitimate needs and 
interests. I also propose that it is not this bimodality, but instead the systemic lack of a 
democratic structure within either culture, which lies behind the overall dysfunctionality of 
the country's NIS. While in both 'underdeveloped' and 'repressive' contexts there are practical 
barriers to communication amongst the main pillars of innovation, there is nothing actively 
preventing national linkages from being constructed, and from mutually learning, under 
democratic rule. In Iran's case, the IRGC plugs into academia through its elite military 
universities, failing at the same time to connect with other elements that are not under its 
direct, hegemonic control. 
 
This project aims to address the following questions: 
 
1) How do actors within the Iranian regime on the one hand and cyber-activists on the other 
exploit and develop online technologies in their conflicts with one another? 
 
2) What are the capabilities and functionality of Iran's National Innovation System with 
regards to telecommunications technologies? 
 
3) To what extent and why are imported ICTs used in the power struggle between the regime 
and the cyber-activists in Iran? 
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Statement of Originality 
 
Since most of the scholarship in STS has been intellectually focused on the innovation 
processes in Western democracies, where the NIS theory best applies, not much attention has 
been paid to the socio-technical dynamics of ICT innovation in repressive countries. Using 
Iran as a case study, this research attempts to expand upon the mainstream NIS model in 
order to fill this theoretical gap. 
 
Many analysts and commentators (Searls and Sifry 2003; Shirky 2010) have taken a 
technologically deterministic standpoint to the outcomes of ICT innovation, failing to take 
into account the socio-technical factors at work in repressive states. The journalism industry 
has not hesitated to reduce complex innovation processes to a passive response to a 
'technology push,' proposing arguments not adequately justified from a scholarly perspective. 
This was all-too-familiar during Iran's post-election unrest in June 2009 as well as during the 
Arab Spring protests in 2010 and 2011, when articles and editorials with a techno-utopian 
bent dominated the news media and frequently appeared in such venues as The Economist 
and The Daily Telegraph, extolling the so-called 'liberating powers' of the internet. This study 
identifies substantial bias in most previous approaches to the issue, and develops a new 
model to more accurately explain the interplay between ICTs and democracy in autocratic 
countries. 
 
Iran's Green Movement: Political Activism and the Digitalisation of a Conflict 
 
Before we can proceed with a thorough analysis of ICT innovation processes in Iran, it is 
critical to fully understand the specific socio-political circumstances in which these processes 
are at play. What follows is a context-driven profile of Iran, with a distinct focus on the 
aftermath of the contested presidential elections in June 2009. 
 
The intolerant approach to peaceful street protests employed by the Islamic Republic's top 
security officials caused mainstream political dissent to be diverted to the online sphere, 
especially as ICTs became increasingly embedded into the Iranian urban lifestyle. Millions of 
political dissidents intolerant of the continuing physical casualties channelled their way 
across to each other through the internet—a promising medium of communication 
customarily championed by popular media as a safe haven for oppositions of all kind. The 
significance of ICTs to sustaining Iran's Green Movement has been rarely contested. Golkar 
(2011: 56) explains that the regime's legitimacy was never seriously challenged until "the 
publication of reports and videos of rape inflicted by security forces on detainees, especially 
in Kahrizak prison, as a result [of which] some religious leaders, intellectuals and reformists 
harshly criticised the government." Among these was the late Ayatollah Hussein-Ali 
Montazeri, Iran's most prominent cleric dissident, who openly denounced the results of the 
2009 presidential elections (McClatchy Newspapers 2009). Kurzman's (2012: 163) analysis 
of the leaked images of the protests suggest that "virtually every image of the Iranian Green 
Movement included, somewhere in the frame, a picture of someone taking a picture" using a 
camera phone. Assessments such as these, although useful in determining the involvement of 
digital technologies in the revolt under study, continue the discussion mostly at the techno-
utopian level and are thus in need of further conceptual dynamisation. 
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Today, the direct, unmodified application of Western scholarly frameworks to repressive 
contexts remains a common problem in Social Sciences (Fu et al. 2013; Fuller 1995; 
Pattersson 1982). A brief examination of post-2009 mainstream politics in Iran, therefore, 
seems crucial to understanding the extent to which online technologies can influence the 
chosen context.  
 
Despite the Islamic State's routine civil rights violations in the past, the crackdown on the 
2009 protests distinctively marks the beginning of a new period in the relationship between 
the citizens and the state officials, one during which even the centrist layers of the society lost 
faith in the regime. Beeman (2009: 5) scrutinises the issue from a Social Contract Theory 
perspective, asserting that "by allowing—or even by some accounts ordering—the beating of 
women and young people, effecting house arrests and crackdowns, the authorities in Iran 
essentially broke their contract with the people. In both cases, social order began to fray." 
Ahmadi (2009: 7) considers the heavy-handed attacks on the pro-democracy opposition as 
"declaring a war on Iran's civil society forces . . . [alienating to the] majority of population, 
and significantly [radicalising to] the nonviolent movement." Kojoori-Saatchi's (2010: 105) 
study concluded with the view that the government's response to the demonstrations was 
surprisingly violent behaviour, which "took the absolutist nature of the regime too far." 
Alimardani's (2011: 7) investigation held the top Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC) generals directly responsible for putting the "clerical elite . . . at odds with the 
public's democratic aspirations." Finally, Paris (2011: 7) portrays Iran's 2009 presidential 
election as a turning point in the history of the Islamic revolution, during which the regime 
completely lost the only two sources of legitimacy it had always claimed to have: "The 
Iranian people, who saw their votes dismissed, and the religious establishment, many of 
whom lost confidence in the supreme leader after he lent his partisan support for President 
Ahmadinejad in the dispute over the election." 
 
The disintegration of trust between the citizens and the regime in the face of the street 
crackdowns has transformed the nature of the relationship between political dissidents and 
the ruling elite from co-existence into a complete ideological collision. This is precisely the 
reason why the hard-line core of the regime reacted so impulsively to what was arguably just 
an electoral dispute. Zehforoush (2012: 1) notes a tendency within the neo-conservative strata 
to thoroughly cleanse the socio-political scene in Iran in its favour, explaining that "the 
concepts of revolution and revolutionism in general, and the 1979 Iranian revolution in 
particular, have been the first victims of this new thinking." This has been systematically 
countered by what Hakakian (2012) alleges to be the Iranian citizens' priority to escort the 
"clergy back to the mosque . . . [and] to stand on secular legs." Heideman (2009: 5), likewise, 
views the post-2009 oppositional current as a "non-violent and non-ideological pro-
democracy movement which demands individual freedom and civil rights." 
 
Non-violent movements do not often translate into a peaceful transition of power in 
repressive states. In the event of a political turmoil, telecommunications technologies do not 
function just as a reflection of democracy, but equally as a weapon helping the dominant 
force to avoid it. As the internet turns increasingly into a user-oriented technological tool that 
proportionally rewards innovativeness, autocratic regimes will continue to burst the techno-
utopian bubble, utilising the medium to defy what was once perceived by most to be its 
'ultimate' purpose. 
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Revolutionary Guards Go Digital: Exploiting ICTs to Confront Popular 
Resistance 
 
IRGC, the security arm of the Islamic Republic, has had a tangible online presence since the 
outbreak of the street protests in June 2009. Once considered to be a leisure time activity for 
the 'upper-class,' blogging and social networking have been transformed by political 
dissidents into an influential means of protest. Millions of Iranian citizens can be considered 
pro-democracy cyber-activists (Daily Aztec 2011). The Islamic regime is now ranked as the 
world's worst internet oppressor (OpenNet Initiative 2011a), while also boasting a potent, 
rapidly expanding cyber army (United States Institute of Peace 2013), making the country 
one of only five states with cyber warfare capabilities (Military Advantage 2008). 
 
A major inadequacy in the scholarly community's response to the post-2009 political 
developments in Iran was its inability to avoid the temptation to hypothesise purely based on 
journalistic accounts by enthusiastic observers who gave precedence to recency over depth, 
evidentiary accuracy and clarity of analysis. This has led to a somewhat exaggerated 
description of the relation of internet and Web 2.0 applications with modern social 
movements in repressive countries, portraying telecommunications technologies as 
democratic in nature. Burns and Eltham (2009: 304) disapprove of this techno-utopian 
approach, calling for attention to the fate of the pro-democracy cyber-activists in Iran, many 
of whom received long prison sentences (CBS Interactive 2012) after the launch of Iran's 
cyber police in January 2011. They observed a commonly overlooked notion: the threats 
ICTs present for political activists. In their view, "social media became a vector for state 
repression . . . —a pattern in earlier unsuccessful revolutions." This is not to deny the 
mobilising capacities of the internet, but to suggest that ICTs are mostly non-partisan in 
nature, and that there are valuable technical lessons for any stakeholders involved in a 
modern power conflict, regardless of location or intent. According to Burns and Eltham 
(2009: 303), the Iranian protesters' use of social media platforms to challenge the regime 
validated "one of the theses of the revolution in military affairs: that activist movements 
would tap the internet for global reach." This, in turn, is precisely why repressive regimes 
almost always resort to 'pulling the plug' of the internet as an immediate sign of panic in the 
face of popular revolt (Aking et al. 2012; Arnaudo et al. 2013; Bowman and Camp 2013; 
Howard et al. 2011; Papic and Noonan 2011; Scott 2012; Yang 2013). 
 
The IRGC's timely, scalable tap into the internet could indeed be considered to be the Islamic 
Republic's key to surviving the most challenging act of opposition in its history of existence 
(Moore and Selchow 2012; Mueller and Van Huellen 2012; Washington Times 2009a). 
Metghalchi (2011: 58) views IRGC's armed support as economically-driven and a major 
contributor to the endurance of the Islamic Republic despite the continued opposition, 
gradually transforming a semi-autocracy to an absolute military dictatorship. The IRGC 
"stood firmly behind Supreme Leader Khamenei . . . [who later that year awarded them] a 
majority stake in the state telecommunications company." The relationship between the neo-
conservative core of the regime and IRGC's top generals is a mutually convenient one, 
whereupon they grant one another the much important support each requires, through a 
blatant exchange of money and power. Ahmadi (2009: 6) detects a rapidly growing military-
intelligence coalition taking over key profitable businesses ranging from construction and 
automobile manufacturing to laser eye surgery and real estate. This arrangement has 
subsequently prepared the ground for the Ayatollahs to, as Clark (2011: 23) explains, "use 
state apparatuses against protesting citizens and political dissidents" during and after the 2009 
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street protests—simply investing communal resources (e.g. oil and gas revenues) into 
suppressing popular dissent. 
 
The 'cat and mouse' nature of the online power struggle in Iran means that the mere existence 
of a computer-literate opposition can keep the oppressive force on guard and in need of 
frequent ICT developments, as any victory in such competitive settings is necessarily 
temporary and subject to successful challenge by the 'counter-innovators.' Posch (2010: 46) 
argues that dissent, no matter how weak or disorganised, effectively prevents the one process 
truly necessary for the Islamic regime in its pursuit of ideological Utopia—"the creation of a 
new fixed narrative and reading of the events that took place in 2009 in the Islamic 
Republic." Thus, the Iranian cyber-activists' contributions to Iran's political discourse is 
essential to the enhancement of democratic developments in the country, and one which can 
be equally strengthened or weakened via relevant Western policies to which it happens to be 
exposed. 
 
Technological Diplomacy: Western Policies, the Iranian Diaspora and the 
Innovation Cycle in Repressive Countries 
 
The influence of Western policy on the socio-technical developments in repressive countries 
is a largely underexplored subject. This theoretical gap not only persists in the literature but 
also directly contributes to the distortion of political developments in such states by: a) 
allowing dual-purpose Western ICTs to quietly find their way to security officials in 
repressive regimes, and b) depriving pro-democracy dissidents residing in emerging 
economies of effective access to their basic technological needs to battle online censorship. 
 
While US politicians have been reasonably active in supervising dual-use ICT export to 
repressive countries like Iran, the EU seems to have viewed the legislative approach a little 
more sceptically, enabling the exposure of the world's largest trading block (Belward 2013; 
De Ville and Orbie 2013; Jørgensen 2013) to illegitimate end users. Ahmadi (2009: 7) sees a 
big role for the use of economic powers in the global promotion of democracy, suggesting 
that "unless the international community rejects the IRGC coup's legitimacy and puts 
significant pressure on the Iranian government to respect the rights of their citizens, the 
situation will further deteriorate." Also, Dale (2010: 1) believes that the Green Movement's 
chances of overcoming the state repression strongly "depend on [if] the fledgling movement 
receives support from abroad . . . In the case of other recent 'colour' (aka 'velvet' or 'soft') 
revolutions such as Ukraine's Orange Revolution and Lebanon's Cedar Revolution, action by 
the United States and its allies was critical in ensuring open elections." But despite this 
relatively common confidence in policy solutions within academia, a well-informed tailored 
response is yet to be implemented, and many European governments remain unable to 
consistently and harmoniously regulate the cross-border trade of dual-purpose ICTs inside 
their borders. This creates, as Tucker (2012: 333) argues, "safe havens where [technologies] 
might be used for harmful purposes." 
 
What is unique about the Green Movement is its capability to mobilise en masse and unite 
not only the local dissidents, but also the Iranian diaspora worldwide, whose contributions to 
the reformist camp had previously remained minimal due to physical isolation. Mostly 
limited to an undersized elite including veterans of the previous regime (Seattle Times 2009), 
political activism was far from a common notion among expatriate Iranians until the 
aftermath of the 2009 presidential election. Posch (2010: 46) assesses that "the [2009] 
elections politicised apolitical layers of Iran's society in and outside Iran." Pointing at a series 
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of street protests held by Iranian New Yorkers in support of the Green Movement, Golkar 
(2011: 56) considers the widespread use of ICTs as the main reason for the successful 
establishment of a historically absent bridge between local and expatriate dissidents, 
explaining that "many [local web] users have been able to mobilise Iranians living abroad and 
bring them to the streets using organisational methods via the Internet." Burns and Eltham 
(2009: 302) also acknowledge expatriate Iranian communities as an integral cog in the 
development of the events succeeding the contested elections, highlighting the expatriates' 
keen utilisation of digital technologies in their protest activities. In their view, the viral 
dissemination of the audio-visual evidence of the regime's deployment of disproportionately 
aggressive methods to defuse an essentially peaceful civil rights movement best reflects the 
role of the Iranian diaspora in framing the "Revolutionary Guard and Basij violence against 
the street protestors as coordinated destruction—concerted repressive political violence." 
 
Expatriate Iranian cyber-activists and their allies worldwide have been instrumental in the 
development of various anti-filtering technologies since 2009 (Global Mail 2012). Having 
observed increasingly successful utilisation of foreign ICTs by cyber-activists in defiance of 
its sophisticated online censorship system, the regime has routinely charged dozens of local 
netizens with maintaining 'illegitimate foreign contacts' (BBC 2013). Clark (2011: 32) argues 
that the only way the regime could have justified its efforts to destroy the Green Movement 
inside the country would have been to somehow establish its "association with Iranian 
diaspora around the world," a relatively large number of whom are forced into exile to avoid 
prosecution, and thus known to be in favour of a fundamental regime change. 
 
The evident reliance of the ruling elite and cyber-activists in Iran on foreign-sourced ICTs 
raises several questions with regards to the functionality and capability of Iran's National 
Innovation System, a thorough analysis of which follows in the next chapter. 
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Chapter ii: Online Technologies, Human Choices and the On-
going E-struggle in Iran: Social Shaping of Technology Meets 
National Innovation System 
 
The interplay between innovation and social change in repressive states remains a largely 
underexplored area of STS. The second chapter will explain the theoretical undercurrents of 
this research, by attempting an analysis of the dynamics and patterns of innovation within 
post-2009 Iran's online political realm. 
 
About a decade after the Iranian regime's first official implementation of online censorship 
technologies, over ten million websites (Deibert 2008) remain unreachable from inside the 
country today. Iran has turned into the biggest prison (Luehrmann 2007) for bloggers and 
journalists in the world. The first question which arises here is how exactly the Islamic 
Republic has developed one of the most sophisticated internet censorship systems in the 
world. 
 
STS as a New Mainstream Paradigm: Human Agency, Artefact Trajectory and 
the Complex Nature of Innovation 
 
Given the reciprocal nature of innovations (Valovirta 2012), socio-technical systems are the 
conceptual cornerstone of the STS school of thought (Ellinas et al. 2014). Amongst the many 
theories proposed since the early days of STS, SST is a highly prominent one which gives 
compelling weight to sociological variables, at the same time as recognising the certain 
characteristics  with which individual technologies may be associated (Basden et al. 2011; 
Magaudda 2014). If a functional NIS requires that the three essential spheres of authority, 
business and academia, then innovation processes can best be explained through an inter-
disciplinary approach. Therefore, as with any other form of serious inductive research, it is a 
balanced focus on the interaction of the social and the technical that can promise to decode 
innovation processes and their surrounding patterns – a conveniently overlooked notion by 
the determinism advocates, which largely consist of business entrepreneurs, online security 
experts and computing engineers (e.g. Gratton 2010). 
 
What gives mainstream STS its current authority (Jasanoff 2003) is its fundamental focus on 
the principle of mutual shaping. Historically, techno-society researchers (e.g. Negroponte et 
al. 1997) have emerged from a deterministic background regardless of their respective 
discipline. When it comes to new innovations, the end user has often surprised design 
engineers in terms of 'legitimate' use. Therefore, "social learning [is] crucial to how generic 
ICT capabilities are applied and used in particular settings" (Williams et al. 2000: ii). STS, on 
the other hand, draws the attention to the sociological significance of taking into account 
constructivist notions such as "uncertainty, peer reviewing and the settling of scientific 
controversies" (Bauer 2009: 5) – although it must be acknowledged (Wesselink and Hoppe 
2010) that the peer reviewing practice alone cannot always be a convincing determinant of 
academic validity. 
 
The sociotechnical environment in its current form is stranded in a contradictory state 
whereby both business enterprises and governmental institutions are often discouraged or 
even unable to interact efficiently due to profound ideological differences. Both these 
economic forces are just as often left with no choice but to adapt themselves to the risks of a 
highly politically charged climate. This paradox calls for the introduction of a new, future-
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oriented analytical framework within emerging economies in order to help revive what Borup 
et al. (2006: 287) refer to as the "promissory properties of innovation networks." 
 
This interpretation of STS does not build merely on the technical capacities of ICTs, but 
instead on the social and cultural factors and values under which individual technologies have 
been innovated. Sociologically, it translates into putting a firm emphasis on the case-by-case, 
content-based observation of relevant new media accounts, asking "whether there is evidence 
that people are collectively finding ways to appropriate, adapt and actively shape the use of 
digital technologies to take [a more purposeful] control of time" (Wajcman 2008: 67). 
 
Despite what it might seem, not only this approach to STS is not disruptive to constructivism, 
but it can be highly beneficial to finding new links between various seemingly disconnected 
studies across disciplines. In search of a definitive solution, Kelly-Garrett (2006: 203) finds a 
need for the development of an innovative system which can help locate all "existing and new 
work" within a comprehensive framework. This research builds on Lynch and Cole's (2005: 
272) conception of "accountable science and technology" to further examine this relatively 
young strand of STS. 
 
Technological Determinism, Social Bias and the Humanitarian Significance of 
the Constructivist Response: An IS Perspective 
 
Innovation processes are occasionally viewed by some (e.g. Barney 1991; Shapiro 2010) as 
technology-driven – a theoretical angle rejected by most IS analysts (Fritsch 2011; Niklasson 
2013). The constructivist school of thought promotes a dynamic approach to innovation. 
From an SST perspective, new technological artefacts are all but fortuitous (Nambiar and 
Kennedy 2012; Teixeira and Werther 2013). This analysis method not only prevents biased or 
opportunist commentators from taking undeserved credit for functional, people-driven 
advancements, but also helps reinforce any future promises which those advancements may 
possibly hold. 
 
The global STS debate is currently polarised between two mainstream and equally forceful 
models: the one that suggests innovation systems can perfectly function under an 
economically sound, but not necessarily a democratically inspired, regime dismissing the 
significance of the co-evolutionary dynamics between society and technology, and the one 
calling for an outright dismantlement and restructuration of the undemocratic systems, 
striving to shift the general focus of the scholarly research towards the historically less 
promising (Franzese 2014; Smith and Lee 2015) theories of political science. There is, 
however, a conveniently overlooked alternative, which seeks to put forward policy-making as 
an alleviator of the social concerns and values as defined by most constructivism scholars – a 
finely conceptualised proposal argued by Woodhouse et al. (2002: 298), who view the main 
role of regulatory practices to be the global promotion of "a more democratic, 
environmentally sustainable, socially just, or otherwise preferable civilisation." From the 
perspective of the EU, the politically most powerful (Jørgensen 2006) decision-making 
institution in terms of foreign policy, bringing closer the diplomatic efforts and hi-tech 
innovations is vitally important to the worldwide promotion of democracy in the 21
st
 century. 
On that note, S&T and foreign policies, as Stein (2002: 463) asserts, "can be mutually 
reinforcing in the quest for a better global future," helping transform the dynamics of power 
in repressive countries like Iran. 
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Based on this outlook, the main focus of the international control systems should not be on 
the technical artefacts or the 'legal' bindings associated with them in certain repressive states, 
but instead on independent assessments of the possible modes in which those technologies 
can be adapted and used by the potential end-users worldwide. Any approach other than the 
above, as Woodhouse and Patton (2004: 4) argue, will inevitably lead to the dead-end that is 
either technological neutrality or determinism, which they describe as "folk theories that 
attempt to…explain [the human-technology] interaction in black-and-white terms, attributing 
agency either entirely to people or entirely to technology." 
 
The validity of this view has been recognised by the even less constructivist STS researchers 
such as Lynch and Cole (2005), who propose a hybrid of social and technical as an ideal 
theoretical framework for scrutinising the sophisticated nature of human-technology 
interactions. 
 
The very foundation of this branch of constructivism was laid over two decades ago by 
Haraway (1994: 59), who pioneered a thought school which fundamentally ruled out the 
neutral and deterministic doctrines, setting the main emphasis on the highly dynamic ideas of 
reconfiguring "what counts as knowledge" and reconstructing "the generative forces of 
embodiment." 
 
Rooted theoretically in techno-feminism, Haraway's "Cyborg Manifesto" seems to have 
formed the basis of a reformist movement which over a decade later put the concept of 
participatory technology on the map together with the other mainstream theories of social 
innovation. Among the most progressive of these theories developed to date is SST in which, 
according to Tedre et al. (2006: 128), "the abstract and the concrete interweave", and cliché 
terms such as performativity, "efficiency and predictability" are positively eliminated from 
STS. 
 
Cyber-Activism, Modern Social Movements and Advanced ICTs' Patterns of 
Creation and Use in Repressive Contexts 
 
If we consider the technical innovations to be a reciprocal process of socio-technical 
dynamics, then a functional NIS simply cannot be planned or designed on a top-down basis. 
Otherwise, any progress resulting from the system will only stand to serve the politically 
powerful strata of the society. But a temporary shortfall may not necessarily mean a 
permanent failure, as ICT innovations can at any stage be highly responsive to creative user 
inputs regardless of the scope of their intended or perceived functions (Gounari and Grollios 
2010; Valkenburg 2012). 
 
In repressive states, the industries have no choice but to become a subordinate to the desires 
of the dominant political elites. While it might seem pragmatic to assume that all the social 
researchers are by default empathetic toward philanthropic ends, their work is in reality 
sometimes influenced by economic agendas, including those dictated by the government. 
This idea points out (Frickel et al. 2009: 446) to an increasing need for pioneering, agenda-
setting academic studies, even if they may suggest outright "conflicts with the interests of 
elites." 
 
The typical users of activism-oriented ICTs across geopolitical borders have repeatedly 
shown a keen tendency to favour social, cultural and environmental justice over technocratic 
and economic gains, or as Smith (2005: 109) views it, to support an alternative which aims to 
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"identify scope for further improvements, or even adapt the technology to uses unanticipated 
by the original designers" – a phenomenon markedly demonstrated by the Iranian cyber-
activists after the June 2009 turmoil. This points to an emergent cyber-activist system of 
innovation comprising a network of local and expatriate political dissidents, which as 
evidence shows is considerably less concentrated and resourceful yet equally knowledge-
oriented, as compared to the regime's online censorship apparatus. For the purpose of 
conceptual clarity, this thesis defines a system as a "group or combination of interrelated, 
interdependent or interacting elements that form a collective entity" (Rouse 2003: 33) often 
characterised by change (Padoch and Sunderland 2014), which follows a set of rules and 
values in its persistent pursuit of an ultimate cause. 
 
One of the main reasons behind the scholarly community's relative inability to explain the 
sociological roots of cyber-activism is the common yet overly simplistic analysis (Qiu et al. 
2009) of the information divide phenomenon based on the user's economic background. That 
is why there is a crucial requirement (Selwyn 2003: 101) for a "systematic and objective 
understanding of individuals' non-use of information technology", particularly within 
undemocratic environments. Some prominent feminist scholars (e.g. Wajcman 2007; 2008; 
2009; 2013) have laid the foundation for this through their fruitful attempts to theorise the 
human-technology relationship with regards to socially vulnerable user groups. 
 
This casual reduction of compound concepts such as computer and network literacy to static 
concepts such as user skills merely infecting (Gunduz 2010: 45) "elderly people, some 
categories of housewives, illiterates and the unemployed," stems typically from a 
deterministic school of thought which subconsciously undermines the all-important 
sociological undercurrents behind the issue under scrutiny. 
 
The utopian view on rapid, scalable technological advancements as typically championed by 
repressive governments, which essentially forms the above rhetoric behind the digital divide 
phenomenon, tend to build chiefly on Habermas's notion of scientisation of politics 
(Wajcman 2013: 349), according to which "political problems are seen as technical ones 
[…whereby] the expert directs the politician." But contrary to this narrative, not only the 
consumers of a given ICT do not passively receive it as an inflexible, static tool, but instead 
they actively seek to "alter the meanings and deployment of technologies" in direct 
accordance to their very social aspirations and needs. Further contributing the argument at 
hand is the work of Huyer and Mitter (2003: 7), who deem the "communication, critical 
thinking and problem solving skills" to be far superior to the industrial output volumes and 
sheer technocratic ambitions in terms of the national economy. 
 
The key to decoding this puzzle is to approach the matter from a carefully examined 
perspective, and one that has the capacity as well as the aim to explain the nature and 
mechanisms of the interplay between structure and agency in the field of STS beyond 
technocracy and in a more contextual sense than is conventionally pursued – a fact 
thoroughly reflected in the evidence extracted from the study of NIS structure and 
functionality in individual countries. If else, many future research opportunities could be 
wasted on methodologies which fail to acknowledge the basic fact that even the most ancient 
fabrics of literacy (i.e. reading and writing) are influenced (Livingstone 2003: 4) broadly by 
"power and authority to access, interpret and produce printed texts." Such a delicate goal will 
need inevitably to acknowledge that the internet, despite some media propaganda, has not 
fundamentally transformed the trajectory of social activism, but instead has developed it into 
an "available toolkit of action forms" (Van Laer and Van Aelst 2009: 234). Given this, ICTs 
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ought to be viewed as an influential factor, but not a revolutionary force, when it comes to 
social protest. The electronically mediated means of communication do not by default enable 
mass protestors to succeed, or as Yzer and Southwell (2008: 11) put it, "radically break social 
barriers to have…previously unimaginable conversations." Instead, they remain to be a 
mutual, renegotiated (Flanagin et al. 2010) product of the interaction between the social and 
the technical which tend, in nearly all repressive contexts, to be solely shaped by the ruling 
political elite. 
 
National Innovation System: Theory and Practice 
 
Many Innovation System (IS) theories and theorists—such as Social Systems of Innovation 
(Amable et al. 1997), National Business Systems (Whitley 1993), Technological Systems 
(Carlsson and Stankiewitz 1991), Regional Systems of Innovation (Cooke 1992; Maskell and 
Malmberg 1997), Sectoral Systems of Innovation (Malerba and Breschi 1997)—have tried to 
explain the structure and functionality of a country's knowledge production system at various 
points in history, often with the aim of improving their homeland's economic status through 
identifying and addressing the barriers against growth. Among these models, NIS is perhaps 
the most wholesome and comprehensive concept developed to date. The origins of the NIS 
theory seem to go back to the late 19
th
 century, when List (1841) first introduced a theoretical 
framework he referred to as the National System of Political Economy (NSPE) to help 
Germany catch up with the then much more industrial England. Preparing the ground for a 
range of policies focused on the production and application of new technologies, his 
advocacy was "one of the main factors in Germany overtaking Britain in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century . . . [and] the foundation for the superior skills and higher productivity of 
the German labour force in many industries" (Freeman 1995: 6). List was the first scholar to 
recognise the "interdependence of the import of foreign technology and domestic technical 
development . . . [and the idea that] nations should not only acquire the achievements of other 
more advanced nations, they should increase them by their own efforts." He was the first 
scholar in the history of the discipline to bring together the two notions of education and 
infrastructure building together in a bid to create a robust domestic production system, and to 
rule out Smith's (1776) cosmopolitan approach which considered cross-border knowledge 
trade as a consistently beneficial procedure for all the parties involved. 
 
The first scholar to speak distinctively of NIS was Freeman (1982), whose work built directly 
on List's National System of Production (NIP). Originated at Sussex University's Science and 
Technology Policy Research Unit (SPRU), Freeman's theory was different from that of List 
in the sense that it focused on the "importance of an active role for government in promoting 
technological infrastructure . . . [and the circumstances under which] free trade will promote 
economic development" (Johnson et al. 2004: 2). This was closely followed by Lundvall's 
(1985) introduction of Innovation Systems (IS) at Aalborg University's Innovation, 
Knowledge and Economic Dynamics Research Group (IKE), which built largely on the same 
concepts and literature. Since the mid-1980's, Freeman and Lundvall worked separately and 
together to improve the concept and turn it into a coherent model. While the NIS model is 
deeply rooted in Western culture and is specifically developed to address the innovation 
issues in open political systems, Johnson et al. (2004: 2) note that "some of the most 
important elements going into the combined concept actually came from the literature on 
development issues in the third world," where lack of economic development remains a top 
concern for local Innovation Studies scholars. But NIS is simply not designed to be applied to 
semi- or un-democratic states, which calls for a set of alterations to help tailor the theory for 
such case studies. 
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Unlike Freeman, Lundvall et al. (2002: 215) suggest that the IS theory as we know it today 
"was not based upon any direct inspiration from List [and that it] was only after the concept 
had become generally accepted that Christopher Freeman . . . went back and brought forward 
List as the intellectual ancestor." Instead, they identify the concept with Linder (1961). 
Conversely, Lundvall's work is thought to have been greatly inspired by that of the MIT-
based Von Hippel (1976). But apart from minor disagreements on the origination the NIS 
model, scholars remain largely in agreement about its core, which has been unfairly criticised 
on a few occasions as well. Patel and Pavitt (1998: 3) define NIS as the study of the 
"institutions involved in the generation, commercialisation and diffusion of new and better 
products, processes and services (i.e. technical change), and of the incentive structures and 
competencies in these institutions that influence the rate and direction of such change." 
Putting a techno-political spin on the model in question, Carlsson (2006: 58) describes it as "a 
set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to the development and 
diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework within which governments 
form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. As such it is a system of 
interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and artifacts, 
which define new technologies." With regards to the founding fathers of the theory, however, 
one cannot ignore a difference in the core focus of their work. As Niosi et al. (1993: 208) 
observe, "technological flows and technology development interaction among firms appeared 
to [Lundvall] much more frequent within national boundaries than across borders [while] 
Christopher Freeman put the accent on social and political institutions that accompany 
technical innovations  . . .  not simply those in direct charge of R&D activities." 
 
A turning point in the development of the NIS theory into more of a flexible, internationally 
usable concept was perhaps the work of Carlsson (2006: 58), who argued that "depending on 
the purpose of the inquiry, the most useful definition of innovation systems might not 
coincide with national borders." This was particularly salient for developing, undemocratic 
countries, where dependency on foreign sources of technological innovations remained a 
serious issue. Previously, Fagerberg (1994, cited by Patel and Pavitt 1998: 3) had identified 
"two essential components of . . . knowledge generating activities: education and training in 
all countries, and R&D in the industrially advanced countries," which not only shows he 
believed in the flexibility of the NIS model, but also underlines the extent to which he 
appreciated education as an influential factor in developing a nation's innovation possibilities. 
An inter-disciplinary approach supported later on by many other innovation scholars 
(Doloreux 2002; Dutton 1996; Ruttan 1997) puts the emphasis on educational, social and 
political processes and their control over the trajectory of technological artifacts, as opposed 
to leaning towards the economic factors and how the research and development budget is 
managed. This breakthrough in the history of the study of innovation systems helped open the 
way for future extension of the theory to undemocratic states. This brings us right back to 
Freeman's (2002: 193) emphasis that NIS can be traced back to List, who too saw "that 
industry should be linked to the formal institutions of science and of education . . . [adding 
that] List's book on The National System of Political Economy might just as well have been 
entitled The National System of Innovation, since he anticipated many of the concerns of this 
contemporary literature." 
 
The main argument often put forward by the critics of the NIS model, as Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff (2000: 110) report, is that "academic technology transfer mechanisms may 
create unnecessary transaction costs by encapsulating knowledge in patents that might 
otherwise flow freely to industry." But the above scholars rule out this criticism by 
emphasising that knowledge would not be "efficiently transferred to the industry without a 
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series of mechanisms for identifying and enhancing the applicability of research findings"—a 
concise argument that truly captures the core essence of what the theory represents. But what 
even the most devoted adherents of Freeman and Lundvall seem to overlook is that openness 
is prerequisite to a functional NIS. Freeman and Lundvall's original model is best applied to 
North-Western European countries, where lack of democracy is hardly a tangible issue. 
Features of a democratic system, therefore, have been considered as given in the formulation 
of the concept. The identified gap in this otherwise robust theory prevents it from being 
directly applicable to repressive countries, where the nationwide innovation processes are 
often distorted by ruling elites' ideological or militaristic approach to the generation and 
diffusion of scientific knowledge—in this case, IRGC's clout over the Iranian mass economy. 
While the dysfunctions of an undemocratic state's NIS may seem to be a positive incident to 
some radical activists in the West, I argue otherwise. A repressive regime's monopolistic 
approach to technological innovations creates division within a country's NIS, which will in 
return weaken the domestic pro-democracy forces, who are denied their fair share of research 
and development budget. Under the circumstances, the problem will not merely be a lack of 
financial resources, but rather a pattern of allocation dictated by senior IRGC security 
officials, who are increasingly resorting to ICTs in their bid to defuse opposition. This 
secretive approach also restricts the regime's chances of recruiting appropriately-skilled 
candidates, which it has traditionally addressed through resorting to European innovations. 
This, in turn, points to a weakness in Western policy, which currently remains imperfect in 
terms of regulating intercontinental technology trade ethics. Deprived from accessing or 
contributing to any scalable in-house stream of technological contributions, the cyber-
activists are meanwhile forced to rely solely on the limited attention they occasionally receive 
from Western democracies. This division, along with the religiously-motivated gender 
inequality that exists in most repressive countries (Kanwar 2009), has made Iran's NIS a 
dysfunctional one. 
 
Another noteworthy limitation of the NIS theory, in its traditional form, is its lack of 
elaboration on cross-border influences on the innovation processes in a given country. NIS 
was originally designed with the relatively small, stable and secular Northern European (e.g. 
Nordic) states in mind: countries where the government officials are democratically elected 
and religious or militaristic goals do not determine the trajectory of technological artifacts 
(Christoffersen et al. 2010). In such circumstances, the expatriate factors become much less 
relevant, for several combined reasons. For one, these countries remain largely independent 
and at the forefront of exporting hi-tech, telecommunications innovations (World Economic 
Forum 2012). Further the rate of emigration of highly-skilled forces from these countries 
remains extremely low due to the high quality of life, with Northern European citizens' 
occasional choice to live outside their country rarely being politically-motivated or 
permanent (Huffington Post 2012). It is yet rarer that people from these nations dedicate their 
lives to careers of radical political activism (Ervasti et al. 2008). This is simply due to the 
already high rates of social tolerance and inclusiveness along with the highly democratic 
nature of the Northern European political regimes—eliminating the need for organised 
resistance. The above factors result in a classic, functional NIS maintained by all members of 
the society regardless of their political tendency, location or gender. 
 
This research was first inspired by Mackenzie and Wajcman's (1985) Social Shaping of 
Technology. SST argues that technological changes are not the result of an inner technical 
logic and that human choices, whether made consciously or unconsciously, can actively 
influence the direction of innovation trajectories. In their thorough analysis of the socio-
economic processes influencing technological innovations, Williams and Edge (1996: 866) 
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suggest that SST "has been forced to go beyond simplistic forms of social determinism 
which, like technological determinism, see technology as reflecting a single rationality—for 
example an economic imperative, or the political imperative of a ruling elite." The theory 
stands distinctly apart from Social Construction of Technology (Bijker et al. 1987; Pinch 
2008; Pinch and Bijker 1986), also known as SCOT, which represents a more socially 
deterministic approach in comparison. Based on SST, it is reasonable to argue that the 
trajectory of online innovations in Iran is neither arbitrary nor accidental, but rather largely 
shaped by the long-term objectives and strategies of the Islamic Republic, which controls the 
key means of Research and Development (R&D). 
 
The main hypothesis of this dissertation has been founded on a number of IS theories and 
concepts such as the National System of Political Economy (List 1841), NIS (Freeman 1987), 
the Learning Economy (Lundvall 1995) and Diffusion of Innovation (Rogers 1983), and on 
the research of scholars such as Nelson, Edquist and Sclove among others. While the NIS 
theory originally refers to the flow of information among people, enterprises and institutions 
and how they interact, there is no generally accepted view as to what the structure and 
functionality of a country's IS should be like. Iran's NIS is unique, and this thesis has 
employed Freeman's conception of NIS only as a baseline to develop a specific model for 
Iran. 
 
NIS Functionality: From Nordica's Ordinary Choice to the Developing World's 
Ultimate Dream 
 
Despite various conceptual shortcomings (Bugliarello 2011; Cimoli and Porcile 2010), the 
NIS theory remains to be the social constructivists', as well as many other STS scholars' (e.g. 
Pinto and Santos-Pereira 2013; Qi 2011), preferable choice of theory for studying the 
emerging economies. 
 
The NIS theory has not been sufficiently critiqued by STS scholars researching the developed 
economies (Kwon 2010). The main body of the critical NIS literature produced by non-
Western academics tends to stem from isolated, crisis-driven studies of political flashpoints 
rather than from concrete, original social research based on inductive methods. A great 
example of this is Ikejiaku's (2014) publication on the international laws of commerce, in 
which he accuses unfoundedly the entire industrialised world of conspiracy to "legitimise 
colonialism, acts of exploitation . . . [and striving merely] to protect, project and promote the 
interest of the [West]." 
 
The geographical divide between Eastern and Western oriented STS literatures raises the 
paradigm-altering question of whether the IS approach to techno-activist research is a 
conductive or an inductive one in nature. While many experts (e.g. Asheim and Gertler 2005; 
Fagerberg et al. 2009) in the highly industrialised democracies of Northern Europe 
traditionally have found NIS to be a socio-technical fit for their respective nations, various 
attempts to apply the concept to non-Western countries have failed to prove fruitful due to 
intricate contextual clashes and incompatibilities across national borders. 
 
Today, local and regional circumstances have been largely respected by most EU regulations, 
where "strongest linkages are to Nordic countries, especially to Finland and Sweden" 
(Danielyan and Wittbom 2009: 30) – homes to some of the largest ICT innovators in the 
world. If we recognise the true organisational complexity in being "a free market economy 
and at the same time a Nordic welfare state" (ibid: 30), then no emerging economy can 
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remotely compete with its top European (i.e. Finnish or Swedish) counterparts in terms of 
NIS capability and functionality. 
 
Based on the above, the practical applicability of the NIS theory as an economic driving force 
stands profoundly different in the West from that in a developing country like Iran, where all 
major R&D decisions and plans are made as part of an ideological system with economically 
unjustified development priorities. This calls for a critical cross-examination of major 
previous scholarly attempts at the universalisation of NIS. 
 
NIS in Emerging Economies: Theoretical Gaps in the Literature 
 
As the main body of NIS became more focused on already highly industrialised European 
countries immediately after its instigation, the concept has become less relevant to the 
underdeveloped economies of the third world. Although relatively limited, part of the Eastern 
literature (e.g. Arocena et al. 2014) attempting at the development of the NIS theory steps 
indeed in the right direction. 
 
NIS has evolved and expanded considerably over the recent decades. If there is one key 
element that makes the theory conceptually superior to its counterparts with regards to social 
research, it will have to be its cohesive ability to locate nationwide innovation practices at the 
"heart of discussion on upgrading and growth" (Chaminade and Vang 2008: 2). 
 
The rapidly changing chain of events in the emerging economies has somehow left the NIS 
theory inefficient in terms of universal application. A prime instance of this theoretical 
shortfall is the emergence of affluent, yet technologically underdeveloped firms in the South-
East of Asia, whose relatively extended global presence is rooted predominantly in what S.H. 
Chen (2004: 341) calls the rise of "leapfrogging competition", where the institutionally 
favoured companies in the developing countries form a habit to invest generously in latest 
successful Western innovations, without having fully decoded the previous generation(s) of 
the technology involved. Although often highly rich in terms of physical assets, these firms 
are almost consistently behind their Western counterparts with regards to the prolific 
production of internationally transferrable scientific knowledge. 
 
In STS, indigenousness encompasses "coherent systems of . . . explanation that . . . can often 
offer better accounts of local phenomena than those theorised by Universalist science" 
(Bebbington 2001: 7293). This stands distinctly apart from endogeneity, which refers 
(Jackson 2012) to that "which comes from within a given society, and to the specific 
characteristics, values, ideas, knowledge, institutions and practices that pertain within a 
society." Thus, while many NISs in the emerging economies can be considered somehow 
indigenous due to their instinctive adaptation of the 'natural' scientific knowledge, seldom any 
of them are truly endogenous in sociotechnical terms. 
 
Indigenous technology might be simply an outcome of various 'catch-up' techniques and 
practices such as reverse engineering, social appropriating or even outright off-setting. In the 
case of either modes of Iran's NIS, foreign purchases almost consistently take precedence to 
innovation, especially when it comes to ICT advancements. Largely due to structural issues 
caused by contextual circumstances (e.g. IRGC's belligerent foreign policies), this finding has 
been reflected substantially in the answers given by the experts interviewed throughout the 
project. The notion of endogeneity has never been a priority or even a real possibility in the 
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telecommunications industry in Iran, as the country's main innovation actors are too poorly 
managed and coordinated to function as a unified, dynamic system of optimal standards. 
 
The import-oriented characteristics of NIS in Iran link directly to the democratic degree (i.e. 
gender neutrality) of the construction of its major industrial actors. Subsequently, the relative 
uniqueness of the Iranian NIS model lies within its characteristically charged suspension 
between adaptation and imitation, which has ultimately led the country to a state of technical 
unsustainability. Iran's vulnerable place as a relatively passive consumer in the worldwide 
knowledge-production picture can be compared in many ways against the historically 
prominent example of the World Health Organisation's struggle with the implementation a 
new health management information system in Uganda in 1993, where Gladwin et al. (2003: 
) highlight the West's lack of attention to "organisational context when . . . attempting to 
understand the causes of information management problems . . . in [underdeveloped] 
countries." The technologically dependant nature of all such states translates into import-
oriented development strategies, with excessive financial expenditure on foreign expertise 
seen as a remedy for the country's systematic failure on the indigenous innovation front. This 
capital-driven trend has had serious implications for the NIS theory. 
 
Apart from making fundamental contributions to STS throughout its history of existence, the 
NIS theory in its current form tends (Lyasnikov et al. 2014; Watkins et al. 2014) to have one 
more remarkable flaw when it comes to the emerging economies, which is its relative 
inability to explain the inevitable, yet varying degrees of a state's technological reliance on 
foreign, more technologically advanced sources of innovation. Although many scholars have 
recognised NIS to be the most suitable conceptual framework to employ in the modern 
studies of sociotechnical policy with a primarily Western focus (Ernst 2002: 4), it is crucial to 
note that the NIS in the developing countries tends to operate on a hybrid and sometimes 
even a bifurcated basis, where "very limited sharing and pooling of resources occurs within 
the country," and where an assembly culture formulates the nation's "main vehicle of learning 
and capability formation" (ibid: 4). 
 
A slight form of this systematic malfunction is reflected in the state of NIS in South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore, whose core approach to innovation has traditionally been an 
economic-driven one. Unlike in the industrialised democracies, the authorities in these 
countries seem to have built their NIS on a foundation of financial investments, where the 
main focus of the major universities, institutions and enterprises is on a "well-developed 
system of management of technological diffusion" (Mathews 1999: 1), as opposed to a 
bottom-up, indigenous and knowledge-based structure. 
 
The general structure of the so-called catch-up economies may have roots partly in their 
universities insistence on direct application of the Triple Helix model as the prevalent model 
for their nationwide innovation programmes. While TH is known to be a perfectly functional 
model in politically open contexts, a great majority of the emerging economies (e.g. South 
Korea) seem to suffer from a "lack of collaborative networking" (Shapiro et al. 2010: 3), 
preventing the framework in question from successfully mimicking the levels of functionality 
at work in the decentralised Western European systems. 
 
Among these states, the case of Singapore is a perfect evidence of how a country's NIS can 
economically advance, but not necessarily make any progress towards the top of the global 
innovation tree, resulting in very little levels of investment (Wong 2003: 191) in "indigenous 
companies and small and medium-sized firms." 
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A similar argument applies to South Korea, which is further proof as to why simply 
attempting to duplicate the various measures taken by a functional NIS without taking into 
account the various unique characteristics of the destination country is an essentially flawed 
model. Therefore, although commonly viewed as one of the most industrialised nations in its 
geographical region, "the lack of basic technology [has become] the weak point of Korea's 
NIS" (Yim 2006: 157). 
 
This pantographic policy employed by some developing states in the Far East may have 
helped them achieve more financial gains to date than they would have otherwise. But with 
them having increasingly turned into a "global factory" (Ernst 2006: 3) as a result of their 
excessive focus on global sales, they have been in effect reduced to competent adaptors of 
imported expertise at best. But the mere scale of manufacturing output cannot accurately 
determine the social sustainability of a given NIS. For instance, although Japan was the main 
provider (Borrus 1997; Branstetter 2001; Ernst and Guerrieri 1998) of civilian technologies 
used actively by the US and Canadian military forces toward the end of the 20
th
 century, the 
NIS in those countries was never deemed by mainstream STS scholars as dysfunctional or 
inefficient. On the other hand Japan, a once highly applauded producer and exporter of high-
tech electronic goods, is no longer a leader in the global ICT community, nor does it seem 
capable of posing any serious threats to the West in terms of indigenous ground-breaking 
innovations. 
 
Even in scarce cases where non-industrialised countries have tried to challenge the 
knowledge gap at the academic level, their major universities' focus has remained largely on 
learning and not innovating (Assmann and Stiller 2014; Cappelli et al. 2014), and on catching 
up instead of leading. The South Asian governments, which often bank on the management 
and diffusion techniques as opposed to developing their own R&D solutions, usually have 
their eyes set on profitability and hence have neglected those enterprises interested in 
endogenous innovations (Intarakumnerd et al. 2002) as a general rule. 
 
Reversing the emerging economies' unoriginal approach to ICTs requires no less than an 
ideological transformation across their inner circles of political power, in terms of willingness 
to reprioritise the society's genuine needs through investing in home-grown research projects, 
as well as a redefinition of their innovation ambitions within their academic means. From an 
STS perspective, such systems have two major issues to overcome (Wong 1999) if they are 
ever to pursue the suggested route: being culturally and politically detached from the leading 
Western research centres, and not having an immediate access to the lucrative Western 
markets. 
 
NIS Variations, Indigenous Technology and Cross-Border Dependency: What 
Makes Innovations Socially Sustainable? 
 
Since its dawn on the emerging economies, asset development, but not technological 
endogeneity, seems to have become the key indication of functionality in NIS. Instead, this 
research proposes that cross-border reliance needs to become a key determinant of economic 
success in the developing world. Therefore, the present application of NIS in the developing 
countries is not only inadequate, but also confusedly justified in terms of theoretical depth. 
Conversely, to suggest that profit planning is an unorthodox business management tactic 
would be equally redundant. The intellectual dilemma between morality and lucrativeness 
can, to some extent, obscure the boundaries between ethical and unethical practice.  
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Politically-closed regimes, such as the communist party in China, are yet another commonly 
ignored reason why the innovation systems are contemporarily viewed through a technocratic 
lens, turning into a cog within the state's security-driven, outsourced approach to 
technological innovations. When tested under such binary circumstances, mainstream NIS 
theory in its existing formula proves largely to remain restricted to democratic contexts. 
 
One must never forget the profound impact of the socio-political factors on the on-going 
status of a nation's NIS. China, one of the fastest growing economies in the world, owes its 
economic stability chiefly to its communist regime's fundamental reforms within the political 
realm, which subsequently transformed the country into the "biggest production hub" 
(Altenburg et al. 2008: 333) for the US as well as for the rest of the OECD states in Europe 
and elsewhere. However, the Chinese owe too much of their economic success to "adopting 
and using ideas and products developed elsewhere" (Chang and Shih 2005: 155), placing 
their NIS under the same category as that of their Iranian counterpart in terms of self-efficacy 
and output originality. 
 
Iran's NIS: An Empirical Analysis of a Bifurcated Structure 
 
There is little evidence of any domestic efforts and investments within Iran aimed specifically 
at self-sufficiency with regards to cyber policing. While government-sponsored experts and 
engineers have been having a hard time keeping up with the pace of advances in anti-
censorship techniques, there is substantial evidence that the regime's strategy to outsource the 
job has proven more successful. Western telecommunications conglomerates have 
occasionally contributed to the suppression of online political activists in Iran over the past 
decade. Some of these companies have sold Iran's security officials complex internet 
censorship technologies, while others have equipped them with tools useful in screening and 
locating individual mobile phones, as well as with machinery designed for jamming satellite 
TV and radio signals broadcasted from the West. 
 
Before a thorough analysis of the socio-technical dynamics of political change in Iran is 
possible, it is necessary to map out and explain the country's National Innovations System 
(NIS). Described by Lundvall (1992: 2), an NIS explicates "the elements and relationships 
which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, 
knowledge . . . [which] are either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation 
state." Due to Iran's complex socio-technical dynamics, this study will focus less on Nelson's 
conception of an NIS, which tends to put the main emphasis on national research and 
development policies, and more on Lundvall's broader notion, which pays a particular 
attention to learning and education. In the following analysis of the Iranian NIS, the three 
core elements of higher education, governmental institutions, and private enterprises will be 
considered, and their interplay with one another will be closely examined. 
 
As was seen in the case of Iran's nuclear ambitions and its production of long-range missiles, 
most of its internal innovations were developed secretly by a handful of well-protected 
scientists based at specialist academic and military research centres—specifically at the 
Ministry of Defence's Malek Ashtar University and IRGC's Imam Hossein University. 
Generously funded by top security officials, both institutions are universities of military 
science and technology offering only a limited number of undergraduate and postgraduate 
programmes to a small number of students (mostly qualified officers) filtered through an 
intense selection process. Many of the rest of the Iranian regime's various politically 
motivated technological innovations take place at IRGC's Baqiyatallah Medical Sciences 
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University and at Sharif University of Technology, one of the country's most prestigious 
science and engineering universities, which runs an extensive nuclear technology programme. 
Although the latter institution is public and therefore not restricted to the IRGC—and indeed 
mostly free from its control—nonetheless, it is technically where the most valuable 
military/dual-use innovations happen, due to its high standards of research and quality of 
equipment and laboratories. All the above universities are located in Tehran. The following 
figure shows the Iranian regime's nationwide system of military innovations: 
 
Iranian Regime and the Technologies of Mass Destruction 
 
 
 
Figure 1 (Spiegel Online 2003) 
 
Patterson and Smith (2005) name five of Iran's major universities as centres where hacking 
innovations may be happening: Sharif University of Technology, the University of Tehran, 
Amirkabir University of Technology, Isfahan University of Technology and the University of 
Isfahan. This list has been composed by the above authors largely based on a content analysis 
of the academic staffs' online profile pages and/or personal blogs, as opposed to concrete 
evidence substantiating that they are in fact engaging in such activities. Their observation, 
therefore, can at best only confirm the above universities' capacity to train professional 
hackers and to develop hacking software, rather than proving that they are undoubtedly doing 
so. Politically motivated hacking attacks are often conducted as a result of complex 
psychological processes. They are not normally deployed merely to show off technical 
ability. In one instance, Patterson and Smith point to Dr. Shahram Bakhtiari of Sharif 
University of Technology's personal webpage having a presentation titled "hacking 
techniques" posted on it. Yet they state that they could not open the file due to a broken URL. 
Even if the webpage in question was indeed a hacking tutorial, it could simply be a routine 
security lesson required by the module of study, and would not directly reflect Dr. Bakhtiari's 
or his students' political ideology. 
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So, without clear confirmation that Iranian universities function as centres of security-
oriented innovations, how then does the Iranian regime upgrade, operate and maintain its 
online censorship infrastructure? Green Voice of Freedom (2010) reports that IRGC has set 
up seemingly private front companies in order to seek and hire professional hackers to teach 
hacking methods to officers in Iran's Cyber Army—an organisation claimed by the regime to 
be the second largest of its kind in the world. Operating secretively and in parallel with the 
country's formal higher education institutions run by the Ministry of Higher Education, "these 
companies [are] responsible for instructing hackers and accomplishing Iranian Cyber Army 
projects. [They] are also involved in importing military technology for the Iranian armed 
forces," the website states. Sabeti (2011) quotes IRGC Commander Brigadier Ali Fazli, 
deputy head of Basij, as saying on 13 March 2011 in an interview with Mehrnews Agency 
that "the cyber section of the Basij . . . includes professional hackers from different branches 
of the Basij among university lecturers, students, students of religious seminaries and 
women." He also quotes him on the close co-operation of the cyber branch of Basij with 
IRGC as explaining that "the reason for the major breakthroughs of the Revolutionary Guards 
has been their reliance on the services of the Basij experts." This is against the country's laws 
on cyber-space passed in the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) on 31 January 2011, according to 
which destruction, manipulation, theft or interception of another's private electronic data or 
interception of private conversations transmitted on the internet or through any other wired or 
wireless form of telecommunication is deemed to be a criminal offense and punishable with 
imprisonment and/or fines (Majlis 2011). Yet the regulations do not clarify the lawmakers' 
standpoint on hacking activities aimed at internal opposition or a foreign state, and even if 
they did, it would be naive to expect parallel extra-judicial apparatuses backed by the 
Supreme Leader to feel bound by them. 
 
The IRGC was formed by Ayatollah Khomeini shortly after the Islamic revolution in 1979, as 
a loyal parallel to the regular army forces, many of whom were conscripted soldiers inherited 
from the previous regime and hence not necessarily very dedicated to the Islamic Republic's 
policies. The IRGC was a ministry within the government and under the President's direct 
command for a long time, acting largely as an extra defence mechanism helping to establish 
border security and assisting the country's other armed forces against foreign threats (such as 
during the Iran-Iraq war), but it was later on separated as an extra-judicial entity placed under 
the Supreme Leader's control. Today, with about 125,000 members, this unelected body has 
grown to be one of the most powerful institutions of the Iranian regime, engaging in a wide 
range of activities from dominating import/export markets to leading and strategising the 
regime's nuclear programmes, from media censorship to arresting, detaining and interrogating 
the political activists. 
 
 
 
——— 
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The following figure illustrates the general structure of the IRGC: 
 
The Hierarchy of the Iranian Regime 
 
Figure 2 (Higgins 2010) 
 
While Iran's Cyber Army may indeed be large (the exact population serving is unknown), the 
number of truly expert hackers it employs cannot be nearly sufficient to develop, implement, 
operate and maintain the world's most sophisticated internet censorship apparatus 
(International Business Times 2012). Therefore, the majority of online censorship 
technologies currently in use in Iran are imported from Western, mainly European, ICT 
companies via IRGC's front companies. With Iran's NIS failing to meet the ruling elite's 
technological needs, the IRGC manages to acquire almost any sensitive telecommunications 
technology via proxy from anywhere in the West. Published by an anonymous UK-based 
Persian blogger, the following picture shows an example of the satellite signal jamming 
machines installed on Tehran's Milad Tower, the tallest building in the country: 
 
A Satellite Signal Jamming Machine Installed by the Iranian Authorities 
 
 
Figure 3 (Spy Blog 2009) 
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According to this photograph, the device is manufactured locally by Saberin Co., a subsidiary 
of the IRGC. But the technology behind these machines has most probably been imported. 
Further, in a Health Ministry report confirming the health dangers of long-term human 
exposure to signals from these devices, a government official's repeated denial (and in some 
cases criticism) of the devices in question could be yet another indication that it is the IRGC, 
not the Ministry of TCI, that has the ultimate control over the regime's censorship initiatives. 
The September 2009 takeover of the Telecommunication Company of Iran, the TCI 
Ministry's biggest contractor and the Iranian equivalent of BT, by the Mobin Trust 
Consortium (aka Etemad-e-Mobin—another IRGC sub-company) following Ahmadinejad's 
decision to privatise parts of the country's telecommunications industry is proof of the neo-
conservatives' keen desire to gain sole charge of the country's national and international gates 
of the flow of digital information—a dream which has largely come true at this point in time. 
 
Although a great deal of concern has been expressed by international regulatory bodies over 
Iran's alleged pursuit of WMDs, neither the UN nor the EU provide much evidence regarding 
the Islamic Republic's use of imported ICTs to silence pro-democracy dissent. According to 
Deibert and Rohozinsky (2010: 3), despite IRGC authorities continuously denying ownership 
of TCI, they seem to have an increasingly easier time analysing the country's online access 
points. "In countries where the lines between public and private authorities are often blurred, 
and/or organised crime and authority mingle in the dark underworlds, such informal requests 
and pressures can be particularly effective, opaque and nearly impossible to bring to public 
account" (ibid: 3). 
 
Confirming the IRGC's vast use of imported technology to address its censorship needs, 
Karlekar and Cook (2009: 100) have found substantial evidence that some Western 
telecommunications technology companies actively aid the regime's "censorship and 
surveillance practices, [providing] equipment that is crucial to carrying out such tasks and at 
times [turning] over the personal data of users leading to their arrest." These companies 
compromise their ethical values despite sufficient knowledge of the Islamic Republic's 
illiberal nature. Some companies have denied these allegations by emphasising Iran's 
seemingly top rated cyber strength and its ownership of one of the most sophisticated online 
censorship systems in the world. The only way to scientifically examine and disprove such an 
argument would be via a thorough analysis of the country's NIS. 
 
Iran is a repressive state where protecting national security against foreign threats is often 
reason enough for the regime to avoid transparency. It isolates its innovation centres and 
restricts access to a narrow number of elite scientists. In such circumstances, where any type 
of technological innovations potentially useful in the defence industry are tagged as 
confidential, neither competition nor collaboration is viable—yet both are cornerstones of a 
healthy, functional NIS. Sun et al. (2010: 2) suggest that the "dynamics of the NIS are 
becoming an important source for national competitiveness." These dynamics largely consist 
of the way various elements of a country's NIS interact with and complement one another. A 
defective innovations cycle, as is the one currently in place in Iran, would result in a weak 
NIS, which will subsequently seek to fill its gaps by resorting to foreign expertise. 
 
Realising the national importance of innovation, Japan, a country heavily damaged during the 
Second World War, managed to recover itself and become one of the world's strongest 
economies in less than half a century. Freeman (1995: 12) contrasts Japan's highly integrated 
NIS with that of Soviet Union, where there was a "huge commitment . . . to military and 
space applications with little direct or indirect spin-off to the civil economy . . . Three-
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quarters of the massive Soviet R&D resources [went] into defence and space research," not 
leaving much space for civil innovations. Freeman counts three main reasons for the failure 
of the Soviet Union's NIS in the civil innovation sector: "The Soviet system grew up on the 
basis of separate research institutes within the academic system . . . [and] the links between 
all these different institutions and enterprise-level R&D remained rather weak . . . Moreover, 
there were quite strong negative incentives in the Soviet system retarding innovation at 
enterprise level, such as the need to meet quantitative planned production targets . . . Finally, 
the user producer linkages which were so important in most other industrial countries were 
very weak or almost non-existent in some areas in the Soviet Union" (ibid). Japan 
importantly detached its NIS from an isolated, uncompetitive and secretive military industry, 
and designed a carefully regulated innovation system along with policies that ensured 
transparency and competitiveness at all times. This model is currently far from being 
employed in Iran. Abbasi and Hajihoseini (2004) explain that "the Iranian innovation policy 
system lacks an overall vision, integration and policy coherence." Mani (2004: 22) notes a 
number of technology support institutions and policy instruments in Iran, almost all of which 
function in isolation, leading to the emergence of a fractured, dysfunctional innovation 
system. "Given the very highly concentrated nature of the manufacturing sector and the 
continued domination of public sector enterprises, [encouraging innovative efforts in 
manufacturing enterprises] is more likely to remain a policy objective for the future," he 
argues. 
 
Similarly, Ghazinoori (2004a: 11) reveals that about sixty-five per cent of all the Iran's major 
research and development centres are military-run and hence located in the capital city 
Tehran. He finds that "there are many research activities being conducted in the defence 
industries which have achieved tremendous results in the fields of manufacturing ammunition 
for the military forces . . . However, there [is] no appropriate relationship between the 
defence research section and non-military areas." His results complement those of a United 
Nations (2005) report on the ownership status of most of Iran's large and medium-sized 
companies. This report holds low representation of the scholars in work in the private (civil) 
research centres responsible for the overall failure of the country's ICT innovations. "In 1996, 
the total number of researchers, research assistants and technicians amounted to 68,385 
persons, of whom 82 per cent were employed in public sector institutes and 18 per cent in 
private sector research centres," the UN report discloses. Salami (2008: 6) also asserts that 
Iran's industrial competitiveness is in urgent need of innovation-friendly policies led by 
academia and industry. According to him, "innovation possibilities cannot be taken as a 
given. Innovation is a capability that has to be developed. It can be said that despite the move 
towards a knowledge-based economy, innovation has not yet become a strategic goal of 
policymaking in Iran." 
 
This top-down approach—primarily designed to give priority to the demands of a secluded 
elite—stands right against Lundvall's original model of an NIS based on inter-sectoral flow of 
knowledge and collaboration. This, in turn, raises the question of how legitimate it is for 
Western telecommunications technology companies to help rectify the technological deficit 
of a system that remains dysfunctional primarily due to its undemocratic nature. Ghazinoori 
(2004b) explains that in countries like Iran, where the regime plays a key role across a variety 
of business territories, and thus ultimately determines the technological artifacts and the 
market dynamics, the NIS has little choice but to fail. He suggests that the Iranian 
government should refrain from dominating the country's economy and instead support the 
development of bottom-up innovations. "In countries like Iran the market demand is formed 
upon observing foreign products rather than on the basis of domestic technological power, as 
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a result [of which] domestic technology can hardly meet the demand, and importing foreign 
technology is inevitable . . . research activities are just decorative and have no relation to the 
country's real needs . . . [and] no technology growth can be expected," the author claims. The 
following figure demonstrates the contrasts between the Iranian NIS with that of a typical 
Western, industrial country. 
 
Iran's NIS is top-down and mainly funded by oil revenues—one reason why the first round of 
the Western sanctions was directly aimed at Iran's energy exports: 
 
Oil Income and the Iranian NIS 
 
 
Figure 4 (Ghazinoori 2004b) 
 
On the other hand, a successful NIS, as theorised by Lundvall, would function based on 
minimal governmental intervention, and maximal independent research, largely reflecting 
market demand, rather than being held hostage to official dictation: 
 
Lundvall's Cycle of Innovation 
 
Figure 5 (ibid) 
 
Iran's currently linear and one-dimensional model of national innovation, as seen above, is its 
source of economic deterioration and a reason behind its self-insufficiency. Ghazinoori 
(2004a: 10) considers the geographical centralisation of Iran's 'prestigious' technological 
universities as one of the main consequences of the Iranian regime's attempt to divert the 
innovation processes in its favour. "Due to the lack of practical facilities and inadequate 
practical experiences among the professors, the graduates of the engineering fields have poor 
innovation and fail to use their skills for the higher level R&D activities," the author argues. 
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The Iranian NIS, in other words, is not reliant on market demand or academic expertise, but 
instead on orders from the political elite. The United Nations report (2005) primarily 
demonstrates that Iran's innovation failure is one caused by weak and partially non-existent 
relationships between the key components of its NIS.  
 
While the report shows a relatively high expenditure on higher education compared to total 
government expenditure (20.4 per cent), it also exposes the country's metaphorical Achilles' 
heel: Iran's technology-based exports accounted for only two per cent of total exports. "Iran's 
expenditure on R&D activities as a proportion of GNP is only 0.5 per cent. In order to 
transform its economy into a technology-based one, Iran needs to increase its R&D 
expenditure substantially," the report reveals. Yet even the regime's high investment in 
academia does not necessarily entail that funds are distributed evenly or fairly or that they are 
allocated based on civil priorities and national interests. Implicit in Ghazinoori's (2004a: 11) 
analysis is the perception that the problem results from of a lack of proper funding dedicated 
to appropriate parts of the educational system: "Eighty per cent of the country's researchers 
are working in the universities, while only 20 per cent of the research budget is allocated to 
[them]. Academic research in Iran is usually conducted without considering the needs of the 
market" (ibid: 11). Furthermore, Maleki et al. (2005) found that the two weakest functions 
within Iran's NIS are knowledge development and market formation. While the latter element 
is not entirely relevant to the core focus of this study, the following table shows a list of the 
negative factors currently influencing the former function in Iran: 
 
Inhibitions and Barriers to the Iranian NIS 
 
 
 
Figure 6 (Maleki et al. 2005) 
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Rezazadeh-Mehrizi and Pakneiat (2008: 88) observe an overly large presence of international 
hardware and software suppliers in Iran's mobile and wireless industry, which happens to be 
monopolised by the IRGC-run Bonyade Mostazafan. They state that domestic industries in 
Iran need to be developed in an evolutionary fashion, further elaborating that "what [is] 
missing here [is] the starting point for this evolution process that could hardly be found in 
domestic dimensions." Looking back at the United Nations report (2005), it is evident that 
results from Iran's knowledge system hardly percolate into the country's production system. 
The report concludes that "the enterprises only undertake production, but do not perform 
innovation activities. While such a strategy was sufficient to cater to an import-substitution 
economy, it is not a dynamic capability for sustainable development" and further determines 
that even Iran's large, state-owned manufacturing enterprises rely on technology imports in 
order to meet their needs. This thesis adheres to Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff's (2000) Triple 
Helix Model (THM)—a well-developed IS concept that puts the main emphasis on academia, 
while encouraging intense collaboration among all three main elements of an NIS in fulfilling 
their roles, which the developers of THM see as often interchangeable. 
 
The THM, as Etzkowitz et al. (2007: 14) describe it, represents "overlapping, yet relatively 
independent, institutional spheres," and is a flexible model which emerging economies should 
embed into their long-term development plans: 
 
Triple Helix Model 
 
 
Figure 7 (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) 
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Differing in essence from THM, the following graph illustrates the theoretical dynamics of 
the Iranian NIS in place today: 
 
Regime's Innovation System in Iran 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
Unlike in THM, Iran's NIS is characterised by heavy influence from state-run, security-
oriented organisations and survives mainly through foreign technology imports at nearly all 
levels. What distinguishes the two models even further is the gradual disconnection of the 
country's scalable enterprises from academia, as these are increasingly merged into the 
IRGC's nationwide economic empire. The reliance of the Iranian NIS on foreign 
technologies, therefore, is a direct outcome of its distortion-induced failure. 
 
NIS Dysfunction in Iran and the Country's Inevitable Reliance on Foreign ICTs 
 
As the Revolutionary Guards rapidly expand their domain in business, a significant and often 
adversarial separation remains between academia, enterprises and institutions. Under such 
conditions, the country's overall innovation output can only be minimal at best, making 
imported ICTs a very attractive option. Vaughn (2005: 9) criticises Microsoft, Cisco, and 
Oracle for encouraging the militarisation of Iran's economy in their trade with the Iranian 
regime, and argues that most Western ICT companies are prepared, on some level, to suspend 
codes of corporate social responsibility in return for guarantees of substantial economic 
profit. He accuses these companies of "trying to bend every which way they can to help 
anyone with a deep pocket" (ibid). Figliola et al. (2011: 11) confirm that the Nokia-Siemens 
Network (NSN) sold online censorship equipment to the Iranian government in 2008, 
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elaborating that "the monitoring centre, installed into the MCIT gateway, was part of a larger 
contract with Iran that included mobile phone network technology." 
 
Pleading innocence, Western telecommunications technologies firms have typically justified 
their business engagement with repressive states by highlighting their legal obligation to 
provide certain 'counter-crime' features to their 'elite' clients all over the world, as part of 
standard service packages. There has been very little research done on the functionality of 
Iran's NIS, and the main body of literature available publicly has been produced inside the 
country, where university-based research is heavily monitored, making it difficult to rely on. 
Iran's case is a blatant example of a bifurcated NIS, where military-oriented innovations 
remain a priority in comparison to the civil ones. 
 
The relationship between recent online innovations and social developments in repressive 
countries is best explained via the Ukraine's Orange Revolution—the world's first and 
arguably most ICT-driven political uprising. Internet and democracy experts, such as 
Goldstein (2007), have argued that digital technologies played a substantial role in the 
expansion of Ukraine's Orange Revolution (OR). Other cybernetics scholars, like Lysenko 
and Desouza (2010), have gone so far as to call OR a 'technology-assisted' resistance, which 
this study finds rather technologically deterministic. A contextual analysis of the Orange 
Revolution will follow in chapter six. 
 
In order to be able to construct an analysable framework relevant to innovation processes at 
work in present Iran, the methodological design of this research stays almost entirely focused 
on the period after 2008 and 2009, which witnessed the country's economic system go 
through major, costly structural transformations (Tehran Times 2010). Following Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad's contested election as President in June 2009, Iran saw a major boost in the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps' (IRGC) role in the country's economic and political 
affairs, in part due to Ahmadinejad's status as an ex-IRGC official (Cordesman and Seitz 
2009). In Ahmadinejad, the IRGC found a 'friendly' figure in charge of the government 
following sixteen years of fruitless (Al-Monitor 2013) reformist efforts. Today, the IRGC 
fully controls about 70 per cent (Institute for Middle East Studies 2011) of Iranian industries, 
extending its influence from 'security-related' industries to a variety of profitable fields 
ranging from the manufacturing and importing of fast moving consumer goods (FMCGs) to 
banking and medical and educational services (Iran Watch 2013). Such activities on the part 
of Ahmadinejad's neo-conservative government were aided by the presence of a mostly 
conformist parliament, elected in 2008 with historically low citizen turnout (Farhi 2008), 
resulting in the formation of what is arguably one of the country's most hard-line legislatures 
since the 1979 Islamic revolution. 
 
Even in a Western democracy, there are normally several conflicts of interest between higher 
education and military institutions, suggesting that the direction of research and development 
budget allocation at country level will be heavily influenced by the values of sponsoring 
organisations. In other words, any institution that funds a scientific study remains essentially 
in control of the socio-political rhetoric that the outcome of that project is likely to convey. 
All research is conducted for specific reasons, one of which is often the desire to create 
profound 'change'—an inherently subjective concept. However, one man's scientific progress 
can only equal the violation of another's rights. As seen below, militaries exist primarily to 
'protect.' They are regimented, biased and conformist. Universities, on the other hand, are 
mostly liberal and flexible in nature and encourage innovation. 
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The following table demonstrates the core differences between military and academia in 
terms of construction and values as well as their relationship to the wider society: 
 
Organisational Values: Military vs. Academia 
 
 Military Academia 
Organisation 
- Strong Structure 
- Clear Relationships among 
Components 
- Weak Structure 
- Fuzzy Relationships among 
Components 
Values and Beliefs 
- Duty, Honour and Country 
- Service 
- Bravery 
- Obedience 
- Intolerant of Ambiguity 
- Freedom of Inquiry 
- Education 
- Intellect 
- Questioning 
- Tolerant of Ambiguity 
Relation to Wider 
Society 
- Service Ethics 
- Quite Removed 
- Conservative 
- Iconoclastic 
- Somewhat Removed 
- Liberal 
Table 1 (Herrmann and Douglas 1996) 
 
Taking these characteristics into account will help make better sense of nationwide 
innovation processes in Iran, where the intelligence unit of the IRGC and Basij militia along 
with senior security officials within the Ministry of Defence has woven a tightly-knit network 
of support within the country's universities, in a bid to prevent 'counter-revolutionary' 
scientific ends from being pursued in academia. A prominent result of this effort is the arrest, 
conviction and imprisonment Dr. Omid Kokabi, an Iranian nuclear physicist (NPR 2011), for 
'co-operating with hostile governments.' It can be argued that the ruling elite in Iran have a 
multi-layered apparatus in place in order to ensure that the generation and diffusion of 
scientific knowledge in academia occurs without surprises. This is particularly crucial in non-
military universities and research centres, where the students might not necessarily be 
ideologically 'fit' to serve the long-term interests of the Islamic Republic. 
 
The Iranian regime's ideological approach to new technologies can be seen as an example of 
what Neriya-Ben Shahar and Lev-On (2011: 876) call Religious Social Shaping of 
Technology (RSST), where "ideology attempts to protect and strengthen it, the luminal 
spaces between ideology and practice." This model focuses on religious groups who see their 
traditional values threatened as a result of freshly emerging technological practices and 
whose position stands sharply opposed to that of the proponents of openness and civil 
liberties, who often employ the same technologies in order to foster and promote democratic 
activities. While there is hardly a shortage of deterministic theories in the field of STS, 
evidence (Feenberg 2006) suggests that the correlation between internet and democracy can 
best be explained through a constructivist approach, most prominently Mackenzie and 
Wajcman's (1985) Social Shaping of Technology. Arguing that cause-and-effect approaches 
such as technological determinism are "at best an oversimplification," and that "changing 
technology will always be only one factor amongst many others," Mackenzie and Wajcman 
(1999: 7) define the politics of technology as "any systematic attempt to ensure that the 
surprises are indeed good ones." Despite their generally negative approach to new 
technologies, the Ayatollahs in Iran have made every possible effort to utilise ICTs as a force 
to help them maintain control over the country's political discourse. But they have also 
calculatingly dismissed certain technologies. The best example of this would be the Ministry 
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of Communications and Information Technology's initiative (ARS Technica 2012) in 2011 to 
replace the regular internet connection with a 'halal' alternative—an essentially parallel Local 
Area Network (LAN) isolated from the rest of the world. This project was widely mocked by 
the cyber-activists worldwide and referred to as the 'filternet.' The plans were soon cancelled 
by senior security officials who denied it altogether. 
 
As the Ayatollahs too must have realised, there are many legitimate reasons why so-called 
cleansing of the internet would not work in Iran, despite allegedly 'successful' implementation 
in other repressive countries such as China, North Korea and Saudi Arabia. Jillian York 
(2012a), director for international freedom of expression at the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation in San Francisco, described three main causes for the Iranian authorities' 
inevitable back-down from the plan, only one of which was purely technological—the 
incapacity of Iran's cyber-police as compared to China's. She reasoned that Iran's banks and 
international businesses, along with many other commercial firms within the governmental 
and private sectors, would suffer mightily from the internet cut-off, and that "such a move 
[would] be damaging . . . to the country's economy, unsustainable without global 
connectivity." She also pointed out an often ignored yet important sociological fact, which 
particularly distinguishes Iran from North Korea: "Iranians have developed a taste for the 
global internet . . . through the use of proxies and VPNs . . . Any attempt to block the social 
networks Iranians have become accustomed to would surely result in an uproar." The bottom 
line is that the main purpose for the censorship system Iranian political leaders have 
implemented today is not—as claimed—to block pornography, but instead to tackle 
politically motivated online activism. As York shrewdly observed, "if Iran were to insist on 
censoring obscenity, it could take different measures . . . Instead, the government seeks to 
tear its citizens away not only from the global internet, but from communicating with their 
families and friends abroad." Technical choices like these turn ICTs into a powerful 
oppressive force in repressive countries—one with prioritisable effects. 
 
Perhaps the biggest differentiator between China and Iran in terms of how they approach 
online censorship lies in their economic structure and functionality as opposed to a systematic 
pursuit of endogenous innovation. Although there is a significant variance of opinion among 
scholars about the exact influence of online technologies on modern social movements in the 
emerging economies, King et al. (2013: 15) highlight the consistent "relevance of 
technological innovations on the longevity of authoritarian regimes worldwide." This thesis 
argues that the degree to which a repressive regime chooses to block online channels of 
communication depends primarily on its ability to afford developing and implementing the 
often much more expensive alternatives. From a financial perspective, it is always much 
more expensive for an autocratic government to purposefully manage, rather than fully 
disrupt, the flow of online information. This simply means that despite the common 
perception, a dynamic stream of online communications does not necessarily need to be 
damaging to the legitimacy and political clout of a repressive regime, if that regime has the 
resources to effectively monitor and process the information on a mass scale. Therefore, as 
China "devolves the bulk of censorship responsibility to internet content providers, [its] 
regime maintains large economies of scale in the face of new technologies" (King et al. 2013: 
15). 
 
In spite of their occasional propaganda, the Chinese authorities' willingness to control, and 
not as much block, online content is manifested in their record-high investment ($6.5b in 
2015) in high-tech start-up companies. The critical truth here for the Chinese political leaders 
is that their two-decade-long trail of vast economic growth would not sustain in the long run, 
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if they were to pull the plug on the online sphere altogether – a strategy favoured strongly by 
the North Korean generals. As Wired (2015) assesses, "the [communist] party is worriedly 
seeking new sources of good jobs [and] technology fits the bill." 
 
Unlike in Iran, we are witnessing in China an NIS that is relatively effective in shifting from 
imitation to indigenous growth and development. This is not, however, least because of the 
dynamism of China's economy or the expansion of technology-related business in that 
country. It is, rather, due to the emergence of a young middle class of entrepreneurs oriented 
to business, as compared to the general inclination to foster bottom-up political opposition as 
is the case in Iran.  
 
Also, the bottom-up opposition in China is tightly controlled when it appears to move toward 
organising a mass protest against the state. The Chinese regime seems to fight direct 
opposition by a combination of severe clampdowns, at the same time as adopting populist 
policies aimed at challenging state corruption. This makes China an increasingly affluent and 
hard-shelled dictatorship, which as King et al. (2013: 15) argue, "is probably being watched 
closely by autocrats from around the world." 
 
Western scholars (e.g. Posner 1961: 323) have widely acknowledged the notion that 
"differences in the rate and nature of innovation in different countries" can determine the 
state of their economic growth. Souitaris (1999: 295-6) proposes based on his robust 
comparison of national innovation in Iran and Greece that the "portfolio of important 
determinants of innovation is wider for countries with competitive market structure and 
support for entrepreneurship than for centralised economies." The portfolio of evidence 
gathered by this thesis in relation with the dynamics of technological innovation in Iran 
highlights markedly the applied significance of what Souitaris calls the "attitude of 
management" toward other main variables within an innovation system such as R&D, skills 
and competition. He concludes his investigation by stating that "In Iran, large firms were all 
public and highly inefficient. Therefore, the small firms were more innovative despite their 
primitive management systems." 
 
On the other hand in China, although large firms usually "attract more bureaucratic 
intervention and hence may be less efficient than small firms" (Zou and Adams 2008: 1149), 
they are at the same time known (Kinkel et al. 2015: 7) to be "more active in building up 
value added activities in foreign countries than small and medium-sized enterprises." In their 
search for the 'truth' on how technology affects the economic growth of a given national 
economy, Soofi et al. (2013: 57) divide major market-based economies of the world into two 
distinct categories of efficiency-driven (i.e. Middle East, Asia-Pacific) and innovation-driven 
(i.e. Western Europe, North America)", with the lead differentiator between the two being 
endogeneity. By conducting a comparative examination of NIS in Iran and China, this 
research has attempted to further explore the former category, in hope of advancing the state 
of scholarly knowledge on the determinants of ICT (e.g. online) innovation across less 
democratic political contexts. 
 
The Social Shaping of Technology is at work not only in spheres controlled by the regime—
pro-democracy cyber-activists have also been busy utilising and adapting newly available 
ICTs as means to their ends. The dissent-friendly capacity of ICTs was already discovered 
nearly a decade ago by Lievrouw (2004: 11), who observed that "new media modalities . . . 
made formerly obscure activist subcultures more accessible and open to people who are 
seeking diverse political opinions or new avenues for political participation." In fact, there 
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have been many scholarly attempts (Earl and Kimport 2011; Kelly-Garrett 2006; Van De 
Donk et al. 2004) over the past decade to establish a robust, coherent relationship between 
concepts of social activism and telecommunications technologies. Very few of these studies, 
however, distinctly argue that the internet's political power does not lie in its 'inherent 
trajectory,' but rather in the way it has been utilised by already active, well-connected groups 
of likeminded political activists across geographical borders. Recognising the reciprocal, co-
evolutionary nature of human-technology interaction is crucial to understanding the 
complexity of the socio-technical mechanisms of political change in repressive countries. 
 
This research can be seen as a constructivist response to either extreme of deterministic 
discourse. In addition to recognising ideas such as Kalathil and Boas's (2003) concepts of 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), e-propaganda and international sphere, it also 
occasionally acknowledges the inbuilt characteristics of individual technologies. The need for 
such an approach is reflected in the concept of dual-use ICTs, which as demonstrated below, 
are potent telecommunications technologies with varying degrees of applicability in both 
civil and military industries. 
 
Authoritarian vs. Civilian Technology Advantage 
 
 
Figure 9 (Joyce 2011) 
 
Bearing the above in mind, the following graph illustrates the structure of Iran's current NIS, 
in relation with the country's on-going power struggle, and builds theoretically upon existing 
interdisciplinary literature: 
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Foreign Technologies, IRGC and the Online Power Struggle in Iran 
 
 
Figure 10 
 
Understanding the origins of telecommunications technologies employed by the cyber-
activists and the regime requires a thorough analysis of the country's NIS. Careful scrutiny of 
this under-theorised structure is particularly important as the dynamics of innovation in Iran 
are fundamentally different from those in Western democracies, where NIS theory was 
originally developed. Unless we comprehend a given nation's mechanisms of innovation and 
how they function, we can neither competently explain the local contribution of ICTs to 
political developments nor effectively address policy gaps in ways that would promote 
democracy or weaken repression. 
 
Forty per cent (All Voices 2010) of Iran's economy was reliant on EU companies in January 
2010. But very few Western ICT firms have either admitted to any ethical errors on their part 
for engaging in this trade or even officially responded to accusations raised against them by 
human rights advocates worldwide. Leberknight et al. (2010: 4) point the finger at a range of 
well-known firms including Secure Computing, Nokia-Siemens Networks and Allot 
Communications, arguing for directly culpability as "there are not many commercially 
available censorship technologies," and that such technology can only be tailored on demand. 
They divide the available censorship technologies into two main categories of software and 
hardware, the former suited to filtering content and the latter useful in classifying network 
traffic and inspecting packet headers and payloads (also known as Deep Packet Inspection). 
Every repressive government needs its own specific technological features, depending on the 
scale of resistance it faces, along with its own ideological objectives. Deibert (2008: 331) 
holds commercial software to account as responsible for most of the online censorship taking 
place in autocratic countries, suggesting that "these products . . . have been readily employed 
by censoring states like Tunisia (Secure Computing), Iran (Secure Computing), Myanmar 
(Fortinet), and Yemen (Websense) to block access to politically-sensitive content." OpenNet 
Initiative's statistics (2005; 2011b) show that Deibert's insights into online censorship are 
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likely to be accurate. According to the organisation, the main internet censorship software 
used in Iran by the Iranian government since the mid-2000s is SmartFilter, which is a 
commercial content filtering tool developed by Secure Computing, a McAfee sub-company 
based in San Jose, California. The following statement has been extracted from Secure 
Computing's official response to accusations of unethical business conduct: 
 
Secure Computing has sold no licenses to any entity in Iran, and any use of our 
software by an ISP in Iran has been without Secure Computing's consent and is in 
violation of Secure Computing's End User License Agreement. We have been 
made aware of ISPs in Iran making illegal and unauthorised attempts to use of our 
software. Secure Computing is actively taking steps to stop this illegal use of our 
products . . . Unless authorised by the US Government, Secure Computing 
Corporation prohibits export and re-export of Secure products, software, services, 
and technology to Iran. 
 
Given that different autocratic regimes have differing overall goals and financial resources, 
various categories of such technology have developed over the years and been deployed by 
different regimes. The following figure demonstrates a range of online censorship techniques 
popular with repressive regimes, organised based on cost and the main political purposes they 
are designed to serve: 
 
Internet Censorship Technologies: Cost-effectiveness vs. Accuracy 
 
Figure 11 (Wright 2009) 
 
Both SmartFilter and SurfControl belong to the cheapest and hence the least accurate filtering 
method (IP Filtering), demonstrating that most repressive regimes are content with static, 
categorical blockage of websites, as opposed to active surveillance of individual users' traffic 
(routinely practiced in China). In authoritarian countries, the government's primary aim is to 
display an ability to maintain 'full control.' This precedes any interest in the very difficult and 
costly job of identifying and arresting anonymous cyber-activists. While many well-known 
cyber-activists have been subject to prosecution in Iran due to their online activities, there is 
no concrete evidence that the regime has made any systematic attempts to identify or locate 
anonymous web surfers based on the nature of their traffic. These relatively cheap and 
inaccurate filtering methods also result in the permanent blockage of thousands of 'clean' 
websites. The following snapshot of SmartFilter's URL database taken in 2008 demonstrates 
how the Secure Computing programmers have incorrectly classified four of the world's most 
popular social networking services by tagging them as dating websites: 
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Filtering Software and Database Compilation 
 
 
 
Table 2 (OpenNet Initiative 2011b) 
 
The above example is a simple demonstration of how politically motivated technological 
choices can go wrong. As the decade-long history of internet censorship has shown, 
repressive regimes are likely to be more dissatisfied with the popularity of online social 
networking and its viral effect than they are to be annoyed with readership of foreign news 
websites or pornographic content. Naturally, social networking platforms are where most 
online innovation diffusion occurs. 
 
Cyber-Activism: Why Focus on Innovation? 
 
Social movements are by no means a new phenomenon. Historically, the systematic abuse of 
power by corrupt elites has invariably resulted in the emergence of radical resistance 
movements aiming to eliminate injustices and establish human rights, either peacefully and 
through civil disobedience or via means of violence. What is more, political activists have 
generally benefitted from and almost always relied on technological innovations throughout 
the global history of revolution. While these innovations vary across a wide range of 
disciplines, ICTs have intensified power struggles between citizens and states. But 
communications technology has itself been subject to intense change over the years. It was 
not until the creation of the internet that scholars began to see a ground-breaking opportunity 
for transforming the way media can influence political processes. Ever since, untested, techno 
utopian/dystopian theories relying heavily on assumption have reduced ICTs to either a fully 
democratic force or a futile oppressor. With regard to communications theory, the internet 
seems to have caused more scholarly problems than it has solved. There is now a bold 
theoretical division evident within scholarly literature, while neither side seems to address 
questions that truly matter to modern pro-democracy movements in repressive states. Even 
many of those researchers who do come from non-deterministic, constructivist backgrounds 
have so far focused on Western democracies. Very little in-depth attention has been paid to 
the application of telecommunications technologies in dictatorships. 
 
ICTs are neither democratic nor repressive in nature. The internet is just another medium of 
communication, which may or may not be adopted to serve a just or unjust cause. This is not 
to deny its capacity to influence political discourse, but instead to emphasise the importance 
of avoiding biased, absolutist approaches in academic research. In order to achieve a realistic, 
practical model reflecting an accurate correlation between internet and democracy in 
repressive environments, it is best to consider each case within its own context, while 
drawing on empirical data from prominent case studies. Khamis et al. (2012: 1) emphasise 
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the need to consider the roots and functions of "nuanced social, political and communication 
structures unique to each country, as well as the different roles of their various political actors 
and the types of online and offline communication strategies they deployed," when studying 
the interplay between ICTs and democracy. This framework, they argue, "necessitates 
avoiding the technologically deterministic approach that privileges the tools of social change 
over the actors that employ them, thus inappropriately elevating social media above face-to-
face mass action as agents for bringing about political change." 
 
Since the emergence of the internet, many socio-political 'effects' have been attributed to the 
medium, yet not all of them have a substantiated evidentiary basis. There has, however, been 
a positive shift in scholarly literature over the past decade, moving the focus from one-
dimensional models such as McLuhan's (1962) Gutenberg Galaxy to Castells' (1996) more 
dynamic Network Society. As research on the topic rapidly expands, an increasing amount of 
evidence is stacking up demonstrating the potential of online technologies to contribute to 
political change, especially in autocratic countries. Yet this includes providing new 
opportunities to both pro-democracy cyber-activists as well as repressive authorities. 
 
Although it may appear to some quantitative analysts in technical disciplines that the internet has 
a low penetrative power in emerging economies due to generational, economic and educational 
issues, there are concealed socio-cultural undercurrents that turn the online sphere into one of the 
most representational and inclusive communication mediums of our time, even in such contexts. 
Agarwal et al. (2011: 225) reveal that computational studies of the social media, including Kelly 
and Etling's (2008) mapping of the Persian blogospheres, have increasingly gained more 
prominence than empirical accuracy or reflexivity in the recent years. They indicate that such 
inquiries "predominantly do not study processes involved in collective acts in online 
environment. They also are mostly based on either link-analysis or content-analysis. They lack 
insights from social science, such as collective action theories, where issues—shared 
narratives/repertoires—are important in shaping collective action." The common absence of an 
STS perspective in recent literature leads to a semi-casual treatment of an otherwise complex 
multidisciplinary issue. Addressing this gap is one of the main theoretical and methodological 
aims of this research. This thesis has combined two seemingly unrelated mainstream STS theories 
(i.e. NIS and SST) in order to reach a dynamic socio-technical model specific to authoritarian 
states, complementing it with a balanced trio of data collection methods, covering a set of written 
and oral narratives from activists, scholars and journalists residing inside and outside of Iran. 
 
STS literature also comprises a multitude of techno-dystopian arguments. Pickard (2008: 626) 
notes that "the democratic theory embodied by [online] political actions is frequently neglected 
altogether in existing scholarship." Palczewski (2001: 162) asserts that research on the internet 
has largely dismissed social movement and protest theories, which has led "internet studies [to] 
replicate both traditional social movement studies' focus on the state and modernists' limited 
understandings of political participation." The dominant rhetoric in these studies seems to be that 
ICTs are far too deeply embedded into average citizens' lives to be considered a separate force. 
The truth is that many of the studies in the field have overlooked the influence of innovation 
processes on political change, focusing either on developing a new conception of Social 
Movement Theory, or on technologically deterministic arguments. The focal point of previous 
scholarship has been more or less to simply justify the 'role' of existing technology in political 
dissent. It has failed to adequately explain the innovation processes influencing the balance of 
power in specific case studies. This thesis has attempted to establish a robust, reciprocally valid 
relationship between online innovations and pro-democracy social movements in a world that 
increasingly lives its life online. As demonstrated in the next chapter, primary and secondary data 
collected under this project has been sought in order to address this empirical gap. 
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Chapter iii: Weblog Content Analysis, Expert Interviews and 
Document Review—A Methodological Approach Designed for 
Repressive Contexts 
 
Politically repressive environments are not easy to research due to various access limitations. 
The third chapter will provide an exhaustive account of the main choices involved, as well as 
the practical criteria used, in the validation and analysis of data collected through three 
distinct social research methods. 
Methodological Dilemmas: Compassion, Detachment and Self-Reflexivity in 
Social Research 
 
While pure objectivity remains highly valued by the general scholarly community as a valid 
theoretical concept (Kortunov and Platonova 2013; Warnick 2011; Westmarland 2001), there 
are very few socially driven inquiries (Code 2012; Paley and Lilford 2011; Umbricht and 
Esser 2013) where the researcher(s) can legitimately claim to be fully impartial toward the 
issues under scrutiny. This is due to the controversial nature of social inequalities, the long-
term consequences of which have been occasionally acknowledged in some recent critiques 
(e.g. Estacio 2012; Yeates 2008) of the existing global social governance regimen. 
 
The opposite end of the spectrum leads us to what can be called intellectual activism (Holmes 
2007: 41), which essentially refers to the process of situating oneself within a given instance 
of social catastrophe. "Only by disorienting the self and uprooting epistemic certainties can 
anyone hope to inject a positive difference into the unconscious dynamics of the geopolitical 
order," Holmes reiterates. This particular research technique is, as Maxey (1999: 201) puts it, 
a pioneering approach to "challenging patriarchal, objectified approaches to knowledge 
production," verifying that activism and academia do not intrinsically clash in nature, but that 
they collectively form a new, critical sphere, with which individual inquirers have a chance to 
critically engage. 
 
The notion of objectivity has been arguably too loosely defined by some commentators and 
scholars to be constructively applied in politically repressive contexts. Also known as the 
elite bias, the irregular insistence to actively remove any trace of empathy from crisis-driven 
studies of the society, will inevitably lead to the production of impractical conclusions and 
results. In the case of conflict research, as Fine (2006: 91) articulates, there is an ample need 
to create and promote "collaborative contexts . . . in which we critically think through theory, 
design, interpretation and use [, and] where we engage in rigorous, collective self-reflection 
[and] critical distance." 
 
The era of treating activism and academia as two isolated paradigms is long over, and the 
borders between practice and theory are increasingly blurred – especially as the ICTs become 
more readily available (Hargreaves 2009) to all. As Pain (2003: 652) reiterates, political 
activism "exists on a continuum and . . . needs to be accompanied by continuing attention to 
reflexive research practice." 
 
When processing the results of this research, there were three distinct variables which 
effectively influenced the ultimate shaping of the analytical framework. A major requisite to 
meaningful data triangulation in non-positivist research is to examine meticulously the 
evaluative quality of the data collected through each of the methods involved, which 
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immediately raises two fundamental methodological questions: a) Who exactly constitutes as 
an 'expert' in social sciences? b) Where does expert consultation stand in relation to 
qualitative research? Kaplan (2006: 48) cautions qualitative interviewers about an "ever-
growing horde of self-proclaimed experts and generalisers who fill televised panels and print 
columns without ever having filled up a reporter's notebook," highlighting the rise of a newly 
emerging breed of social researchers who tend to rely largely on second-hand reporting in 
order to draw original scholarly conclusions. If nothing else, the undertaking of this thesis has 
taught me the intrinsic value of first-hand over secondary data, simultaneous to enlightening 
me vastly on the intricate tasks that are the filtration, validation and interpretation of either 
type of data. 
 
Indeed, the treatment of online data in qualitative research cannot permanently follow set, 
prescriptive guidelines, although the general principles of validation remain largely 
applicable. Thornham and McFarlane (2014: 197) acknowledge based on extensive studies 
that user-generated content uploaded on the internet is far from static, and that it is a 
"negotiation, a process of refinement and development", and more importantly a much 
personalised practice. "If we locate the content as further embedded in a process extending 
beyond its immediate—spatial, temporal, technological—context" (ibid: 197), it can have 
considerable bearings on its core value in terms of analytical interpretation. For instance, if a 
given weblog under longitudinal scrutiny is discontinued, what conclusions can the 
researcher reach? What if the blog was 'fake' altogether or was 'busted' by the cyber police? 
 
As an avid member and observer of the Persian blogosphere, I have read in 'real-time' many 
glorious 'posts' which turned out in practice to be the blogger's last words before abduction, 
imprisonment and in no fewer than two cases 'unexplainable' death. The gradually increasing 
onslaught of free-to-access information across digital, interactive platforms has led 
(Livingstone 2004: 6-7) many social scientists researching online media to build their 
arguments customarily around the question of internet literacy, often avoiding to explore the 
evolving nature and social implications of the mediating technologies involved. This in turn 
has contributed to the formation of a "universalist, cognitive framework, thereby neglecting 
the historical and cultural contingency of both media and the social knowledge processes that 
interpret them" (ibid: 6-7). Let's consider, for instance, Kelly and Etling's (2008) largely 
quantitative, computerised approach to cyber-activism in Iran, my idea of responding to 
which formed the basic theoretical foundation of this PhD. While the authors in question 
were attempting to explain a dynamically fluid social phenomenon through purely 
technological values, I found it increasingly necessary to seek a constructivist framework that 
does not reduce Iran's bottom-up, anti-repression online activists and cyber innovators to 
passive, reactionary agents, at the same time as explaining the varying limitations of ICTs 
with regards to social movements. 
 
Activist Research Serving Social Sciences: Bridging the Gap between Theory 
and Practice in STS 
 
Activist research has been conventionally viewed by many social scientists (e.g. Merton 
1936; Varisco 2014) as unmethodical or academically invalid. Therefore, the role of this less 
recognised branch of qualitative research as a potent catalyst of positive, democratic change 
is often overlooked (Greenwood 2008; O'Shaughnessy and Krogman 2012; Sclove 1997; 
Suzuki and Mayorga 2014). 
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A great example of this theoretical hegemony is the basic philosophical divide between the 
East and the West in terms of "asymmetries in the terrain of knowledge production and 
distribution" (Casas 2006: 77), which the new wave of constructivist social scientists aims to 
reduce and perhaps eventually eliminate in the long run. 
 
Focusing overly on the dismissal (e.g. Walker 1970) of every data collection approach not 
entirely compatible with conventional social research practices will have a severely negative 
impact on the scholarly community's basic understanding of the continuously evolving 
modern-world social unrests. The academia's failure to adequately acknowledge and engage 
with truly practical fieldwork, according to Choudry (2013: 132), "has made it difficult for 
social movement theorists to grasp the actual political effects of many movements." 
 
There is a relatively limited understanding in research circles on the potential dangers of 
getting overly immersed in the pain and suffering of certain repressed groups. However, the 
general inclination to marry academic social research and outright activism, as Petray (2010: 
86) argues, helps "cultural critique to be merged with political action and results in 
knowledge which contributes not only to academia, but also to the struggle for social justice." 
 
Activism research is widely characterised amongst social scientists by its partiality. However, 
it would be crucial to understand that the core aim of this branch of research "is not to 
produce academic theories based on action; Nor is it to produce theories about action; Nor is 
it to produce theoretical or empirical knowledge that can be applied in action; It is to liberate 
the human body, mind and spirit in the search for a better, freer world" (Reason and Bradbury 
2013: 5) – a philanthropic approach pursued by this research in terms of alleviating the 
counter-democratic restrictions imposed on Iran's cyber-activist community. 
 
On a broader level, the common speculation that academia, activism and policy in nationwide 
contexts are by default in tune with one another is far from realistic. While empirical 
evidence, as Barreras (2004: 5) argues, plays an "important and perhaps necessary role, [it] is 
often not enough to promote policy change." There is now an ever increasing need to 
recognise the overlooked principle that when stimulating social transformations of profound 
magnitude, there is simply not such a direct answer as establishing a functionally shared 
communication channel between academia and politics. An effective solution to this paradox, 
as Hale (2008: 16) recaps, is to ensure fostering "collaboration and communication with those 
whose work in NGOs, social movement organisations, businesses, legal advocacy, and other 
arenas that can be improved by social science knowledge—and can challenge social scientists 
to keep improving their own understandings." 
 
Today, one of the most progressive ways in which one can contribute to the literature on 
modern social movements is to develop a comprehensive framework aimed at promoting a 
stronger and more sustainable link between activism and academia which will, in Carpenter's 
(2009: 217) terms, subsequently help "translate activism into liberatory classroom pedagogies 
. . . , [which can in turn] empower people in our communities." Without fully implementing 
this mutually constructive (Woodhouse et al. 2002) theoretical framework, the likelihood of 
reaching a co-beneficial medium is relatively dim. Thus, it is increasingly crucial for leading 
universities in the industrialised democracies to treat Social Sciences in such a way that the 
discipline recurrently "renews itself through direct engagement with practical problems and 
efforts to create a better world" (Hale 2008: 17). Scholarly researchers are (ibid: 22) fully 
capable of helping "activists reflect on their own movements and struggles, partly through 
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knowledge of how other struggles have played out, [. . . bringing] knowledge of tactics to 
expand the repertoires of activists." 
 
Reflexivity in social research goes significantly beyond a static justification of choice. 
Despite the common perception that it is passive or reactionary, self-reflexivity is "a defining 
feature of human consciousness in a postmodern world – a challenge to conventional ideals 
of science which favour professional distance and objectivity over engagement and 
subjectivity" (Finlay and Gough 2003: 1). Adhering to this dynamic analytical framework has 
resulted in this research to transform from an initially linear mission to a highly rewarding 
learning process. When we in social sciences reflect on our strategies, we are simply 
acknowledging a constructive awareness of our inadvertent influences as a scholar on the 
trajectory of our research. It is this so-called postmodern sensibility, as Finlay and Gough 
(ibid: 1) argue, which "compels us to recognise and celebrate diverse, shifting and often 
contradictory self-fragments – to be playful and detached rather than engage seriously with 
questions about true or enduring values." 
 
Perhaps the most invaluable contribution made by the self-reflexivity process to this research 
was the formation of a broader understanding of the scope and nature of practical restrictions 
by which its methodological choices were characterised. As Spencer and Ritchie (2012) 
observe, it happens all too often that researchers "support their findings only with extracts of 
raw data without illustrating how their analytic output was constructed." 
 
Like many other social projects, this research was initially designed based on a largely linear 
hypothesis. Nearly half a decade on, what was resulted was a comprehensive range of 
relatively far more sophisticated insights not only into the social processes involved in online 
censorship in Iran and other repressive states, but more importantly, those into the intrinsic 
challenges associated with the qualitative studies of political repression in general. It is, in the 
opinion of Yardley (2000: 224) vital that the "diversity and mutability which are central to 
[social research] approaches is preserved despite the difficulties this may create for the 
process of communicating the nature and merits of different qualitative methods, and 
developing procedures for verifying the excellence and integrity of research employing 
[them]." In all honesty, researching Iran's online censorship apparatus, despite its very many 
intellectual rewards, has raised more questions for me in terms of political repression than it 
has so far addressed. 
 
The criteria employed to analyse the results of this research were drawn from a selection of 
prominent social research textbooks, although there were admittedly a degree of political 
influences involved. These influences were largely owed to my personal sympathy, if not an 
outright sense of belonging, towards Iran's Green Movement, which was in hindsight integral 
in the project's choice of data sources (i.e. blogs, interviewees, media accounts), as well as its 
design and use of tailored checklists and questionnaires. For example, it can be argued that 
the snowball sampling of the activist Persian weblogs and interviewees resulted in the 
conclusions  to be partially biased, or that too many of the interviewees relied excessively on 
left-oriented published material or media reports, many of which had been already taken into 
account directly by this research. 
 
All these choices and dilemmas made the projected plans for a robust data triangulation more 
challenging to execute, if not impossible. As Tracy (2010: 838) argues, even when 
interpretive measures in social research are entirely founded on scholarly justifications, their 
practical "consequence of any delineation of criteria" is almost invariably political. "Tools, 
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frameworks, and criteria are not value-free. By offering an answer to 'what makes a 
qualitative research study good,' [we must also] thoughtfully attend to the long history and 
controversy that swirls amongst the politics of evidence," she elaborates. The Iranian society 
at large is one characterised by strong popular "support for pro-liberal values such as a belief 
in the importance of self-direction and benevolence" (Porat 2012), as well as by an "uneven 
development of capitalism and industrialisation" (Tohidi 1991: 259). Before one can 
rigorously evaluate the data collected from the field, it is imperative that such influential 
socio-political variants are identified, understood and embedded into the grand scheme of the 
analytical criteria. This study would not have taken place if I were not as intimately familiar 
with, as well as genuinely concerned about, the socio-political issues underlying the questions 
raised regarding the case study under scrutiny. But more importantly, the very same personal 
circumstances and emotional commitments under which this research was conducted were to 
some degree influential on the reliability of the end results. Thus, the key idea here is not to 
focus merely on the notions of access or prior contextual knowledge, but also on one's ability 
to objectively identify, keep up with and process in time a steadily inflowing stream of 
evidence on the highly dynamic subject that is online communication, and during or in the 
aftermath of a major political turmoil. Of course, this may well involve various 
uncomfortable yet sensible decisions and compromises in one's personal ambitions and 
political beliefs. 
 
Not too long ago, when I was presenting a paper extracted from this thesis at an international 
symposium on media and democracy held at the London School of Economics and Politics, a 
senior colleague sitting on the panel told me that she thought I was overstating the case of 
gender gap in Iran, which she said in her opinion was not necessarily at odds with 'normal 
realities' of a non-Western society. Many months on, I am yet to make utter peace about how 
epically distant our perspectives were. As Eyben (2015: 4) explains, upholding a pragmatic, 
multi-disciplinary discussion surrounding the so-called politics of evidence is "mutually 
beneficial and help re-imagine and reconceptualise" the global promotion of human 
development. Without such a constructivist discourse, the horizon of activist scholarship will 
remain unpromising to say the least. In Denzin's (2009: 155) view, there is a sizeable breed of 
research analysts that regards "dispassionate objectivity" as an ultimately ideal practice. 
"Global efforts to impose a new orthodoxy on critical social science inquiry must be resisted. 
A hegemonic politics of evidence cannot be allowed. Too much is at stake", he firmly asserts.  
 
So how exactly can we define a framework which not only openly includes experts from 
various academic disciplines and political backgrounds, but also more vitally enables 
constructive discussions amongst them with the distinct aim of creating a fairer society? 
According to Morse (2006: 395), evidence in social research is made of "concrete and 
indisputable" facts, while politics can be described as "activities concerned with the 
acquisition or exercise of authority [and are] necessarily ephemeral and subjective." During 
the course of this research, there were countless instances where an observed weblog diverted 
abruptly to highly offensive language and other contents due to what I assessed at the time to 
be frustrated radicalisation. Although arguably understandable in context and given the 
surrounding circumstances, the response of this research was almost invariably to eliminate 
the blog in question from the final shortlist. As this project sees it, leaving extreme 
ideological views out of the equation will have to be the only sustainable solution to creating 
a common ground that serves and unites all the reasonable inhabitants of a modern, civilised 
community. I also would like to refer to the ethical principles underlying my initiation of this 
thesis as an 'operational bottom-line', which I hope can help further fade the traditional lines 
of division between classic scholarships and academically validated activist research. 
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Hindsight Reflections: Deconstructing the Research Design in Retrospect 
 
From a methodological perspective, the overall results of the project at hand have largely 
served to uncover new insights to the increasing significance of online observation (Bengry-
Howell et al. 2011) and networking (Hine 2007; 2011), as well as to help justify the 
circumstantial integration of activist spectacles with institutionally approved social research 
techniques (Bryman 2012). 
 
The sampling of the Persian activist weblogs was planned in such a way that they came 
entirely from the 'opposition' camp. This was not to cut any methodological slacks, but rather 
an organised attempt to give an otherwise unheard voice to a relatively sizeable political class 
systematically oppressed since June 2009 (Dabashi 2011; Milani 2010; Tahmasebi-Birgani 
2010). The blogs were seen primarily in the research design as direct, first-hand sources of 
raw information on the Iranian activists' engagement with new ICTs. Although every effort 
was made to validate the true identity of the bloggers, a scant minority remained somewhat 
inconclusive. This has been carefully considered during the analysis phase to ensure 
minimum impact on data authenticity. For instance, in the few cases where the true gender 
identity or the exact geographical location of the blogger could not be confirmed beyond 
reasonable doubt, vigilant care was taken to ensure their exclusion from all processes relating 
directly to the corresponding analytical dimension. 
 
While the sampled interviewee population reflects three distinct categories of experienced 
professionals, it too excluded informants with any past or current known links to the inner 
layers of the Iranian regime. This was mainly to help give a voice to the oppressed 
progressive currents, and to minimise the presence of any ideological or fear-driven bias. 
Among autocratic states worldwide, Iran's online police have a particular reputation (Lock et 
al. 2013: 5) for their "threats against Iranians outside the country who are disenchanted with 
the current government, in some cases leading to detainment and arrest." Setting aside the 
ethical restrictions imposed by institutional regulations, there would have been no viable 
route to methodically obtain and assess the true insights held by top IRGC operatives from an 
academic perspective. 
 
The formal documents reviewed throughout the thesis were selected on a largely inductive 
basis, meaning that their inclusion was influenced significantly by the social patterns 
emerging from the preliminary data analysis. Some publication categories retrieved 
specifically for this project include recent credible studies of the Iranian NIS, country-
specific statistical data based on leading humanitarian NGOs' research, relevant scholarly 
journal and conference papers, investigative reports conducted by prominent news agencies, 
and official analyses, correspondences and statements released by political institutions and 
specialised think tanks in Europe and North America. 
 
The main aim of this study being philanthropic (as opposed to politically motivated) in 
nature, the verified facts extracted from published documents played a big role in validating 
the refined data toward the final stretch of the pre-analysis phase, as well as being highly 
helpful in detecting empirical patterns which could have otherwise remained concealed. This 
aspect of the grand methodology has also been instrumental to drawing and justifying the 
final conclusions – a dynamic approach to qualitative research associated (Adham et al. 2015) 
closely with some of the most impactful scholarly campaigns for the promotion of human 
rights in the relatively young (O'Lear 2015) history of STS. 
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The research methods implemented throughout this project were exclusively crafted to serve 
one crucial end: evaluating the project's core hypothesis on the socio-technical dynamics of 
online innovation among politically progressive Iranian cyber-activists, alongside that of the 
regime's censorship apparatus. While analysing the content of the weblogs proved significant 
to both identifying and explaining the forms of online protest in Iran, the semi-structured 
interviews facilitated the factuality verification process by providing the framework with an 
invaluable set of expert consultations. Finally, the critical review of a relatively large volume 
of officially published online and offline documents revealed an array of essential facts, 
figures and statistic, in addition to contributing extensively to the understanding of the hidden 
subtleties of Iran's cyber-activism scene. On an opposite note, the time limit factor driven by 
personal commitments and circumstances, the lack of sufficient financial resources, and also 
the access issues rooted in ethical and safety concerns raised by the host institution were to 
some degree influential on the general outcome of this thesis. Of course, the successful 
elimination of each of these operational obstacles could have possibly helped further improve 
the overall quality of the produced results by enhancing (Wilkinson 2005) analytical 
precision. 
 
Research Methods: An Overview 
 
The complexity of STS has been routinely undermined by loyal adherents of technological 
determinism. Socio-technical Systems, as Reddy (2013) argues, best benefit from qualitative 
research methods—particularly useful for "examining complex environments where technical, 
organisational and social factors intersect." Much social research in academia employs 
quantitative data collection methods, often ignoring the interpretive nature of the discipline out of 
convenience. This creates distraction in the scholarly literature, as such research typically "fails to 
communicate information clearly or efficiently" (Callahan 2006: 73) at least in certain subjects. 
 
The methodological design of this project has been developed carefully to complement both the 
theoretical framework within which the study is conducted and the sophistications required to 
research repressive countries like Iran. It takes into account the ethical issues which can arise as a 
result of such inquiries. Given that the main conceptual foundations of the research at hand were 
originated in the Northern European states, it was important to demonstrate the structural 
differences at work here. Thus, the sources of data were systematically categorised to help 
explain the reciprocal correlation between political developments and ICT innovations in Iran, 
with the hope that this may help establish a general model to serve other emerging economies in 
the world. 
 
To ensure the reliability and accuracy of the research, three distinct data collection methods were 
adopted, putting the main emphasis on first-hand data collected in relation to Iran as the primary 
case-study, at the same time as enabling systematic triangulation of the results. 
 
The following graph shows the chief sources of data employed by this project: 
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Research Methods: A Tailored Design for a Repressive Context 
 
 
 
Figure 12 
 
The core dataset of this study consisted of the following four general categories: 
 
 Evidence of the structure and functions of Iran's NIS, of its reliance on foreign 
technologies, and of the contribution of Western ICT companies to online censorship 
in Iran. Sources include scholarly journals and print/broadcast/online media outlets. 
 
 Evidence of regime-sponsored hacking attacks aimed at cyber-activists as well as 
evidence of censorship of their efforts and proof of the regime's overall cyber-power. 
Sources include Persian weblogs, technical press/journals and semi-structured 
interviews. 
 
 Evidence of hacking attacks against the regime conducted by local and expatriate 
Iranian pro-democracy activists as well as evidence of the systematic use of anti-
filtering software developed inside and outside Iran. Sources include Persian weblogs 
and semi-structured interviews. 
 
 Key texts of international export policies for dual-purpose ICTs as well as evidence of 
consumer boycotts launched against Western telecommunications technology 
companies that contribute to online censorship in repressive states. Sources include 
official documents published by respective authorities, scholarly journal articles and 
media accounts. 
 
Weblog Content Analysis 
 
This research has generated a set of data on Persian cyber-activists living inside and outside 
Iran, taking into account factors including location, gender, education and technological 
innovativeness. The main purpose of this data collection phase was to help assess the 
computer literacy and innovation capabilities of politically active Persian bloggers, as well as 
the extent of their reliance on foreign anti-censorship software. 
 
Despite the increasing popularity of online social networking, the blogosphere remains the 
most prominent form of pro-democracy cyber-activism in Iran—the youngest and most 
Document Review 
Expert Interviews  
(Scholars, Journalists 
and Bloggers x 17) 
Weblog Content 
Analysis 
(Active Blogs x 65) 
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highly connected country in the Middle East (BBC Persian 2013) and the second largest 
blogging nation in the world (Vakil 2011). Although modern cyber-activism in Iran has roots 
that stretch back into the late 1990s, it was radically transformed following the disputed 
presidential election in June 2009, when the regime's heavy-handed suppression of street 
protesters made ICTs even more relevant to political dissent. The booming number of 
politically motivated Persian blogs makes them a suitable tool for measuring cyber-activism 
in Iran and a symbolic mirror reflecting bottom-up technological creativity. In this social 
movement entirely reliant on ICTs, online innovations are the metaphorical blood in the 
cyber-activists' veins. They should be most visible where the power struggle is fought the 
hardest. 
 
Having examined hundreds of Persian blogs on a longitudinal basis, 65 were eventually 
selected for close monitoring, in a bid to identify and explain the main patterns in the Iranian 
cyber-activists' experiments with online innovation. The blogs were carefully sampled from a 
wide range of options, bearing in mind the following criteria: 
 
 Degree of popularity: Determined in a number of ways, including observing unique 
hit counts and/or taking into account the volume, scale and dominant tone of the user 
comments left on each post. 
 
 Keyword frequency/relevance: Only blogs which actively contributed to the online 
power struggle with the regime were selected. Selection criteria involved developing 
an extensive, context-driven list of Persian keywords known (see Kelly and Etling 
2008) to be closely associated with the pro-democracy discourse within the Persian 
blogosphere. 
 
 Regularity of updates: As a general rule, only blogs whose content frequency did not 
fall under the threshold of one post per two weeks were chosen. This was mainly to 
avoid wasting time on short-term, casual activity, and to ensure that the sampled blogs 
were worthy of analysis. 
 
 Location diversity: The blogs were sampled equally from across an array of websites 
maintained both inside and outside Iran, in order to help analyse and potentially 
distinguish between local and expatriate cyber-activists' innovativeness in relation 
with the online power struggle with the Islamic regime. 
 
 Background diversity: In order to strengthen the reliability of the results of the 
research, the selected blogs were chosen to represent a well-rounded range of 
mainstream netizens. No socio-political class was allowed to dominate the sampling 
range. 
 
Many well-known political bloggers use a 'sidebar,' where they recommend one another's 
blogs to their visitors, creating a massive network of interlinked, likeminded cyber-activists. 
This facilitates browsing through homogeneous blogs and aids the systemisation of sampling. 
The two hundred blogs initially considered were gradually narrowed down to one hundred 
and twenty, of which fifty-five were later eliminated for at least one of the following reasons: 
 
 Lack of sophistication: As the Iranian government increased its pressure on online 
dissidents, a number of anonymous anti-regime blogs made excessive use of 
obscenities. Such sites are often created not by 'genuine' cyber-activists, but instead 
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by frustrated youngsters turning to derogatory language as a means to release 
psychosocial pressure. 
 
 Gradual change of focus: Many young political activists residing in repressive 
countries have an inclination to use blogging websites as a temporary platform to 
practice citizen journalism—an impulsive reaction to political violence. These blogs 
soon tend to either take other, non-political directions or even stop updating 
altogether, as soon as a major flashpoint is over. 
 
 
——— 
 
 
The blogs were analysed using a carefully composed checklist consisting of seven distinct 
questions: 
Blog Analysis Checklist 
 
Question Objective 
1. What is the location of the blogger? 
To help explain the different ways local and 
expatriate Iranian cyber-activists contribute 
to online power struggles with the regime. 
2. What is the gender of the blogger? 
To help clarify differences between how 
male and female Iranian cyber-activists 
contribute to the country's system of online 
innovations, as well as to help measure the 
male/female representation ratio within 
Iran's NIS. 
3. What is the main focus of the updates? 
 
To help look for discussions related to the 
use of technology by Iranian cyber-activists, 
and the contribution of foreign 
telecommunications companies to the 
regime's online policing activities, etc. 
 
4. Does the blogger use their outlet as a means to 
circulate protest/petition/strike calls? 
 
To help find examples of consumer 
boycotts against foreign 
telecommunications companies and their 
influence on lobbying for export controls 
 
 
5. What level of computer literacy does the blogger 
exhibit? 
 
To help understand how the regime's 
restriction of online communications has 
been countered by the cyber-activists' 
innovations, and the extent to which these 
innovations have succeeded 
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6. Does the blogger use their outlet as a means to share 
or obtain technical tips about countering the regime's 
repressive technology, such as how to bypass internet 
filtering, un-jam satellite TV signals, protect online 
identities, increase network security or launch hacking 
attacks on the websites associated with the regime's 
online police? 
To gather specific data on circumvention 
techniques used by cyber-activists 
7. How many regular contributors does each blog 
have? 
 
To help evaluate the ability of online 
technologies to unite like-minded cyber-
activists through enabling and encouraging 
teamwork 
Table 3 
 
Expert Interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used because they are flexible in nature, making them 
suitable for comparison-driven contexts where "more than a few of the open-ended questions 
require follow-up queries" (Adams 2010: 367). Convenient, low-risk access was another 
crucial factor behind the selection of Western-based specialists in preference over those 
directly involved in the crisis. The interviews enabled the collection of an essential dataset on 
the online power struggle in Iran, as well as on the structure and functionality of the country's 
NIS, helping to test the hypothesis of this research as well as answer its main questions. 
Highly experienced in their respective fields, the participants were viewed as professional 
consultants, whose insights proved valuable to the verification of the blog findings. 
 
Structured interviews generate quantitative results, making them unsuitable for qualitative 
research. The significance of semi-structured interviews to qualitative research is that the 
method facilitates informed interpretation—valuable in social research—and consequently 
allows for more in-depth investigation. This makes it possible, as Barriball and while (1994: 
330) explain, for the same question to be rephrased over and over again, refined to be more 
fitting for participants with various understandings of certain terms or concepts. As they put 
it, in semi-structured interviews, "validity and reliability depend not upon the repeated use of 
the same words in each question, but upon conveying equivalence of meaning. It is this 
equivalence of meaning which helps to standardise the semi-structured interview and 
facilitate comparability." Given the professional diversity of the population of interviewees in 
this study, only a semi-structured approach could deliver the refined results typically 
demanded by a post-graduate research project of such vast scope. 
 
Seventeen experts were interviewed in total. The informants were chosen based on the chain 
referral or 'snowball' sampling method. They comprised a range of prominent figures, divided 
into three distinct categories of bloggers/activists, scholars and technology journalists. 
Snowball sampling is particularly beneficial in identifying and explaining relationships and 
characteristics important to a specific community in regards to an explicit research topic 
(Atkinson and Flint 2001; Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). All the participants were fully 
briefed on the aims, objectives and likely future implications of the research; none objected to 
the public disclosure of their true identity in the final dissertation. The mode and length of the 
interviews varied due to several factors such as the participants' availability. No electronic 
recording of any kind was involved during the entire process, in order to both encourage 
honesty and avoid ethical complications. The majority of the conversations were conducted 
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in person, but alternative means of communication such as regular telephone, Skype and 
other secure online chatting services were also employed on a few occasions due to timing 
and/or accessibility issues. 
 
The interview material for this research was gathered in person (i.e. face-to-face discussion) as a 
general rule, although there were multiple instances where follow-up questions and clarification 
requests were communicated to some of the interviewees through email, telephone or Skype. In 
order to maintain ethical integrity, it was decided at the outset to not record any of the interviews 
electronically. Instead, shorthand and other personalised coding and summarising techniques 
were used to document the participants' comments and answers. The full interview transcripts 
were later on assessed in relation to a checklist developed based on analytical dimensions 
emerging from the activist Persian weblogs and published documents, and with careful attention 
to the core expertise of every informant. Where shorthand was employed, reasonable care was 
taken to preserve the integrity of the provided responses, by revisiting the interview notes in a 
disturbance-free physical setting and immediately following the event. Also, in many instances 
the full edited scripts were shared in writing with the respondents, who almost consistently 
confirmed their general satisfaction with the conceptual authenticity of the quotes. Where there 
were issues raised, amendments were made upon request. 
 
——— 
 
The following table shows a list of the core questions provided to the interviewees, as well as 
the research objective each question specifically serves: 
 
Interview Questions 
 
Question Objective 
1. Where do you place social networking and 
politically motivated hacking attacks in the 
online power struggle between the regime and 
the cyber-activists in Iran? 
To help determine the relationship between online 
innovations and political processes and underline 
the technological elements contributing to 
repression, as well as those encouraging democratic 
activity 
 
2. What is the contribution of the government / 
IRGC-owned companies and institutions (i.e. 
universities) to the development of the Iranian 
regime's censorship / surveillance 
infrastructure? 
 
To help clarify the Defence Ministry's / IRGC's 
extent of influence on the regime's innovation 
policies and strategies in the field of online 
technologies 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-
reliant in terms of producing censorship / 
surveillance technology? Why? 
To help explain the structure and functionality of 
the Iranian regime's system of online innovations 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, 
particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens 
Networks (NSN) in the repression of the cyber-
activists in Iran? 
To reveal if foreign telecommunications technology 
companies have helped address the issues faced by 
the Iranian regime with regards to its system of 
online innovations and the extent of this assistance 
 
5. How do you think international legislators 
(e.g. the European Parliament) can address the 
above issue through policy? 
To help better regulate the export of dual-purpose 
telecommunications technologies by foreign 
companies to repressive countries such as Iran 
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6. What are the main anti-censorship / 
surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How widespread are such practices? 
 
To help identify the main sources of the software 
currently used by the Iranian cyber-activists and 
explain the innovation processes leading to such 
technologies 
 
7. What are the main sources behind the 
development of the anti-censorship / 
surveillance software currently used by Iranian 
cyber-activists? 
Same as above 
8. How do you differentiate the local and expat 
Iranian cyber-activists' role in their power 
struggle with the regime? 
 
To help distinguish the different ways in which 
local and expatriate Iranian cyber-activists have 
influenced processes involved in the invention of  
anti-censorship/surveillance technologies 
Table 4 
 
Document Review 
 
Aside from its grounding in the scholarly literature, this research also chose to assess a series 
of official documents as part of its analytical framework, a full list of which can be found 
under appendices. 
 
These documents include journalistic accounts and editorials published in credible 
mainstream news media (e.g. BBC, Bloomberg, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, etc.) 
and legal statements issued formally by the EU, UN and US authorities, with a special focus 
on official declarations reflecting the West's latest policies on the trade of ICTs with the 
Iranian regime. In addition, a series of relevant online and offline public communications 
were examined, such as NSN's press releases issued in response to the allegations of business 
misconduct in Iran. 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
The data collected for this research has been analysed using manual qualitative techniques. 
 
With regards to the Persian blogs, the results were initially broken down and laid out in MS 
Word tables, in accordance with the provided checklist. These were then rigorously 
scrutinised for emerging patterns in the use of online technologies, bearing in mind a 
combination of demographic, cultural, social and psychological variants. These patterns were 
then reviewed and translated into a range of simplified, relatable charts and graphs, using MS 
Excel and Adobe Photoshop. 
 
Regarding the interviews, an inductive analysis was performed on the raw transcriptions to 
help detect patterns that could help validate or dismiss the hypothesis and to answer the main 
research questions. A carefully filtered extraction of the interviewees' answers was outlined, 
processed and visualised in the same fashion as the blog contents. 
 
Weighing the above two datasets against one another significantly facilitated the analysis: 
unsubstantiated arguments were eliminated, boosting the accuracy of the proposed claims. 
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The refined outcomes of the preliminary and secondary stages of data analysis were then 
finalised by being passed through a fact-checking framework, consisting mostly of published 
scholarly and journalistic documents. 
 
In order to assure robust results, conclusions were based on the outcome of this triangulation 
process. A copy of the analysis tables and formulas can be found under Appendices. 
 
Ethical Clearance 
 
Formal approval of the University Research Ethics Committee (UREC) was granted on 5 
October 2011 (See Appendices for a copy of the certificate). 
 
With regard to the blogs analysed, no private or public contact was conducted with any of the 
bloggers at any stage of the study, and the true identity of the bloggers was kept fully hidden 
unless disclosed via a public profile page. The emergence of the online sphere has unsettled 
the principles of qualitative research, causing a multitude of complexities over the past two 
decades, especially in the field of Social Sciences (Masson et al. 2013). Yet there is no real 
reason why the internet should not be treated similarly to its offline equivalents, except in a 
few infrequent enough instances. Data willingly posted on a communal domain, where 
authors cannot typically choose their audiences, can legitimately be treated as public, 
especially as this domain is commonly known to be communal and to operate in this manner. 
Eysenbach and Till (2001: 1104) insist that informed consent is a necessity, "when behaviour 
of research participants occurs in a private context where an individual can reasonably expect 
that no observation or reporting is taking place." Privacy, as Kuper et al. (2008: 689) argue, 
becomes an ethical issue only "when data constitute personal reports of experience or 
perception," and it would be safe to suggest that overtly presented political arguments do not 
fall under the category of confidential data. Nonetheless, any technical details likely to help 
divulge the bloggers' true identity were removed from the final manuscript. 
 
Although the preliminary methodological framework of this thesis was designed to rely 
mostly on first-hand data, reported data (i.e. media accounts, expert interviews, etc.) became 
increasingly integral to the research process, due to various access issues amongst others. 
This subsequently had profound theoretical implications for the end results in terms of both 
analysis and validation. As Jick (1979: 608–9) assesses, primary—or directly collected—data 
can be central to the quality of analysis in a social research project. "While one can rely on 
certain scientific conventions for maximising the credibility of one's findings, the researcher 
using triangulation is likely to rely still more on a 'feel' of the situation . . . Situational factors 
play a prominent role [in illuminating behaviour in context]," he argues. Such unfiltered 
experience of the matters would have been empirically invaluable to the authenticity of this 
project, by assisting to provide a considerably more in-depth explanation of how Iran's cyber-
activist network of innovation functions and communicates. 
 
Nonetheless, the resulting void within the core dataset was rectified to some extent through 
admitting a systematically vetted repertoire of published documents and reports. According to 
Hox and Boeije (2005: 598), researchers working with secondary data must consider 
carefully whether the data appropriately fit their research question. "In general, it is 
acceptable if the limitations of the available data limit the secondary analysis to some extent, 
for instance, by impeding tests of some specific hypothesis. However, it is not acceptable if 
the limitations of the data make it necessary to change the research question in order to be 
able to use them at all," they emphasise. Perhaps the main intellectual lesson arising from the 
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extensive employment of secondary sources for this thesis was learning to differentiate in 
practice the 'impossible' and the 'unlikely' in academic social research, and more importantly 
to vigilantly look out for and try to manage efficiently any instances of previously 
unfathomable data-hypothesis clash, where the truth is "sometimes uncomfortable" 
(Lieberson 1989: 60). After all, the final verdict was clear: despite all the positive 
contributions and outcomes, the idea of gaining a fully comprehensive insight into Iran's most 
secretive layers of political opposition from afar was a socio-technically ambitious one to say 
the least. 
 
Secondary data can often make it much more difficult for the researcher to monitor and 
preserve the quality of the results. Social research involving secondary reporting usually 
dictates that "additional information [are] archived with the data itself . . . [and] to make 
certain that such additional metadata describing the data and their quality are in fact 
available" (ibid: 598). This is particularly noteworthy due to the characteristically tempting 
nature of philanthropic inquiries, which can easily lure the researcher into gathering a far 
larger quantity of raw data than a self-funded, independent academic project is typically 
capable of processing. Consistent with the argument of Hox and Boeije, this thesis resonates 
widely in hindsight with Greene's (1995: 16) search for a formal model of social science data 
and its analysis, "which can directly guide the design of documentation and metadata." 
Although viewed initially by this project as a productive strategy reassuring accuracy, soon 
organisational challenges began surfacing as a result of data overload, somewhat disrupting 
the projected completion timeline of the thesis. The most recently occurred example of this 
methodological chaos was an unforeseen, urgent need to revisit a large portion of the 
published materials referenced throughout the dissertation, which proved to be highly 
troubling due to a lack of proper archiving, as well as to the ephemeral nature of online 
content. 
 
In terms of source protection, the interviewees consisted only of Western nationals and 
expatriate Iranians, all of whom were fully briefed. They were also informed about their right 
to withdraw from participation. All gave their informed consent to inclusion in this research. 
 
Finally, the documents reviewed for this research were all openly published legal 
communications downloaded from certified websites, the scrutiny of which is highly unlikely 
to raise any ethical complications for individuals or institutions involved. 
 
A triangulated, thorough analysis of the main research findings follows in the next chapter. 
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Chapter iv: Democratic Structure, Bimodality and NIS—A 
Triangulated Analysis of Innovation Patterns and Processes 
within Iran's Online Sphere 
 
The following chapter aims to present and analyse key findings of the research in light of the 
hypothesis. This will include empirical evidence of the bimodality and dysfunction of Iran's 
National Innovation System when compared to Freeman and Lundvall's classic NIS model, as 
well as the existence of socially shaped innovation patterns within the country's cyber-activist 
community. I will then explore a proposed, alternative model of national innovation and 
examine its potential transferability to other politically repressive environments on the basis 
of a set of indicators such as gender equality, geographical location of cyber-activists and 
democratic features of the given innovation systems in individual countries. These indicators 
were identified through blog content analysis, expert interviews and document analysis. 
 
Activism in Iran: Where Do ICTs Stand? 
 
While the structure and functionality of an NIS does not automatically dictate the balance of 
power in a repressive country, it is an accurate determinant of various influential actors' 
potential competence in the hostile, often highly divided political discourse existing in such 
states. The separation of Iran's NIS into two isolated, disproportionately funded sub-systems 
is likely to have disrupted the fair distribution of the means of research and development in 
the country, preventing healthy, merit-based competition and collaboration among the 
institutions, enterprises and universities involved. The half of the country's NIS loyal to—and 
supervised by—high-ranking security officials within the regime has been weakened by the 
bimodality of Iran's NIS, along with Western trade restrictions and sanctions, depriving it of 
an irreplaceable source of domestic scientific expertise.  
 
A similar case can be made for the other half of the NIS—taken to consist of politically more 
moderate, pro-democracy schools of thought inside and outside of Iran. Apart from 
explaining Iran's largely under-documented NIS, this analysis can be used directly in the 
scrutiny of the effects of imported technologies on the regime's ability to repress political 
dissent, as well as to cyber-activists' counter-repressive abilities. Hence, it can be used when 
seeking to influence the balance of power in the country's highly polarised online political 
discourse, where an increasingly intense clash of interests is currently in progress. 
 
Iran has not only the youngest and most highly educated population in the Middle East but 
also the highest rate of connectivity in the region. These factors, along with dissatisfaction of 
Iranian middle class youth at the regime's stance on civil liberties as demonstrated in the 
street protests in 2009 as well as in the landslide victory of the only non-conservative 
presidential candidate in 2013, have made the internet a key sphere for dissidents. 
 
Online media have now moved to the frontline of the country's political discourse. As shown 
in the table below, about three quarters of the interviewees believed that the internet as a 
medium has a role in the conflict in question, while only one contested the significance of 
online technology. 
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The only respondent who largely discounts the importance of online communication methods 
to the power struggle in Iran is Dr. Randy Kluver, Associate Professor in the Department of 
Communication at Texas A&M University and Executive Director in the Office of 
International Affairs there, who thinks that on its own, "social networking is not all that 
important," except for its ability "to develop networks of resistance." With regards to hacking 
attacks, he believes that they are "primarily symbolic, and [have] no real function other than 
to say 'we were here.'" This comment tends to capture the essence of the constructivist 
approach toward cyber-activism and supports the case of the critics of technological 
determinism such as Mackenzie and Wajcman (1985), the developers of the Social Shaping 
of Technology theory, who suggested that the way technology affects society is largely a 
consequence of the way the society itself relates to technology and is, therefore, context-
driven. They argue that this, in turn, influences the direction and pattern of future 
technological innovations in a given field. 
 
Although a dominant majority of the participants confirm the significance of online media to 
political developments in Iran, there seems to be a divisive disagreement amongst them with 
regards to how ICTs influence activism and the nation. Dr. Alexander Dawoody, Assistant 
Professor of Public Policy at Marywood University, sees cyber-activism as merely useful to 
the Iranian diaspora with very limited domestic capacity to effect change. On the other hand, 
Elahe Boghrat, a journalist at the London-based online newspaper Kayhan, finds both online 
social networking and hacking attacks to be greatly useful to the Iranian cyber-activists, "as 
online activism does not usually lead to torture and violent death." Dr. James Fielder, Air 
Force Major and scholar in International Relations and Comparative Politics, observes that 
social networking has much more weight than hacking attacks in Iranian contexts and states 
that even when hacking attacks are employed they are "used to evade censors rather than to 
carry out offensive attacks," elaborating that "maintaining reliable communication channels 
appear[s] more important." 
 
Dr. Tessa Houghton fully agrees with the statement that social networking sites represent a 
greater potential threat to the regime that hacking attacks, as "they have the potential to 
facilitate organisation and solidarity amongst much greater numbers of people than single 
instances of . . . DDoS or defacements." Layla Hashemi, Professor of History and Political 
0 0 
2 
3 
1 
5 
2 
4 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Very Low Low Medium
Low
Medium Medium
High
High Very High No
Comment
Expert Survey: The Significance of Online 
Technology to Political Activism in Iran 
Figure 13 
  
55 
Science at Montgomery College, Nassim Nazemi, Juris Doctor and Law Clerk at the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and Kevin Coleman, Senior Fellow at 
Technolytics Institute, all see the internet as a key component in Iranian politics and of great 
value to Iran's civil rights movement, as it is unbound by geographical specification. Mr. 
Coleman goes on further to rate the influence of both social media and hacking attacks on 
political activism in Iran: 
 
Social Networking Sites (1 = Low, 3 = Medium, 5 = High): 
• 4.0 with a potential of 4.4 
 
Hacktivism (1 = Low, 3 = Medium, 5 = High): 
• 3.5 with a potential of 4.2 
 
Other experts expand the focus beyond the cyber-activist zone and discuss online innovations 
in a broader context inclusive of the government and pro-regime activists. The overall view 
of Dr. Jed Crandall, Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the University of New 
Mexico, is that the internet is ultimately in service of repression, briefly explaining that "the 
government could be using man-in-the-middle attacks to steal [a cyber-activist's] username 
and password and then monitor their activities and tie particular people to specific social 
media posts." If this claim is true, then the scholarly community will have very little choice 
but to conclude that the online sphere is not a significant or even suitable communication 
method for political activism, as counter-innovations will hardly have any significance in an 
environment where the oppressive force inevitably has the upper hand. 
 
Neal Ungerleider, Social Media Consultant and International Technology and Cyber-security 
Reporter at Fast Company, argues that social networking is primarily useful to the Iranian 
activist diaspora and their sympathisers, adding that "DDoS, malware and phishing attacks 
against cyber-activists are common at the hands of the Iranian government and regime 
supporters." This portrayal, which assigns social networking to the activist groups and 
hacking attacks to the repressive force, is one that particularly underlines the role of social 
processes in systematic innovation. If we assume that repressive regimes have small popular 
bases within the nations they rule, we can see why they need to invest a relatively 
disproportionate amount of resources in top-down, commissioned technological innovations. 
This stands against the crowd-sourced, bottom-up and more democratically driven innovation 
system established in the activist community, which is primarily empowered by concepts 
such as social collaboration, virality and dark humour, as well as a non-specialised and often 
experimental foundation of ICT-mediated networking knowledge, all tied together by a 
shared sense of motivation rooted in a common political goal.  
 
Taking into account Boudreau and Lakhani's (2013: 7) argument that "crowds . . . are 
energised by intrinsic motivations . . . that are more likely to come into play when people 
decide for themselves what problems to attack," the Persian online sphere must consist of 
motivated individuals who have, out of necessity, resorted to acquiring knowledge that could 
potentially help them with day-to-day technological challenges they face on the internet as a 
result of the Islamic Republic's censorship policies. This configuration and situation has 
resulted in the formation of what this research calls a Cyber-activist Innovation System (CIS), 
characterised by its sharp focus on anti-censorship activities. The existence of such a 
community network is particularly manifest in the recurrent appearance of a 'recommended 
bloggers' sidebar on politically active Persian blogs, revealing the depth of interconnectivity 
among Iranian cyber-activists. 
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Dr. Ulises Mejias, Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at the State University of 
New York at Oswego, does not deny the ability of social networking tools to organise 
activism and disseminate information, but believes that this mode of cyber-activism is not as 
directly confrontational as politically motivated hacking attacks. He, however, argues that the 
importance of cyber-activism might be slightly overrated "in Iran, where the government has 
at its disposal the same tools other governments have to monitor, track, and block online 
activities, but is willing to use them more overtly to stifle dissent." Madeline Storck, scholar 
in International Relations and Affairs and in Media and Communications, agrees and further 
criticises the media's tendency to use unscientific terms such as “Twitter revolution" or 
"Facebook revolution" when referring to the popular uprisings in the Middle East. She 
suggests this trend "relies on broad assumptions about the democratic nature of the internet, 
ignoring the importance of context, both cultural and historical," particularly in Iran, where 
the regime "is known to have one of the most advanced systems of networked 
authoritarianism in the world, perhaps second only to China." 
 
The above findings underline the importance of innovation processes in shaping the balance 
of power in a repressive state such as Iran. Moreover, they justify the new theoretical 
framework proposed by this research. While most studies about the issue focus on 
conventional, static anti-censorship techniques common in cyber-activism, the contextual 
realities in Iran reflect a rather different portrait. The research at hand shows that not only are 
the majority of the users alien to advanced anti-censorship technology, but also that the 
regime continuously detects and disables such tools with various borrowed filtering 
techniques. 
 
Anti-Censorship Innovations: How Do They Emerge? 
 
The dynamics of innovation in both of Iran's NIS modes are interconnected. If we examine 
the conflict from a pro-democracy perspective, we see that Iran's cyber-activists play off the 
regime's oppressive policies, acting primarily in reaction to its moves. Their main endeavour 
is to reclaim universally recognised civil rights of free speech and the right to information. 
The regime, by making ideology-driven technological choices with typically repressive 
repercussions, drives the conflict against itself and remains responsible for intensifying a fire 
already consuming the country's resources. 
 
It must be noted, however, that online proxies known as anonymisers have never really been 
a fully viable solution for Iranian activists, due to many limitations they have as well as to the 
generally very slow speed of 'broadband' connections in Iranian homes. That is why Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs), or cheap sources of "tunnelling, encryption, authentication and 
access control technologies and services used to carry traffic over the internet" 
(Balasubramanian et al. 2014), have become so popular with Iranian internet users in recent 
years. The wide availability of VPNs in the Iranian online market, however, should not be 
assessed merely from a technological perspective without paying close attention to the socio-
political realities of the country. Users may favour VPNs for various technical reasons 
including their convenience and ease of use, acceptable speeds and even relatively cheap 
prices. But I argue that VPNs equally serve the regime. Those observers and commentators 
who see VPNs as an effective response to the regime's censorship policies may need to 
consider asking why such services are sold legally and often by the very same ISPs that offer 
filtered connections in the first place. 
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Paid-for and free VPN and proxy connections are becoming increasingly popular in Iran. In 
one instance only, American-based non-profit organisation Pillar Fourth Committee (2011) 
announced that they had started providing one million secure connections to the Internet 
users in Iran in the first phase of a project which, if successful, could expand to serve a much 
larger population.  
 
Meanwhile the legality of VPNs remains subject to debate amongst the country's decision-
making elite to date. Tabnak (2009), a Persian news website close to moderate conservative 
Mohsen Rezaie, the former head of IRGC, quotes the seventh amendment of the fifth section 
of the country's cybercrime law in deeming "distribution of anti-filtering software or of any 
information which can potentially facilitate neutralisation of the filtering system" as illegal. 
Gerdab (2010), a website linked to the high-ranking, hard-line security officials operating 
within FETA and IRGC warns users that bypassing online filters is a crime and that engaging 
in such activity is punishable by imprisonment (from 91 days to a year) or/and a financial fine 
ranging from 500,000 to 2 million Tomans ($200 to $800). However, Hamshahri Online 
(2011), another virtual Persian news service published by the office of the currently 
conservative Mayor of Tehran, questions the authenticity of such claims, arguing that such 
decisions are usually made by the Committee for Determining Criminal Content, a parallel 
panel of highly conservative officials, known to be directly responsible for implementing 
filtering technologies inside the country. The paper quotes Ali Motahari, the head of the 
Iranian Parliament's Communications Committee explaining that while the law currently 
forbids using anti-filtering software, VPNs are indeed legal as they are not specifically 
designed for circumventing online filters and have vital data protection functions for 
individual users and businesses. Hoghooghdanan (2011), an online society for the Iranian 
lawyers, also clarifies in an article titled "The Legal Debate over the Use of VPNs" that 
virtual private networks are perfectly legal to use, according to the current domestic laws. 
 
Justifying VPNs in public adverts by emphasising their security-oriented qualities, rather than 
their capacity to serve as proxies, not only helps government-run service providers enjoy an 
increasingly profitable source of income, but also allows them to secretly police and perhaps 
intercept a huge portion of personal communications otherwise hard to hack. More 
importantly, the prevalence of VPNs allows the regime to cut off the connectivity of 
somewhat select users during political turmoil without having to pull the plug on the 
country's internet altogether. In a highly critical article titled "Governmentalisation of A Civil 
Affair," Alef (2012), a Persian news website associated with Ahmad Tavakkoi, a non hard-
line, Western-educated conservative figure and parliament member, states that "if we suppose 
that 20 million out of the roughly 34 million Iranian users who regularly access Google and 
Gmail services inside the country have turned to VPN services following their blockage, and 
given that these services cost, in average, 30,000 Tomans (just over $12) per month, a 
staggering profit of 60 billion Tomans (nearly $2.5m) must have been generated within only 
the first two days." 
 
Despite the regime declaring certain uses of VPNs to be illegal outright, the fact that most of 
these services are subject to identical price tariffs and offer substantially similar technological 
guarantees makes it hard not to assume a connection between the businesses in question and 
those ultimately responsible for the filtering technologies applied in the country. 
 
Following the regime's inability to fully justify a criminalisation of VPNs by stretching a 
certain section of the local cyber laws, the online economic news website Donya-E-Eqtesad 
(2013a) in July 2013 quoted the former TCI Minister announcing his nationwide plan to 
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regulate VPNs through monopolisation of the market in favour of the government and 
thereby ban the private sector from participation. Based on this, the regime would be able 
both to decide if an individual is eligible to own a secure connection and to regularly monitor 
this person's traffic to ensure 'legal' usage. Only a month later, however, the same newspaper 
(2013b) revealed the complete failure of the domestic VPN project, quoting Mahmoud 
Khosravi, the head of the contracting firm in charge, who confirmed that despite spending 
billions of Tomans (millions of USDs), only 26 companies applied for their version of VPN. 
 
Policy confusion like this could be a consequence of the Iranian regime suffering from too 
many parallel decision-making bodies with often inconsistent and sometimes opposing views. 
For instance, the Persian news web portal Shahrzad News (2012) reported that following the 
regime's decision to block an array of high profile email services and search engines such as 
Gmail and Google, many governmental institutions had to take matters in their own hand and 
equip their staff with the very software deemed illegal in order to be able to continue with 
everyday duties. This is simply because there are absolutely no domestically developed 
services that can remotely compare with such sophisticated tools. The BBC Persian service 
(2013) highlighted this insufficiency by pointing out that Chinese internet users "operate on 
home grown sites like Weibo, the Twitter equivalent micro-blogging site, and Baidu, a local 
search engine that is more popular than Google," unlike in technologically dependent 
dictatorships such as Iran, where citizens rely on foreign services. The article in question also 
cites Mahmoud Enayat of the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) stating, "there are Iranian 
equivalents to Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, but none of them has been successful. The 
likes of Baidu are built by the private sector in China. That can't happen in Iran, as Iranian 
companies haven't been able to generate an income stream." 
 
Various Iranian cyber-activists based in-country and abroad have regularly reported on 
changes regarding the development of the filtering system in the country via updates on 
social networking services, mainly Twitter and Facebook. The micro-blogging website 
Twitter has been an integral part of almost every major social mobilisation around the world 
since shortly after its creation in 2006—Iran's Green Movement was among the first globally 
scalable political movements that embedded the tool in its protests. What distinguished 
Twitter from many other less successful micro-blogging platforms was, according to Time 
(2009), that "it's free, highly mobile, very personal and very quick. It's also built to spread, 
and fast . . . Twitter is promiscuous by nature: tweets go out over two networks, the internet 
and SMS, the network that cell phones use for text messages, and they can be received and 
read on practically anything with a screen and a network connection." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
——— 
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The following snapshots of a sympathetic foreign Twitter user's updates calling for hacking 
attacks to be launched on hard-line websites demonstrate how the service was employed by 
some non-local cyber-activists to support the Green Movement. 
 
Twitter: Politically Motivated Hacking Attacks Go Viral 
 
 
Figure 14 (Twitter 2009, cited by Gadzetomania 2009) 
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Local cyber-activists in Iran, however, had bigger problems to deal with. The following 
example shows a familiar 'error message' an Iranian web user tended to face at the time—a 
government-inflicted outage of online security protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL): 
 
Google Chrome: SSL Connection Error 
 
 
Figure 15 (Iran Media Program 2012) 
 
The innovative use of Twitter by Iranian cyber-activists during the 2009 protests presents a 
particularly noteworthy case, where Twitter offered participants a telephone number to call in 
order to communicate their Tweets as regular voice messages. These 'alternative' Tweets 
were recorded onto the Twitter servers and immediately made available as audio files for 
other users worldwide. This experiment was later developed into a popular service during the 
2011 Egyptian uprising, the result of a joint project between Twitter and Google named 
Speak2Tweet. This creative, timely cooperation between two powerful foreign online 
empires, as Joudeh (2011) argues, simply helped "keep information flowing despite state 
efforts to shape the public narrative." 
 
Despite a mainstream perception which often reduces expatriate cyber-activists to side-lined 
observers merely holding up a mirror to events inside their respective countries, there is 
evidence suggesting that such communities are becoming increasingly independent from their 
local counterparts, whose reactions to change are no longer necessarily more timely than 
those based abroad due to various technological advances. A simple example of such 
independent initiative comes via the following website which helps non-locals determine the 
latest filtering status of individual URLs within Iran: 
 
Censorship Sniffer: Is 'This' Blocked in Iran? 
 
 
 
Figure 16 (Deutsche Welle 2013) 
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In a feature story titled "Who Is Smarter: Internet Users Or Filtering Officials," the 
conservative online news outlet Mashregh News (2012) admitted the existence of an 
innovation-oriented pool of thousands of geographically disconnected local Iranian internet 
users managing to come up with creative ways to bypass filtering, noting there is almost 
nothing the government can do to respond in real time. Perhaps that is why online Persian 
scientific news website Dana Khabar (2013) warns users about a possible nationwide 
disconnection from all types of VPN. The article explains that VPNs can be easily taken 
down by disabling a handful of critical tunnelling ports such as Point-to-Point Tunneling 
Protocol (PPTP), Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol (SSTP) and Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol 
(L2TP), and points out that the regime may alternatively resort to replacing the internet with a 
'purified' national intranet, which might only allow access to a limited number of 'licensed' 
locally-hosted websites. 
 
It would be extremely difficult to retrieve any meaningful, reliable information on issues such 
as this directly from the regime due to its closed nature on matters of what it deems as 
security-oriented data. This may be why about one third of the surveyed experts felt unable to 
comment on the matter. A majority of the participants, however, believed that conventional, 
non-VPN, anti-censorship techniques such as TOR and Psiphon are common among and a 
practical solution for Iranian cyber-activists (Wired 2013). 
 
 
Figure 17 
 
Dr. Babak Rahimi, Associate Professor of Iranian and Islamic Studies at the University of 
California at San Diego, puts a lot of weight on VPNs as the most effective and widespread 
anti-censorship solution in Iran due to their effective performance and relatively cheap cost. 
Neal Ungerleider and Dr. James Fielder are the only other respondents who specifically 
acknowledged VPNs as a practical anti-censorship solution. The former, however, rejects the 
idea that they are a 'common' anti-censorship technology, indicating that only a small 
minority of users have the knowledge and skill to fully and correctly deploy them. 
Conversely, Dr. Fielder refuses to undermine the social impact of the older 'generation' of 
online proxy tools such as the TOR network, BitTorrent, CC Proxy, EZ Proxy, Simurgh 
(seemed to be developed domestically) and other similarly coded software 'solutions'. He, 
unlike the above two experts, believes that "the only practical and reliable method to evade 
Iran's censorship regime is through an unblocked proxy server," not the government-
regulated VPNs, elaborating that "it becomes a game of cat and mouse between the activists 
0 
1 1 1 
0 
4 4 
6 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Low Low Medium
Low
Medium Medium
High
High Very High No
Comment
Expert Survey: The Commonness and Practicality of  
Conventional Anti-Censorship Technologies in Iran 
  
62 
and the regime, with the activists finding or building new proxies as Iran's Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology sniffs them out." 
 
The pattern by which politically motivated technological innovations affect Iran's online 
sphere may best be explained through Von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) Game 
Theory, also known as Interactive Decision Theory. When applied to the discipline of 
Political Science, it describes strategic, informed choices made by two or more actors 
involved in a zero-sum conflict (Myerson 1991). From an IS standpoint, political conflicts are 
often a particularly prolific environment for technological innovations by all parties involved. 
As Gregory Asmolov (2012, cited by iRevolution 2012) acknowledges in his study of digital 
resistance in Russia, "innovations are created by the oppressed, who try to challenge the 
existing balance of power by using new tools and technologies, but the state can also adapt 
and adopt some of these technologies to protect the status quo." Perhaps the most outstanding 
feature of the Asmolov's work is its unique emphasis on the importance of how protesters, 
rather than necessarily creating new technological tools themselves, innovatively adopt 
existing new technologies in favour of their cause. 
 
A large portion of the expert participants in this research agree to some extent with Dr. 
Fielder regarding Iranian cyber-activists' widespread and successful deployment of proxy 
servers—a testament to the fact that the regime has been largely unsuccessful in its filtering 
efforts. Also, the active presence of many senior Iranian figures on popular social networking 
websites such as Facebook and Twitter (Telegraph 2013) proves that the government takes 
these tools seriously and is aware of their penetration within Iranian society, despite the 
official ban imposed on them. 
 
Dr. Tessa Houghton, Assistant Professor of Media and Communication at the University of 
Nottingham, confirms that proxies and other tools of firewall circumvention are the activists' 
most commonly used technologies, but underlines that these techniques are used not only by 
this community alone, but also by many other internet users across the country. In her view, 
"these tools are very practical, and great for promoting solidarity and co-ordination . . .and 
thus exert pressure for change either indirectly or directly." 
 
Providing individuals with a circuit-based "mechanism of communicating anonymously on 
the internet" (Thomas and Mohaisen 2014: 173) and initially brought up in Dr. Fielder's 
interview, the TOR project appeared repeatedly throughout the surveyed experts' answers. 
Dr. Jed Crandall clarified that he had no credible data on the current state of affairs in Iran, 
but suggested that those behind TOR were the right people to approach. While none of the 
experts actively involved in TOR were available to comment on the record, Dr. Marcus 
Michaelsen, a scholar of Communication Science, claims that Iranians are one of the biggest 
user groups on TOR—averaging almost 50,000 daily users, including not only activists but 
also ordinary people seeking to access all kinds of blocked content. He disclosed that 
"someone from TOR told me that the Iranian authorities are not very successful in 
discovering connections to the TOR network and that the TOR people were able to quickly 
counter the few attempts made with deep packet inspection." Dr. Nassim Nazemi, too, has 
observed that Iranian cyber-activists evade detection and circumvent censorship primarily by 
routing traffic through proxies and masking their IP addresses. She adds, however, that the 
reason why these categories of software solutions, led by TOR, are not more popular is that 
they perform relatively poorly on low-speed networks. 
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Samples produced by a longitudinal (2008–2010) study of Twitter suggest that Iran is the 
second largest market for TOR, only after densely populated China (Nawaat 2010). The same 
study also finds Iranians predominant users of other popular proxy software such as Psiphon 
and Sesawe. Meanwhile, other democracy advocates have created multifunctional anti-
censorship bundles based on existing, open-source technology and aimed not necessarily only 
at repressive countries. Pirate Browser is a popular example: 
 
PirateBrowser: Open Source Programming at Counter-Censorship Service 
 
 
Figure 18 (Eddy 2013) 
 
In the same way, LimeWire, a popular, free peer-to-peer online file sharing software 
promoted itself via an ad-banner campaign during Iran's post-election turmoil encouraging 
Iranians to defy the regime's censorship by using their software to circulate videos of the 
protests: 
 
LimeWire: Peer-to-Peer Networking to Fight Online Censorship 
 
 
Figure 19 (Roettgers 2009) 
 
Yet Limewire was ordered to shut down by a US Federal Court injunction in October 2010, 
and found liable for causing financial damages to record labels by allowing its users to breach 
copyright law (Guardian 2010). Such heavy-handed responses to software allowing the free 
exchange of protected content has caused significant citizen backlash in Western countries, 
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including the founding of the Pirate Party—a political party first formed in Sweden in 2006 
that promotes openness on the internet and now officially operates in 43 countries worldwide. 
The US governments' war on 'online piracy' has had a negative impact on pro-democracy 
cyber-activists worldwide. If put into practice, ATandT's latest 'anti-piracy' technology, under 
which "users [would be] assigned to a so-called risk class, and as a result alleged pirates may 
have their access to file-sharing sites blocked" (Torrent Freak 2013), could be a crushing 
blow not only to copyright violators, but also to global political activists who rely on peer-to-
peer networking as a method of bypassing online censorship. It will be highly useful, and in 
fact necessary, to draw a line between legitimate file-sharing and unauthorised reproduction 
of protected content in order to enhance internet regulations. 
 
Although many types of proxy software are neither produced specifically for nor aimed 
directly at repressive countries, research conducted by Nawaat (2010) has found evidence 
proving that "circumvention tools providers and promoters, who claim to address internet 
filtering globally, have their attention drawn towards almost the same countries." The less 
democratic a country's ruling structure is, the more it is that the netizens of that country 
would be inclined to employ online innovations to break communication barriers. Therefore, 
there will inevitably be a large demand for outside assistance by opposition forces technically 
unable to match their oppressors' resources. 
 
The Washington Post (2013) deems proxy software employed to circumvent internet filtering 
to be the most common solution among in-country Iranian cyber-activists, but also observes 
that regime "authorities have gained the upper hand in recent months, making it difficult to 
reach many popular websites." On the other hand, Nassim Noroozi, teaching assistant and 
doctoral candidate at McGill University's Faculty of Education, in a comment left on an 
Aljazeera (2013) news story, identifies VPNs as the counter-censorship solution most 
commonly used by Iranian cyber-activists, explaining that this relatively heavy reliance on 
VPNs means that any serious attempt by the regime to disable certain online tunnelling ports 
and protocols is likely to create a large information blackout within the country. The BBC 
(2012) also quotes Mahmood Tajali-Mehr, an Iranian ICT consultant based in Germany, 
expounding on the alleged popularity of VPNs in Iran as saying that "every schoolchild 
knows how to bypass restrictions by using VPNs." He never refers to obstacles set up by the 
regime to hinder the use of VPNs, possibly due to the comparatively older publication date of 
the article in question. 
  
Various established technology news sources, including Wired (2013), confirm that the 
Iranian government only officially started tackling VPNs in March 2013. Some other 
observers report successes, where groups of Iranian cyber-activists have found their way 
around the regime's VPN blockage. International Business Times (2013) reveals that Project 
Ainita, an anti-censorship non-profit promoting the use of open source technology, 
introduced services named 'HTTPS Everywhere' and 'Proxifier' to offer Iranian cyber-
activists proxies, encryption and a privacy firewall only days after the new restrictions were 
put in place. If used together, these would effectively help circumvent the regime's efforts. 
Similarly, Tech Eye Network (2013) cites Joshua Van Raalte, the owner of a Brazil-based 
free online proxy software called 'Hide My Ass' as claiming that his Iranian users had 
remained unaffected by the restrictions. Tech Eye reports that "he thinks that this latest 
attempt at internet restriction is likely to be largely futile." 
 
 
——— 
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The following is one example out of the many web pages run by non-Persian speaking cyber-
activists dedicated specifically to offering circumvention of online filtering in Iran: 
 
Foreign Empathy and Internet Censorship in Iran 
 
 
Figure 20 (Centre for a Democratic Iran 2012) 
 
This research, however, has found no substantial evidence of the aforementioned service ever 
having been used on a mass scale by Iranian cyber-activists during or after the 2009 protests. 
 
Cyber Police, Online Activists and Self-Reliance in the Virtual Power Struggle 
in Iran 
 
Home-grown Iranian anti-censorship technologies are almost equally diverse. Yet these tools 
never became as popular due to factors such as inability to gain users' trust, inconvenience, 
inconsistent performance, untimely discontinuation, security bugs (Citizen Lab 2012), or 
permanent elimination by the regime—all problems that seem to be rooted in inadequate 
funding as well as a lack of technological competence and other vital resources typically 
needed for time-sensitive, security-oriented projects. To give one example, Access Flickr, an 
extension for the Firefox internet browser designed to bypass filters imposed on the popular 
photo sharing website Flickr, was created in the mid-2000s by Hamed Saber. Saber, a local 
Iranian photo-blogger, was tracked down and arrested (Global Voices 2010) in 2010 for 
publishing his photos of the post-election street protests: 
 
Access Flickr: Home-Grown Anti-censorship Software in Action 
 
 
Figure 21 (Global Voices 2007) 
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Prior to running afoul of the regime, Saber was a male computer hardware engineering 
graduate, who obtained his degree from Sharif University of Technology (SUT), one of Iran's 
most prestigious institutions of higher education. He previously attended and graduated from 
the Allameh Helli High School, an elite school only open to the 'superiorly talented,' In 
addition, he won a bronze medal at a nationwide IT Olympiad. To give another example, Iran 
Proxy, known to be the first Iran-based online anti-censorship forum, was founded by cyber-
dissident Hossein Ronaghi-Maleki, who has been serving a 15-year prison sentence for his 
political advocacy since December 2009 (Amnesty International UK 2013). 
 
Sabz (Green) Proxy is an Iranian trace-resistant online proxy software. According to some 
reports, its technology has been employed by cyber-activists elsewhere (Floss Manuals 2011) 
to develop anti-censorship systems in their respective countries. Motivated by the regime's 
drastic enhancement of online censorship following the emergence of the Green Movement in 
June 2009, the developers kept the software simple, yet highly functional and specifically 
tailored to the security needs of the typical Iranian user. Further, the programme has been 
released with a fully Persian-language mode—a first in Iran's history of cyber-activism: 
 
Green Proxy: Breaking through Innovation Barriers 
 
 
Figure 22 (Floss Manuals 2011) 
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Simurgh-e-Sabz (Green Phoenix), also simply referred to as Simurgh (Phoenix), is perhaps 
the best-known 'home-grown' proxy tool developed exclusively for web users in Iran. Once 
the software is installed on a computer, a user would simply be one click away from 
bypassing the government's filtering system. This programme, too, was directly inspired by 
Iran's Green Movement, and has proven to be both popular and effective within the context it 
was intended for: 
 
Green Phoenix: Endogenous, Functional and Popular 
 
 
Figure 23 (Citizen Lab 2012) 
 
One of the primary objectives of this research has been to determine the degree of self-
sufficiency of both the regime and Iran's cyber-activists in the area of online censorship and 
to subsequently explain the exact contribution of foreign-sourced ICTs to online power 
struggles in Iran. While about one third of the surveyed experts had no comment to cast on 
this particular matter, according to a relative majority of the respondents, as seen in the 
graphs below, the extent of dependency on imported ICTs was medium to very high at least 
on the part of the regime and possibly on the cyber-activists' part as well. 
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3 
1 
2 
1 1 
2 
1 
6 
0
2
4
6
8
Expert Survey: The Regime's Degree of 
Self-Efficacy in Cyber Censorship 
  
68 
Expert interviews have helped verify the hypothesis that the Iranian regime is largely 
dependent on foreign ICTs with regards to its online censorship, as Dr. Fielder is the sole 
respondent to believe that the Iranian regime is largely self-sufficient in this matter. He 
compares ICT commerce to small arms and aircraft parts and concludes that the state "has 
access to significant resources and [the] resilience of a mixed economy, in contrast to oil 
rentier states such as Saudi Arabia." This observation appears to be accurate and consistent 
with previously published data that identify Iran as the only oil-rich country with the 
capacity, resources and infrastructure required for a hybrid economy (Muftah 2010). 
 
Dr. Rahimi states that the regime has both borrowed and copied required technology from 
Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) as well as a number of Chinese companies including 
Huawei. The case against the Chinese firm was fully substantiated via investigative research 
commissioned by the United States House of Representatives (2012), nearly two years after 
Nokia voluntarily published (Nokia-Siemens Networks 2010f) a self-assessment report 
acknowledging there had been a collision between its Western ethical standards and its 
adherence to local laws in some markets, including Iran. 
 
Despite being accused of the same ethical error, the cases of the above two firms show a 
significant difference in the Western and Chinese firms' approaches to corporate social 
responsibility and ethical accountability. It seems that what triggered NSN's official 
acknowledgment of its evasion of Western standards by engaging in business with the 
Islamic Republic was a consumer boycott campaign launched by human rights activists in 
and outside Iran as well as an unsuccessful attempt by a prominent Iranian political dissident 
to sue the company in US Federal Court. In a democratic environment, a public company has 
every reason to be afraid of bad publicity and to voluntarily seek to rectify damages it may 
have caused. Such dynamics played little to no role in the case of Huawei. 
 
The Chinese firm's conduct, on some level, compares to the Iranian regime's sale of weapons 
to extremist Shiite rebels in neighbouring countries, or to Russia's sale of anti-aircraft 
missiles to Iran. The bottom line is that most ICT companies, when left to their own devices, 
might be expected to do business with any paying costumer without investigating the nature 
of the proposed use of technologies sold. 
 
Even if a European firm pulls out of a repressive market for ethical reasons, it will soon be 
substituted by a Chinese equivalent far less likely to respond to watchdogs' calls to justify 
some sort of non-adherence to 'Western' values the Chinese firm will claim never to have 
recognised in the first place. In that light, any future policy will need to take into account the 
often varying values that govern the ICT industry in different countries and identify and 
monitor 'high-risk' sellers, making it highly expensive for them to behave in ways that violate 
international norms. 
 
Elahe Boghrat warns of the regime's natural inclination to convince everyone that they are 
entirely reliant on in-house scientists and scientific innovations, while "not only the 
technology, but often the technicians the government speaks of are rented from the West 
either lawfully or illegally." 
 
Dr. Crandall does not deny that the Iranian government has spurred serious innovations 
making the best use of the capacities it has, but considers its technological competence to be 
reasonably low. He considers the regime's attack on the Certificate Authority System to be a 
huge blow to cyber-activists in Iran, "because the basic level of trust on the internet that 
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you're really talking to a particular Western company and not to someone in the middle when 
you use the internet basically fell apart." 
 
Here, he is referring to an episode from July 2011, during which DigiNotar, a Dutch 
certificate authority, was used to issue fraudulent certificates for Google and to launch a set 
of man-in-the-middle attacks against the company (Google Online Security 2011). The 
attacker, though still unknown, was traced back to Iran. Hacking attacks of this sort, which 
access personal data through faking secure connections between the server and the users 
while electronically eavesdropping on them, could easily lead to the disclosure of highly 
sensitive information which the regime can use to identify, arrest and convict thousands of 
political activists. 
 
Dr. Nazemi finds the regime to be proficient at hiding the inner workings of its domestic 
surveillance apparatus and quite adept at copying and improving technologies originally 
developed by others. She adds, however, that this is a "scrappy sort of self-reliance" and that 
she would be very surprised if the regime was not largely self-sufficient at this point. 
 
Similarly, Dr. Houghton believes that the regime is self-reliant only in terms of on-going 
maintenance and having the manpower needed to keep its censorship system running, 
clarifying that it is "heavily dependent upon global TNCs who provide the base infrastructure 
for such censorship regimes." 
 
Mr. Ungerleider, Mr. Akbarzadeh and Dr. Kluver unanimously agree that the Iranian regime 
is not very self-reliant in online censorship. Mr. Ungerleider acknowledges that Iran benefits 
from a large population of coders and IT engineers, but explains that "there are too many 
structural issues preventing a 100 per cent home-grown internet censorship regime." 
Conversely, Dr. Kluver asserts that "it [wouldn't] need a tremendous amount to mount a 
successful surveillance regime." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
——— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
70 
Expert Interviews: The Self-Efficacy of the Iranian Regime's Current Online Censorship System 
 
Name Occupation Location 
Expert's 
Opinion 
Akbarzadeh, 
Pejman 
Journalist, Radio Producer and 
Activist 
Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands 
Very Low 
Boghrat, Elahe Journalist, Author and Translator London, UK Very Low 
Coleman, Kevin Senior Fellow PA, USA 
N/A (Deems 
Irrelevant) 
Crandall, Jed 
Assistant Professor of Computer 
Science 
NM, USA Medium 
Dawoody, 
Alexander 
Assistant Professor of Public 
Policy 
PA, USA High 
Fielder, James 
Air Force Major and Holder of a 
PhD in International Relations 
and Comparative Politics 
TX, USA High 
Hashemi, Layla 
Professor of History and Political 
Science 
MD, USA Very High 
Holman, Paul 
Professor of Political Science and 
International Affairs 
ME, USA N/A 
Houghton, Tessa 
Assistant Professor of Media and 
Communication 
Malaysia 
Campus 
Medium Low 
Kluver, Randy Professor of Communication TX, USA Low 
Mejias, Ulises 
Assistant Professor of 
Communication Studies 
NY, USA N/A 
Michaelsen, 
Marcus 
Holder of a PhD in 
Communication Science 
Germany N/A 
Nazemi, Nassim Juris Doctor and Law Clerk IL, USA 
Medium 
High 
Rahimi, Babak 
Associate Professor of Iranian and 
Islamic Studies 
CA, USA Medium Low 
Storck, Madeline 
Holder of an MA in International 
Relations and Affairs and a MSc 
in Media and Communications 
London, UK N/A 
Ungerleider, Neal 
Social Media Consultant and 
International Technology and 
Cyber-security Reporter 
NY, USA Very Low 
Vahdati-Bana, 
Soheila 
Scholar, Author and Human 
Rights Activist and Holder of a 
PhD in Electrical Engineering and 
Computer Sciences 
CA, USA N/A 
Table 5 
 
 
 
——— 
 
 
MIT Technology Review revealed in an online piece published in 2009(a) that while the 
Iranian regime has a history of relying on software from McAfee called SmartFilter, it has 
now developed a fully endogenous system which automatically searches for and blocks 
websites containing certain types of content. It claims Iran and China are the "only two 
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countries that aggressively filter internet content using their own technology." The journal 
published another online report (2009b) in the same year, stating that that the Iranian 
government's days of reliance on McAfee technology were indeed over, and that the regime 
was largely independent from foreign security firms, as almost all of its online traffic "flows 
through a single government-controlled ISP." Yet, these reports seem chiefly based on 
speculation rather than on empirical investigation, and are not substantiated with concrete 
evidence. 
 
Western ICTs vs. Local Politics: European Innovations and the Dynamics of 
Online Censorship in Iran 
 
This research has found that Western, mainly European; ICT companies have routinely filled 
the technological hole resulting from the Iranian regime's malfunctioning NIS. While the 
majority of these firms either deny or legally justify engaging in such transactions, no 
consistent, reliable data clarify the exact role of Western expertise in systematic censorship in 
Iran. The expert survey, however, was instrumental in exposing the truth of the matter. 
Almost half of the respondents thought that European technology played a very large role in 
the Iranian regime's censorship activities and more than half thought it had at least medium or 
above influence. About one third of the participants, however, did not feel they were fit to 
comment on the topic. 
 
 
Figure 25 
 
Of all the participants, only one questioned the importance of scrutinising the contribution of 
European ICT firms to cyber censorship in repressive countries. Dr. Randy Kluver briefly 
states that he "wouldn't think the European companies [are] that important," since they would 
simply be replaced by Chinese competitors, if they withdrew from this market. 
 
Many experts mentioned the importance of Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN). Dr. Alexander 
Dawoody views NSN's business in Iran as a great damage to the democratic movement in the 
country, as "the Iranian regime learned from NSN and adapted its technology in creating its 
own domestic form of TCI." While Dr. Babak Rahmi holds NSN accountable for its role in 
the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections, he claims that "since 2010 [the] Iranian 
surveillance regime has become more domestic-based." Dr. James Fielder and Madeline 
Storck both verify, on the basis of electronic forensics, that the cell-phone tapping technology 
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relied by the Iranian regime to arrest many cyber-activists in the aftermath of the 2009 
presidential election was indeed provided by NSN, yet at the same time they deny that NSN's 
presence in the Iranian market was particularly unlawful. Ms. Storck clarifies, "in the Iranian 
example, the definition of criminal is clearly being stretched." Dr. Jed Crandall, however, 
suggests that NSN did more than merely provide the Iranian government with interception 
technology, and that "they reportedly built the system in Tehran used as a chokepoint for the 
internet, and [which] is critical because it makes man-in-the-middle attacks relatively easy to 
implement," adding that "few other countries have that kind of capability." Many professional 
reports, including those published by Reporters Without Borders (2012) and OpenNet 
Initiative (2013), have confirmed the Iranian regime's use of European technology in 
launching hacking attacks against political dissidents home and abroad, taking note in 
particular of technology sourced by NSN and Ericsson. 
 
Other experts refuse to comment on any given company for a variety of reasons, but 
nevertheless acknowledge the contribution of European-sourced ICTs to cyber censorship in 
Iran. Mr. Ungerleider stated that as a journalist he was "uncomfortable going on the record 
without solid evidence of illegal sales of surveillance technology by EU and American firms 
to the Iranian government or to government-affiliated companies," but nevertheless 
mentioned that the role of Western companies was "massive." Dr. Tessa Houghton holds 
transnational corporations such as Cisco and Siemens accountable for their poor attention to 
corporate social responsibility. On the other hand, Dr. Ulises Mejias puts the main blame on 
Western governments, asserting that the case of Iran clearly demonstrates that capitalism 
clashes with any ideals that European or US governments might profess about promoting 
democracy around the world. He argues "these governments are only slightly less responsible 
than the corporations, because they have been promoting policies of corporate deregulation 
that allow the companies to do what they are doing." There are, however, relatively few 
scholarly sources that deem Western governments more accountable than individual 
companies for the sale of dual-use technologies to repressive regimes. Although facilitating 
relevant bottom-up processes within corporate environments to promote good corporate 
ethics cultures may well prove helpful as a long-term, complementary solution, Western 
governments cannot afford to ignore policy in favour of self-regulation in an increasingly 
profit-driven world. Among the various advantages of a policy solution is that it "provides a 
baseline against which . . . [the firms' performance] can readily be evaluated" (Anand 2005). 
 
A chain of journalistic investigations, triggered by the emergence of Iran's green movement 
in 2009, and led by news organisations including the BBC (2009a), Bloomberg (2011), 
Reuters (2012), Wall Street Journal (2011a; 2011b) and the Mail and Guardian (2013) have 
revealed a number of contracts between foreign ICT firms and the Iranian regime and raised 
the question of whether such activities are in line with sanctions legislated by the US, EU and 
UNSC. 
 
 
——— 
 
 
 
The following table shows a list of these foreign firms engaged in ICT trade with Iran, along 
with the country in which they are based: 
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Foreign ICTs and Online Censorship in Iran 
 
Company Location 
Nokia-Siemens Networks Finland 
Ericsson Sweden 
MMC Ventures UK 
Creativity Software UK 
AdaptiveMobile Security Ireland 
Trovicor Germany 
Huawei China 
Shenzhen China 
MTN South Africa 
Reach-U Estonia 
Table 6 
 
The above firms' business with the Iranian regime has not been limited merely to 'shelf 
technology.' Companies have officially agreed to customise, train, and maintain relevant 
products and have offered other interactive services potentially useful in putting pressure on 
cyber-activists. This is the case with Nokia-Siemens Networks, whose "sale to and training of 
Iranian government officials knowingly and wilfully aided and abetted the commission of 
arbitrary arrest, unlawful detention, torture, and other major human rights abuses" (CBS 
Interactive 2010). 
 
The pattern detected in the European ICT companies' conduct contrasts with the role that 
emerges for most of the assessed North-American firms, which have proven to be more 
dedicated to providing citizens of repressive states with innovative technological solutions to 
governmental censorship. 
 
North America and the Emergence of Counter-Censorship Technologies 
 
Firm Software Location 
Censorship Research Centre Haystack USA 
Ultrareach UltraSurf USA 
Dynamic Internet Technology Freegate USA 
The TOR Project TOR USA 
Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto Psiphon/ASL19 Canada 
Table 7 (Farivar 2011; PBS 2009; Pritchard 2014; Seib 2012) 
 
The findings listed so far form a model which verifies the main hypothesis of this research 
regarding the bimodality of Iran's NIS and the relationship between imported ICTs and online 
power struggles in the country. 
 
The relatively rich history of anti-censorship technologies developed in North America, 
especially in the United States, could be due to the increasing concentration of expatriate 
Iranians in the region. The presence of such influential lobbyists, many of whom are 
positioned at the forefront of business or academic worlds, seems to have made a notable 
impact in terms of convincing and motivating partners to help advocate for freedom of 
information in Iran and other repressive countries. Perhaps the most significant actor in this 
regard, the National Iranian-American Council (NIAC) was instrumental in pushing for the 
passage of the Stand With the Iranian People Act (SWIPA) in the United States House of 
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Representatives in 2010. The language of the Act includes prohibiting "Federal procurement 
contracts for companies that provide surveillance and censorship software and other tools of 
repression to the Iranian government" (NIAC 2010). The mastermind behind SWIPA's 
introduction was Keith Ellison, Congressman for Minnesota's Fifth Congressional District, 
who has been extremely vocal about the impact of Western policies on human rights in 
repressive countries. It is the willingness of the United States Congress to systematically 
regulate the export of dual-use ICTs to repressive states that has made European 
telecommunications technology companies into dictators' suppliers of choice. 
 
Iran's NIS, Dual-use ICTs and the EU/US Export Policy Divide 
 
Figure 26 
 
The consistent geographical patterns of imported ICT fuelling either side are directly related 
to the distribution of the Iranian expatriate community around the world. According to Global 
Times (2012), an estimated two million Iranians live in the United States and about 500,000 
in the United Kingdom, making these two countries the world's top host nations for Iranian 
expatriates worldwide. The reasons behind the apparent exclusion of UK institutions (perhaps 
with the exception of the BBC Persian service) from any globally scalable anti-censorship 
advocacy in Iran, however, should be subject to further research. 
 
The dominant role that the IRGC plays in Iran's mass economy must be added to the above 
model. Collaboration between military and civilian sectors is not, by any means, unusual or 
even unconstructive. In fact, as Gummett and Stein (1997) argue, defence sectors have been 
instrumental in shaping nationwide innovation processes in many Western countries since 
World War II. Yet unlike in Iran, where the armed forces and especially the IRGC hold a 
substantial amount of extra-judicial powers, militaries in industrialised democracies are 
essentially legitimate and respected sectors of society, dedicated to protecting countries 
against external threats and to maintaining national security. 
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IRGC, Nationwide Innovation Processes and the Breakdown of Iran's NIS 
 
In an era of globalisation when conventional physical warfare is becoming less prevalent, 
Western militaries are increasingly more involved in the production and development of 
conflict-oriented ICTs. Originally "a spin-off from US military spending" (Financial Times 
2011), the internet as we know it today is now a kind of “battleground" of opinions for 
politically motivated struggles and is, therefore, an influential tool in processes of democratic 
change. In such an environment, the only way to ensure the functionality of a country's NIS is 
the establishment of a collaborative and transparent partnership between military and civil 
sectors, motivating—as well as putting the emphasis on—innovation and development of 
dual-purpose technologies to address both sectors' legitimate interests and needs. Kulve and 
Smit (2003) argue that investing in dual-purpose technologies is the best way to maintain an 
advanced, competitive innovation system based on mutual benefit and trust. They 
acknowledge, however, that the definition of dual-use is becoming increasingly fraught due 
to technological advances that raise new ethical issues and in light of innovations that lean 
towards alarming political goals, such as the Iranian regime's nuclear ambitions: 
 
 
Technology Development and Intersectional Cooperation: Military vs. Civilian 
 
 
Figure 27 (Kulve and Smit 2003) 
 
In Iran, however, contextual realities tend to guide the country's socio-technical dynamics 
down a different path than in many other states. If we accept the above model as the basic, 
functional form of military-civilian collaboration in a reasonably democratic country, the 
following would best represent the relationship between the two in the Iranian instance: 
 
 
Technology Imports, IRGC and the Military/Civilian Dynamics of Innovation in Iran 
 
 
Figure 28 
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Simultaneously in charge of Iran's economy and military projects, by the end of 2011 the 
Revolutionary Guards had invested nearly one billion dollars into the development of a 
cyber-taskforce aimed at boosting its cyber warfare capabilities (Jerusalem Post 2011). This 
occurred while numerous civilian projects across the nation have been halted or abandoned in 
the past decade due to lack of funding. This is, as Voelker (2005: 8) notes, far from the 
'revolutionary ideals' once promised by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic 
Republic, which were mostly civil-oriented. In her assessment, she explains that "the primary 
concern for Iran is state security and maintaining the region's existing political order." The 
lack of a reasonable balance between civil and military expenditures by the Iranian regime—
a pattern detected in all south Asian countries—has led to what the Royal Danish Defence 
College (2013: 5) calls 'in-conflict state building.' This phenomenon results in "weak and 
dysfunctional civilian institutions vis-à-vis stronger and more functional military 
institutions," the centre reports. With extensive economic sanctions having increased the cost 
of military-oriented imports to the country, this expenditure gap will only widen in favour of 
the armed forces, on whose future the regime depends. 
 
About three quarters of the participants remained unable to comment specifically on the role 
of the IRGC in online censorship in Iran. The remaining quarter, however, unanimously 
confirmed that the organisation and its allies are heavily engaged in the development of ICTs 
and various online infrastructures. The interviewees' lack of knowledge about the IRGC and 
its economic activities could be due to the unusually complicated form of the Iranian state, 
which has been referred to by observers as a hybrid (Brookings Institution 2013) of a 
Western-style democracy and a powerful, multi-layered theocracy operating under the 
Supreme Leader. Under direct command of the Supreme Leader's office, the economic wing 
of the IRGC dominates almost every business operating at a national scale, often through 
setting up seemingly private front companies aimed at circumventing international sanctions. 
 
Dr. Alexander Dawoody explains that the IRGC's "contributions [have] strengthened the 
regime's stronghold on power and caused great damage to democratic mobilisation and town 
hall-types of cyber meetings." Dr. Babak Rahimi observes a division within the organisation, 
between civil and military functions, calling for a need to distinguish between the IRGC's 
private sector and intelligence units within the paramilitary force, arguing "it is the 
[intelligence units] that [are] in charge of censorship/surveillance infrastructure." Elahe 
Boghrat says she has discovered that Iran's paramilitary forces, led by the IRGC, "spend 
billions on complex technological infrastructures to sniff [out] and neutralise online dissent." 
 
Layla Hashemi believes that the Iranian regime is gradually coming to understand the 
potential of the internet and is exploiting it for core national and international interests, 
"through the establishment of government funded websites and web logs [and] through 
censorship of information." Dr. Nassim Nazemi has established a relationship between the 
IRGC and Iranian universities, explaining that regime has a firm hand in attracting the best 
and brightest of Iran's remarkably well-educated experts. She claims that "Iran's universities 
and businesses are just as captive as the average Iranian citizen, and so we have every reason 
to believe that their best minds are being plundered in furtherance of the regime's censorship 
and domestic surveillance schemes." All these comments verify the bimodality of Iran' NIS, 
where defence industries come into conflict with civil innovations in online and offline 
spheres. 
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Admittedly unaware of the Iranian context, Dr. Randy Kluver expands on the Chinese model, 
where GLCs (government linked companies) have had a big role in the configuration of the 
regime's technological infrastructure. This has allowed "the government to more or less 
dictate surveillance capacity at a level that was not heard of a dozen years ago." Similarly, 
Dr. Tessa Houghton recognises government-run companies and universities as extremely 
critical in repressive states for "providing the regime with a pool of talent from which to draw 
their cyber troops from [and] to find skilled staff to work on their infrastructure and systems." 
Yet in certain markets domination by so-called GLCs is not by default synonymous with a 
malfunction within the respective countries' national economy as can be seen in the case of 
British Telecom, British Gas, British Airways and British Rail. Instead, I argue, the 
democratic or undemocratic features of the state are reflected in the functions and 
dysfunctions of the companies it controls. 
 
In a politically open country, where politicians are true representatives of civilian interest, 
governmental or public ownership of a company makes little difference to ordinary citizens, 
as practical, well-enforced regulation aims at preserving transparency within most industries. 
In a country like Iran, however, there is systematic corruption within the core of the ruling 
elite (such as IRGC commanders), giving them immunity from accountability. Further, the 
judicial system is weakened through the existence of parallel institutions controlled by the 
Supreme Leader and his ideological allies. In this context, nationally owned firms represent 
much more than mere economic governmentalisation of certain industries. This complex 
economic power structure underlies the dysfunctions of Iran's NIS. Starosta De Waldemar's 
(2010: 27) research on the relationship between transparency and resource allocation within 
an innovation system shows that "corruption and the emergence of new products are strongly 
correlated." Systematic corruption has an overall negative impact on innovation processes as 
a general rule. Yet the author's depiction of 'corruption' seems to be mostly focused on the 
issue of bribing and other matters affecting entrepreneurs operating at the firm level. The 
corruption rife within Iran's economy is much more thoroughgoing and operates at much 
larger scales. Iran's economy has been increasingly directly controlled by the IRGC, which 
Isakow (2011) likens to an "amalgam of the Iranian CIA, Marines, Mafia and Fortune 500." It 
is now estimated as owning over 30 per cent of the country's businesses. Although 
independent data are not readily available due to the Islamic Republic's secretive nature, the 
country's frequent placement at the bottom of Transparency International's (2012) Corruption 
Perceptions Index should be taken as an indication that the same claim of a pernicious effect 
of corruption on innovation applies to this national innovation system. 
 
In testimony before the Canadian Parliament's International Human Rights Subcommittee in 
2013, human rights advocate Mark Dubowitz explained that the Iranian cyber-police mainly 
focus "on filtering websites in Iran, monitoring the email and online activity of individuals on 
a watch list, and observing the content of Internet traffic and information posted on web 
blogs." The United States Treasury Department's Office of Public Affairs published a 
factsheet with similar claims in 2012. Yet Mehriran (2010), an online news website based in 
Germany and published in multiple languages, cites an Iranian official stating that it is the 
Guidance Ministry and the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI) that are the main 
actors in the regime's internet censorship projects, and that "the IRGC . . . [would only] 
monitor and be responsible for providing security." Even if that is true, the official in 
question (or the news agency reporting him for that matter) fails to remind readers that the 
IRGC owns nearly half of TCI's shares via two of its many front companies, named Mobin 
Trust Consortium and Sadra and both owned by IRGC's Khatam-al-Anbia Force. They 
gained control of the heart of the telecommunications industry amid the post-election unrest 
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in what was the largest transaction in the history of the Tehran Stock Exchange, a combined 
trade involving 7.8 billion USD (Rooz Online 2010). 
 
Similarly, Jen Psaki, Spokesperson for the United States Department of State revealed in a 
2013 statement that "the Iranian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 
and the IRGC [had] placed the electronic warfare entity Ofogh Saberin in charge of a project 
to override and spoof commercial satellite communication frequencies emanating from what 
the Iranian government deemed were subversive Western media sources." While the IRGC 
has never openly admitted to having any direct presence in Iran's ICT industry, there have 
been some scattered statements made by the organisation's former and current officials that 
can be deemed to acknowledge key facts. For instance, Global Information Society Watch 
(GISW) explains that in 2010 details on the Iranian Cyber Army were not confirmable until 
Ebrahim Jabbari, the Commander of the Ali Ibn Abi Taleb Ground Forces Regiment of the 
IRGC, praised the group's achievements in a speech. 
 
One of the many different versions of 'access denied' error messages used by mainstream 
Iranian ISPs directly mentions the Data Communication Company of Iran (DCI), owned by 
the IRGC, as the authority responsible for the website blockages: 
 
Access Denied: DCI and Internet Censorship in Iran 
 
 
Figure 29 (Swift 2003) 
 
The model introduced here should be used to develop policy, as current policies seem to 
overlook the dynamics of innovation in Iran and in other repressive countries. Unless current 
deficiencies are addressed, we can expect the continuation of the status quo, wherein foreign 
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companies make significant contributions to the development of the Iranian regime's 
telecommunications infrastructure through the sale of 'dual-purpose' technologies produced in 
democratic countries and wherein civilian and military sectors remained intertwined via 
corruption and antagonism rather than open collaboration and competition. It is important to 
differentiate the above phenomena from seldom instances of other repressive regimes 
knowingly helping their Iranian counterparts either for ideological reasons or in exchange for 
significant sums of money or other services and favours. 
 
It is conceivable that most European ICT conglomerates develop their ethical codes of 
conduct statically and based on Western, democratic values, hardly applicable to repressive 
states where the conceptual borders between criminality and non-adherence to the regime are 
often obscure. As long as this seems to be the case, we should expect that repressive regimes 
will easily make up for shortfalls in research and development by signing long-term, 
exclusive contracts with European Telecommunications firms, openly and legally. Further we 
can expect that such companies will remain subject to extensive criticism and sometimes 
even costly boycotts. A lack of adequate, official guidelines, therefore, seems to show that in 
the international market for telecommunications technologies the concept of Social Corporate 
Responsibility (SCR) operating alone has proven inefficient. 
 
NSN, a Finnish-German company involved in one of the world's most contested cases of ICT 
trade between a Western firm and a repressive regime (BBC 2010), has routinely pleaded 
innocent (Nokia-Siemens Networks 2010a) in response to allegations. The company has 
announced in various public statements that while they have a commitment to carry on 
maintaining parts of the country's system under currently valid agreements, they have no 
desire to expand arrangements with the Iranian regime (Wall Street Journal 2011c). 
Meanwhile, NSN and various other Western ICT firms continue to do business with the 
Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI), now fully owned by the IRCG (TeleGeography 
2009), either directly through legal channels or via proxies. Yet despite these Western 
contributions, the speed, coverage and stability of the internet and cell phone networks 
continue to be among the poorest in the region (Akamai 2013) and the world. This may 
indicate what parts of the ICT infrastructure are budgeting priorities for the regime and 
precisely where it is using foreign expertise to fill its widening innovation gaps in its 
'security' projects. 
 
By comparison, the private, civilian segment of Iran's innovation system seems to be left 
facing competition without sufficient resources to succeed. Whereas the hard-line, military-
oriented core of the Iranian regime has unrestricted access to 'oil dollars' it needs for 
acquiring ICTs it is unable to engineer locally, cyber-activists have no other feasible option 
than to seek out philanthropic 'survival packages' sourced from liberal NGOs and think-tanks 
worldwide, although there have also have been several instances of local Iranian 'innovators,' 
often with backgrounds in software engineering, positively contributing (PC World 2009) to 
the cyber-activist community's systematic anti-censorship endeavours. Such individuals, 
however, have been routinely tracked down and arrested (CNN 2010) by the relatively well-
equipped Information Protection (IP) division of the IRGC, accused of 'spreading 
propaganda' against the Islamic Republic. 
 
 
——— 
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The diversity of the interviewed experts' perspective on the research questions poses an 
analytical conundrum—one that calls for deeper scrutiny. Bearing in mind that the secretive 
nature of the Iranian administration has been highly influential on the relative 
inconclusiveness of the interview answers, such degree of variation within a carefully 
selected group of highly educated scholars somehow raises the suspicion of reason-centred 
subjectivity. On the other hand, the unexpectedly fluctuating ratio of absolute certainty, 
together with the relative conviction in which the expressed viewpoints were often 
emphasised, suggests that the interviewees may have been somewhat opinionated. 
 
This is not a significant finding on its own, given that all the experts were approached as 
independent informants, as opposed to part of an ideological establishment such as the IRGC. 
Non-partisan participants in social research can help explain (Li et al. 2015: 201) a "wide 
range of life experience, interests, knowledge and resources that are foundations for mutual 
learning, building shared identity and agreement and leading to innovations." They are also 
highly beneficial to revealing "new or unanticipated behaviours of the system" (Smith et al. 
2001: 1). For those reasons, the interviewee population selected by this study was sampled 
strictly from non-governmental parties, in order to avoid ethical and/or safety complications. 
 
In an attempt to address this issue, the analytical framework for this study has employed a 
complementary feature known as triangulation, which aims to help determine the credibility 
of the preliminary findings through multi-methodological examination of the raw data 
(Shipman 2014). 
 
At the first glance, the main results of this research portray a realistically representational 
map of cyber-activism in Iran. At the same time, they provide a rich, promising dataset for 
cross-examination of the online power struggle between the Iranian activists and their 
opponents within, or supported by, governmental institutions. The outlined disunion amongst 
the informants can be deemed a demonstration of how the various narratives of a 
controversial social phenomenon can differ amid a group of disciplinarily diverse, yet equally 
qualified, scholars. A prime example of this so-called empirical inconclusiveness is seen in 
the case of IRGC's degree of influence on the development of the internet filtering apparatus 
in Iran. Given the thoroughness of the conducted background checks on the interviewees, 
contextual unfamiliarity is highly unlikely in nearly every case. 
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Validating the Results: A Three-Dimensional Analysis 
 
No. Research Question Weblogs Interviews 
 
Other 
Published 
Documents 
  
1 
 
How do actors within the Iranian regime on the one hand 
and cyber-activists on the other exploit and develop online 
technologies in their conflicts with one another? 
 
   
2 
 
What are the capabilities and functionality of Iran's 
National Innovation System with regards to 
telecommunications technologies? 
 
   
3 
 
To what extent and why are imported ICTs used in the 
power struggle between the regime and the cyber-activists 
in Iran? 
 
   
 
 
Table 8 
 
 
Table 9 
 
Carefully selected from a preliminary list of potential consultants, the sampled interviewees 
are all reputable experts in their respective fields. However, the initial scrutiny of the 
interview scripts pointed to a surprising versatility across the comments and arguments 
provided by different respondents. This subsequently called for further examination of the 
participants' depth and scope of first-hand knowledge conducted on an issue-based level. 
 
Dr Alexander Dawoody is possibly the most enthusiastic source interviewed by this research. 
Answering the questions patiently and at length, he seemed to have a great deal of first-hand 
knowledge about many of the issues in question, including the Iranian cyber-activists' scope 
of engagement with ICT innovations, the IRGC's digital censorship strategies and capability, 
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and the influence of expatriation and gender on the country's online power struggle between 
the theocratic regime and the pro-democracy opposition. Many of the viewpoints expressed 
by Dr Dawoody during his interview are also reflected in his 2015 book 'Public 
Administration and Policy in the Middle East' published by Springer New York. 
 
Former Oxford Internet Institute visiting fellow researching mainly the implications of ICTs 
for Shi'a Islam in Iran, Dr Babak Rahimi is the only other Iranian expert on the interviewee 
list who has published vastly in the field of cyber-innovation. Although he seemed to have a 
tremendous amount of direct knowledge about the questions at hand, Dr Rahimi chose to be 
relatively brief, and not as thorough as the research had hoped in terms of technical details. 
This could have been indeed due to the individual's lack of trust in the interviewer or the 
nature of the project, as he is known to visit Iran on occasion (i.e. safety cautions). Given that 
Dr Rahimi is an established authority on both ICTs and modern Iranian politics, his answers, 
albeit brief, were considered with a highly analytical spectacle. 
 
Elahe Boghrat, veteran London-based journalist and a 2015 nominee for the Courage in 
Journalism award held annually by Women's Media Foundation, is the only Iranian informant 
who identifies openly with a monarchist political system as her primary government of 
choice. Ms Boghrat's responses were perceived as somewhat rebellious in nature, putting her 
across largely as anti-establishment. She tended to have a good amount of first-hand 
knowledge on some of the key issues such as the European ICT companies' extent of 
contribution to online censorship in Iran. As a highly outspoken advocate of atheism and a 
dedicated feminist, the research speculates that Ms Boghrat's insights on political legitimacy 
could be characterised in part by an anti-religion bias. 
 
Dr James Fielder was the perfect non-Iranian interviewee for this research. Despite his 
limited scope of knowledge on some of the specific political issues relevant to post-2009 
Iran, he was incredibly open about both his PhD research, as well as about his many-year-
long experience as a US Army officer. Dr Fielder made a noteworthy influence on my 
decision to pursue expatriation patterns as an analytical dimension for the project at hand. 
Also, he informed the research about Simurgh – an indigenous anti-filtering programme of 
which I was not aware. 
 
Dr Jed Crandall is an internationally recognised expert in the field of online censorship and 
surveillance, who specialises in repressive states. In spite of his relatively limited contribution 
to the research in terms of political depth, he had some invaluable insights about how online 
innovations may have influenced activism in Iran. Dr Crandal stated humbly on many 
occasions that his speculations were largely built on media accounts, and that his direct 
research was restricted mainly to the Chinese context. 
 
A leading cyber-security expert with a distinct focus on politically repressive contexts, Kevin 
G. Coleman has provided some of the most insightful technical data used at various stages of 
this research. Mr Coleman has also kept in touch for a considerable while following the 
interview, forwarding to me frequently the critical updates relevant to my research questions. 
Coming from a practical background, Mr Coleman believes that the important issue to focus 
on is not the source of anti-censorship technology, but if and how such tools can be 
systematically leveraged. Although Mr Coleman demonstrates a relatively great knowledge 
on the Iranian example, he points to a fundamental void of first-hand data on repressive 
contexts caused by access and safety issues. 
 
  
83 
An Iranian expat, politics and history lecturer Layla Hashemi's main contributions to the 
research fall mainly into the realm of international policy. She is a non-interventionist, 
believing that modern social movements can only sustain if they are self-reliant in all aspects. 
However, Ms Hashemi's self-admitted lack of first-hand knowledge on the currently trending 
anti-censorship activities in Iran makes it challenging to evaluate her comments. 
 
A junior researcher at the time, the answers provided by Madeline Storck were highly 
instrumental in this study's analysis of the weblog contents. Although Ms Storck stated that 
her own research had so far remained limited to Egypt, she highlighted two major downsides 
to most studies of similar nature: a) techno-utopian presuppositions, and b) sampling bias. 
 
I viewed Dr Marcus Michaelsen, former TOR project consultant, mainly as an anti-filtering 
expert for this research. He demonstrated a considerably high awareness of the local Iranian 
cyber-activists' circumvention patterns. Dr Michaelsen's comments on internet unblocking 
technologies and their merits and limitations seemed to be highly credible and based on direct 
experience. 
 
As a qualified barrister, Dr Nassim Nazemi is the research’s sole legal consultant. Her unique 
insights on surveillance and user anonymity helped open new horizons to topical issues such 
as trade policy, dual-use technology regulation, and international economic sanctions with 
regards to Iran's modern politics. An Iranian expat, she makes a clear distinction between the 
nature of cyber-activism in Iran and in the West, highlighting the dangers of getting exposed 
in repressive states. Dr Nazemi is the winner of Lowden-Wigmore Prize for Legal 
Scholarship, and her 2012 paper 'Safe Harbour for Anonymity Networks amid a Cyber-
Democratic Storm: Lessons from the 2009 Iranian Uprising' demonstrates her wide scope of 
knowledge on the specific matter under investigation. 
 
Neal Ungerlieder's responses were significant to the balance of the research, as his expertise 
is largely located in investigative journalism. Despite his refusal to comment on certain issues 
on the record due to his professional commitments, Mr Ungerlieder provided me with many 
research-based, primary information, emphasising in particular the influencing power of the 
Iranian diaspora, a as well as that of the  Western  governments and companies in developing 
what he explicitly refers to as anti-censorship policies. With regards to the Iranian cyber-
activists' engagement with online innovations, Mr Ungerlieder acknowledged he had very 
limited insight into the issue due to being a non-Persian-speaking observer. 
 
During the briefest interview, Professor Paul Holman, who answered only one of the 
questions in full, humbly declared a lack of sufficient knowledge on most aspects of the 
subject matter. He, however, underlined the need for a tighter regulation of ICT companies 
helping out regimes like those in power in Iran, China, Syria and Russia. 
 
A young Iranian expatriate and professional journalist based in Amsterdam, Pejman 
Akbarzadeh was approached as a voice of Iran's new generation, and the closest interviewee 
in character to what can be called a grassroots cyber-activist. His ideas revolved around the 
emphasis on European firms' contribution to online censorship in Iran, as well as on the 
denial of the IRGC's endogenous censorship capacity. The insights of Mr Akbarzadeh, who is 
essentially the project's consultant on bottom-up online activism, resonate significantly with 
those of me as a former political blogger and activist. 
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An experienced communications educator, Dr Randy Kluver was yet another remarkable 
influence on shaping the trajectory of this PhD. However, he was somewhat hesitant to 
engage directly with some of the questions from the outset, underlining the limitation of his 
knowledge as a distant observer. Dr Kluver kindly offered me to contribute to an anti-
censorship project he was associated with at Texas A&M University at the time, which did 
not end up materialising due to personal commitments. 
 
Dr. Soheila Vahdati-Bana, who is also an expat Iranian author and journalist based in the US, 
did not agree with the study's premise that there was an on-going online power struggle in 
Iran. Although she acknowledged the relevance of gender to cyber-activism in general, Dr 
Vahdati-Bana demonstrated a relatively limited knowledge of issues specific to the context 
under scrutiny. She came across primarily as a women's rights advocate, and did not engage 
substantively with any of the 'non-gendered' discussions. 
 
Director of the Centre for the Study of Communications and Culture, Dr Tessa Houghton, is 
an expert in soft censorship. However, her answers, as acknowledged openly by her during 
the interview, were based mostly on speculation, and not on any concrete research specific to 
the Iranian context. Dr Houghton advised me that the European ICT firms' contribution to 
cyber-censorship in repressive states is indeed a profound one, and that the Iranian regime's 
(i.e. IRGC) indigenous censorship capabilities are only as good as what they can make of 
technologies catered to them by large global corporations. 
 
Dr Ulises Mejias contributed to this research largely in an advocational capacity, setting up 
his responses on a bed of humanitarian principles not necessarily informed by first-hand 
research or even mainstream media accounts. Firmly in favour of stricter international trade 
regulations, he underlines the contribution of European ICT companies to censorship in Iran, 
China, Egypt, and Libya. Dr Mejias came across as a devout socialism advocate. "Capitalism 
trumps any ideals that European or US governments might profess to have about promoting 
democracy in the world," he stated, boldly likening NSN’s cooperation with the Iranian 
regime to that of IBM with Nazi Germany during WWII. 
 
All the above consultants were offered an initial set of standard information about the study, 
in advance of their participation. According to Seidman (2013: 50), when it comes to the 
protection of the interviewees from adverse future impacts of speaking openly on sensitive 
issues, the "prevailing principle must be equity". This is so long as reasonable measures are 
taken by the researcher to ensure that the interviewee has been fully briefed about the 
intended purpose of the research and its likely socio-political consequences for their careers, 
as well as providing them with a fair and transparent chance to withdraw statements or 
request modifications to them at any time prior to publication. The research at hand 
acknowledges based on previous experience the significance of interviewee protection, even 
though it did not generally tend to encounter any major examples of potential endangerment. 
This is possibly owed to my constant attempts to find a middle ground in each case that 
mutually served the study's objectives and the participant's interests and rights. In Rizk's 
(2003: 981) view, the core ethical principles of social research might require the researcher to 
eliminate some "exciting material" from their publication, or even to "slightly distort the 
results" if they face a dilemma as to which side to prioritise. The researcher, on that basis, 
will ultimately have no legitimate choice but to "trade-off between the accuracy and punch of 
[their] report", he argues. 
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Incidents of such nature were a rarity during the course of this research, as all the participants 
were selected warily from already outspoken figures in their respective fields of expertise. 
Oddly enough, there were multiple instances where the interviewees expressed grave 
concerns regarding the safety of my family members back in Iran, indicating that they were 
very well-informed about the political dynamics within the country. There were only a few 
brief moments along some interviews when the interviewee abstained from responding to a 
question altogether for a reason other than the self-confessed lack of sufficient knowledge. 
None of those reasons were directly or indirectly entrenched in a fear of the Iranian regime.  
 
The most memorable of those instances occurred when interviewing Mr. Neal Ungerleider, 
who quite disappointingly refused to engage with my question on Nokia-Siemens Networks 
(the fourth question on the list), stating that he "felt uncomfortable" as a professional 
journalist to "go on the record without solid evidence of illegal sales of surveillance 
technology by EU and American firms to the Iranian government or to government-affiliated 
companies." He on the other hand referred me to the "impeccable research" conducted on the 
matter by Privacy International, which according to him "spoke for itself", further indicating 
the reliance of many industry experts on a handful of reportorial (although often highly 
accredited) media and NGO accounts. Nevertheless, the strategy used to craft the design of 
these semi-structured interviews could have been enriched in hindsight by way of discussing 
explicitly with each interviewee the possible implications of speaking on the record on 
distinct issues such as specific acts of Western companies or governments in the past. 'Would 
have it been better practice to persuade the participant to reconsider their decision in return 
for a guarantee to mask their true identity in the thesis?' is also a methodological doubt that 
has echoed through my mind looking back at the research results. But then again, one 
wonders if the hypothetical addition of minute extra bits based possibly on speculation would 
have been worth compromising the credibility of the thesis by resorting to pseudonyms. 
 
——— 
 
 
As traditionally common in most non-positivist qualitative enquiries (Galland et al. 2010: 2), 
there are often more than one, and possibly even conflicting, answers which may stem from 
"disagreement, outdated information or simple errors." Referred to by Ishizuka and Matsuda 
(1990: 77) as a deductive interference mechanism, the intended logic here is one which 
openly recognises the significance of incomplete facts, including "hypothetical knowledge, 
knowledge with exceptions, and common sense knowledge." 
 
The key challenge here seems to be the recognition of a need for, as well as contribution to 
the development of, an innovative mechanism which is capable of theorising research results 
in a consistently accurate and meaningful method. Such a framework, as Parameswaran and 
Polyzotis (2011: 3) observe, can involve either "majority voting – have several human 
workers tackle the same question and then take the most frequent answer – [, . . . or 
employing] a more elaborate scheme where potentially conflicting answers are assigned 
probabilities, and [where] correct answers are defined based on a probability threshold." 
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In order for a research design to produce candid results throughout, the most significant 
factor will have to be the thorough reliability of the collected data. Gammelgård et al. (2007) 
count four main elements they suggest every qualitative social investigation based on first-
hand participatory (i.e. semi-structured interviews) data should note: source proximity, age of 
answer, area of expertise, and years of experience. But having full control over all these 
sensitive variables is a rare occurrence in social research, and a privilege seldom enjoyed by 
activism researchers in particular. The sampling process based on which this thesis was 
designed has put the focal emphasis on the latter two factors, acknowledging the practical 
limitations it endured with regards to implementing the other two. 
 
A relatively common technique often employed to validate the research results in non-
positivist research areas is triangulation, which essentially involves the study of various 
sources' perspectives on a given phenomenon (Hussein 2009; Mathison 1988), as well as 
attempting to make sense of the emerging patterns and trends within the process. However, 
the often overlooked angle regarding the notion of triangulation in Social Sciences is that the 
technique is "not aimed merely at validation but at deepening and widening one's 
understanding" Olsen (2004: 1). This will indeed help set the focus of academia on broad 
learning processes, and not on trivial inter-disciplinary commotions. The international 
community will benefit vastly from shifting its rather fixed understanding of triangulation to 
a more dynamic standpoint or, as Moran-Ellis et al. (2006: 5) assert, an "epistemological 
claim" focused largely on the maximisation of what can be learnt from a scholarly enquiry. 
 
Seale (1999: 472), too, underlines the primarily educational function of the concept, arguing 
that the common misrepresentation of analytical triangulation in Social Sciences has been 
encouraged by researchers "who mistakenly believe in inevitable logical connections between 
paradigm positions and techniques." 
 
Despite occasional overlaps, triangulation in social research should not be automatically 
translated into a mere methodological diversity. Alternatively, the concept could involve 
"comparing interview data from several witnesses to an event, [. . . or] comparing 
observational data from various settings that bear on the same knowledge claim" 
Hammersley (2008: 23). Triangulation needs to acknowledge the occasional inconsistencies 
in the incoming data feed or, as Fielding (2012: 125) states, reflect the crucial understanding 
that "one cannot measure precisely the same thing twice, [and that] validating an analysis by 
replication is misguided," due to the essentially fluid nature of sociological processes. 
 
A significance of the constructivist school of though is, in part, owed to its capability to 
simultaneously recognise and work with various parallel conceptual narratives which might 
exist surrounding a given social phenomenon. Under such conditions, methodological 
triangulation is not necessarily just aimed at "assisting the researcher [with] the research 
question" (Golafshani 2003: 604). 
 
The notion of triangulation has been widely undermined within the wider scholarly 
community. In fact, research validation techniques are not particularly popular amongst some 
less senior social scientists. A possible reason why triangulation is considered by many 
academics as unconstructive, according to Guion et al. (2011: 3), is that it "can be time-
consuming . . . , [as well as requiring] resources that are not always available to lead 
researchers." Nevertheless, most qualitative researchers' criticism of triangulation remains 
(Hammersley 2008: 32) to revolve around "a negative reaction to . . . technicism, [and] an 
insistence on the interpretative judgment necessarily involved in the research process." 
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Despite such claims, this thesis has found the practice to be beyond just a data validation 
technique, and highly beneficial to the development of one's understanding of the research 
topic, as well as to the self-reflexivity process. 
 
Reflexivity, or as Breuer and Roth (2003: 188) describe it, the "recognition of cultural blind 
spots" in qualitative investigations, is a constructive approach through which the rhetorical 
"assumptions and values of social scientists may be uncovered" (May 1999). Although 
retrospective attempts at the discovery of circumstantial limits to previously tested data collection 
methods "may seem a gloomy affair" (Jensen et al. 2003: 176) at first glance, they often result in 
the production of considerably more accurate results than otherwise would have been possible to 
achieve. 
 
Cyber-Activism, Network Literacy and the Innovation of Change 
 
Innovation-oriented levels of computer-literacy are crucial to all online social movements. In 
the case of Iran in the aftermath of the 2009 unrest, as Washington Times (2009b) reports, 
hacktivists "were active in helping keep channels open as the regime blocked them and [in 
spreading] the word about functioning proxy portals," acting as well to take down "Mr 
Ahmadinejad's website in an act of cyber-disobedience." Nic Newman (2009) of Reuters 
Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University, observed very little balance in the 
depth of activism between the pro-democracy activists and regime-backed netizens, as 
measured on major social networks such as Twitter, explaining that the "conversation was 
overwhelmingly in favour of opposition candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, who tended to 
attract the support of younger, more computer-literate Iranians," including those in the West. 
NBC (2013) reports that Iran benefits from a large population of young, highly educated and 
web-literate citizens, who can potentially make the country a leading power in cyber-
activism. "Names and web addresses of proxy server sites that allow users to sidestep 
controls are passed around like hot gossip," the agency informs. International Relations 
Review (2013) argues that regardless of the regime's vigorousness in online censorship, the 
"computer-literate generation is able to circumvent these obstacles." 
 
Data collected from the sampled blogs enable us to conduct a methodical assessment of some 
of the most politically active Iranian cyber-activists: 
 
Persian Bloggers, Computer Literacy and Innovative Use of Online Technologies 
 
Item No. Blog's Name 
Blogger's Degree of 
Computer Literacy 
Evidence of Innovative Use of 
Online Technologies  
1 Political Humour Intermediate No 
2 
Political Humour: Jokes About 
Ahmadinejad and Khamenei 
Advanced Yes 
3 Arman Dekami Intermediate No 
4 Alireza Rezaee Intermediate No 
5 Green Iran Forever Advanced No 
6 Short Messages Intermediate No 
7 Gameron Advanced No 
8 Mr. Asghar Advanced Yes 
9 F. M. Sokhan Advanced No 
10 Seyed Ebrahim Nabavi Advanced No 
11 Nikahang Kowsar Advanced No 
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12 Eghbal Mahoori Intermediate No 
13 Mullah Piaz Intermediate No 
14 Mehran Intermediate No 
15 Darush Ariaee Advanced Yes 
16 Mana Neyestani Advanced No 
17 Maatine Advanced Yes 
18 Rain in the Half-opened Mouth Advanced Yes 
19 In Between Intermediate No 
20 
What Kind of Country Is 
This?/What Is Up Today? 
Beginner No 
21 Our Future Advanced No 
22 Tahkhand Intermediate No 
23 
Today's Front Pages of 
Newspapers 
Intermediate No 
24 Mr. Khosn in Exile Advanced Yes 
25 Prophet Yarou Beginner No 
26 Facetious Sayings Advanced No 
27 Samovar Advanced No 
28 Anti-dictator Beginner No 
29 Zekipedia Beginner No 
30 Brainless Money Advanced Yes 
31 Talented Moron Intermediate No 
32 
Anger Flame/Shadow of 
Freedom/Democtatorship 
Intermediate No 
33 Sight Intermediate No 
34 Of Cowardice Advanced No 
35 Serious Humour Intermediate No 
36 Amjadiyeh Intermediate No 
37 Basiji Jokes Intermediate No 
38 Dambooli Intermediate No 
39 Iran's Green Revolution Advanced No 
40 Iran Got Ruined Intermediate No 
41 Dude Intermediate No 
42 Green Man Intermediate No 
43 Vision Is the Truth Advanced No 
44 Green Alliance Advanced No 
45 
Green Movement: We Are 
Countless 
Advanced No 
46 Qom's Green Movement Advanced Yes 
47 Green Musings Advanced Yes 
48 Senaps Intermediate No 
49 Balagari Advanced No 
50 Hollywood Advanced Yes 
51 Mir Ali Sabzineh Advanced No 
52 Mullah Hassani Advanced No 
53 Khan Gor's Musings Intermediate No 
54 Land of Iran Intermediate No 
55 Moghilan Tree's Thorn Advanced No 
56 Other Side of the World Advanced No 
57 World of Humour Advanced No 
58 Uncle Changiz Advanced Yes 
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59 Rebellious Advanced Yes 
60 Annamaz Advance No 
61 Hidden Sense Intermediate No 
62 Sober, the Little Prophet Advanced No 
63 Iran Lover Advanced No 
64 
Superstition and Broken Clock 
Hands 
Advanced No 
65 Dried Whey Advanced No 
Table 10 
 
An analysis of the above indicators leads the research to the following results: 
 
 
Figure 30 
 
The relatively high rates of computer literacy among politically motivated Iranian cyber-
activists tend not to coincide with any high degree of innovativeness within the opposition 
movement. It remains largely consumption-oriented—53 out of the 65 bloggers made little or 
no original contribution to the development of anti-censorship software. This inconsistency is 
particularly worthy of analysis, as the dysfunctions of the Iranian CIS are not likely to be 
symptoms of a shortage of relevant expertise, as this country boasts some of the most 
prestigious Science and Technology research centres in the Middle East. 
  
Recognising the difference between computer literacy and actively engaging in innovation is 
crucial to understanding and explaining the current status of Iranian cyber-activists within the 
country's NIS. In 2009, Iran ranked first in the world for its growth rate in science and 
technology—development in these areas being eleven times faster than the world's average. It 
ranked seventeenth in terms of the production of computer science applications (Science 
Metrix 2010), while topping the World Internet Stats' (2012) table of internet usage in the 
Middle East with nearly 42 million connected citizens, translating into just over fifty-three 
per cent of the total populace. But if Iranians' computer literacy is so high, why are the 
nation's netizens and cyber-activists not especially prolific in producing online innovations? 
 
It seems that computer literacy rates may not have as much relevance to the generation of 
timely, practical online innovations as some might expect. This may partially answer Hasse's 
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(2011) question regarding "the relation between practice-based learning, technological 
literacy and innovation." The aim here is not to discount the significance of education, but to 
underline the effects of resource deprivation on the civil half of Iran's NIS. It would be 
impossible, even for the nation's brightest software developers, to out-innovate foreign 
systems backed technologically by industry giants and funded to the tune of billions of USD, 
especially without any meaningful financial input. That would compare to going into a real 
war with a plastic gun. When young experts find themselves unable to beat the system, they 
will have only two economically viable options—either to migrate abroad as skilled workers, 
or to serve the regime's oppressing forces directly or indirectly by eventually seeking work 
within a governmentally-directed industry. Most people in this predicament will fall into the 
second category for contextual reasons. 
 
The circle of innovation at the national level in Iran is defective when compared with the 
model for democratic countries as developed by Lundvall, where academia, governmental 
institutions and enterprises collaborate in a unimodal system towards one single, transparent 
end. This dysfunctional NIS has led to what is often referred to as an innovation chasm: a 
lack of constructive and logical coordination between universities and industry to address the 
society's legitimate needs—as opposed to secretive, ideological goals—due to the absence of 
democracy within the political framework. Russell (1953: 49) argues that in contest between 
a democratic country and a repressive one, "the one allowing liberty is almost certain to 
become superior to the other in war technique in no very long time." This claim has been 
substantiated empirically in the case of Iran, whose online (Atlantic Council 2013) and 
offline (Elleman 2013) offensive powers remain below the standards of many Western states, 
despite having spent nearly $6.3 billion (SIPRI 2013) on its military in 2012. 
 
In a news article published during the post-election turmoil in 2009, Wired (2009) reported 
that at the same time as the demonstrators were gathering on the streets of Tehran and other 
major cities, their local and expatriate online equivalents were organising and launching 
hacking attacks on various governmental websites. "In both Iran and abroad, the cyber strikes 
are being praised as a way to hit back against a regime that so blatantly engaged in voter 
fraud," the magazine reported. Although it is generally believed that these hacking attacks 
were at least partially conducted by ordinary Iranian cyber-activists, as opposed to 
professional, paid hacking groups, there is also evidence to suggest that the Green Movement 
received a great deal of technical help from sympathetic professionals at home and abroad. In 
one instance, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2011) detected ties between anti-regime 
cyber strikes and the prominent hacking group Anonymous. RFE/RL quotes an Iranian 
member of Anonymous named Arash who was briefly interviewed over the phone. 
Acknowledging their online facilitation of the DDoS attacks in question, he states: "We know 
how powerful Iran's Islamic regime is, and we know it is hard fighting against them. But we 
have hope. And we are lucky because we are fighting on the side of the people of Iran." 
 
Mapping the Geography of Cyber-Activism in Iran: Counter-Censorship 
Innovations and the Local/Expatriate Divide 
 
This research also links the geographical location of Iranian cyber-activists to their degree of 
innovation and their exact contributions to power struggles with the ruling elite. Expatriate 
Iranian pro-democracy cyber-activists bring a different dimension into play. Indymedia 
(2010) describes Iranian expatriates residing in the US as "uberly educated"—a phenomenon 
that seems to largely apply to Iranians based in north-western Europe as well. This could be 
due to their unrestricted access to information and the often much improved access to 
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academic education. Iran's expatriates tend to be more in touch with the contextual realities of 
their country of origin than many locals tend to perceive. Uskowi (2013) reported shortly 
after the June 2013 presidential election that about half of the expatriate community voted for 
the sole non-conservative candidate available to them—Hassan Rouhani—a proportion fully 
consistent with his share of the polls inside the country, where he achieved about fifty-one 
per cent of the vote. One possible conclusion here is that the Iranian expatriates were heavily 
affected by the negative consequences of the regime's hostile foreign policy during the eight 
years of Ahmadinejad's presidency, and therefore felt an urge to support the anti-extremism 
campaign launched by Rouhani and his moderate allies within the inner circles of the Islamic 
Republic. 
 
Estimated to number in the tens of thousands, cyber-activists associated with this segment of 
Iran's political discourse are responsible for an array of anti-censorship activities ranging 
from fundraising to developing proxy software to engaging in DDoS hacking attacks. Yet 
expatriate software developers have not been immune from prosecution by the cyber police 
(HRANA 2013; Near East Observatory 2013). Longitudinal (2009–2011) content analysis of 
sixty-five popular politically active Persian blogs, reformist and secular, sampling equally 
from those based inside and outside of Iran shows that expatriate Iranian cyber-activists may 
not be more concentrated in the United States than in other Western countries. This finding is 
not in line with previously published data (Naghdi 2010) mapping the Iranian diaspora 
suggesting that nearly forty per cent of expatriate Iranians are based in the United States. 
Alternatively, this distribution could be an indication that Iranians residing in the United 
States are less politically active and/or computer literate than their counterparts elsewhere, 
despite their larger population. The rest of the assessed bloggers tend to be scattered 
worldwide, primarily in north-western European countries, where most international human 
rights NGOs are headquartered. For twenty-two bloggers, a geographical location remains 
fully unknown, while two of the expatriate blogs contain no explicit evidence of the country 
from which they are maintained: 
 
Persian Bloggers: The Geography of Online Dissent 
Number Blog's Name Blog's Address 
Blogger's 
Location 
1 Political Humour http://tanze30ya30.blogfa.com Unknown 
2 
Political Humour: Jokes 
About Ahmadinejad and 
Khamenei 
http://ba27.wordpress.com Unknown 
3 Arman Dekami http://g791.wordpress.com Iran 
4 Alireza Rezaee http://alirezarezaee1.blogspot.com France 
5 Green Iran Forever http://greeniranfrorever.blogspot.com 
Toronto, 
Canada 
6 Short Messages http://tweatter.blogspot.com Iran 
7 Gameron http://gameron.wordpress.com 
Bandar 
Abbas, 
Iran 
8 Mr. Asghar http://www.asgharagha.com 
London, 
UK 
9 F. M. Sokhan http://www.fmsokhan.com Iran 
10 Seyed Ebrahim Nabavi http://www.enabavi.com Belgium 
11 Nikahang Kowsar http://nikahang.blogspot.com 
Toronto, 
Canada 
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12 Eghbal Mahoori http://www.khodnevis.org/persian/author/eghbaly Unknown 
13 Mullah Piaz http://mullahpiaz.net Unknown 
14 Mehran http://www.khodnevis.org/persian/author/mehrancartoonist Unknown 
15 Darush Ariaee 
http://sansornashode.blogspot.com and 
http://persiaroyal.blogspot.com 
Unknown 
16 Mana Neyestani http://zamaaneh.com/zamtoon/cat Malaysia 
17 Maatine http://maatine.com Iran 
18 
Rain in the Half-opened 
Mouth 
http://www.debsh.com Malaysia 
19 In Between http://andarmal.wordpress.com Unknown 
20 
What Kind of Country Is 
This?/What Is Up 
Today? 
http://mamlekate.blogspot.com and 
http://emroozchekhabar.blogspot.com 
Unknown 
21 Our Future http://ayandema.blogspot.com 
Christ 
Church, 
New 
Zealand 
22 Tahkhand http://tahkhand.blogspot.com Iran 
23 
Today's Front Pages of 
Newspapers 
http://safhehaval.blogspot.com and 
http://sepehr1970.blogspot.com 
Unknown 
24 Mr. Khosn in Exile http://blog.hasanagha.org 
Oslo, 
Norway 
25 Prophet Yarou http://yaarou.wordpress.com Unknown 
26 Facetious Sayings http://www.hazl.com 
California, 
USA 
27 Samovar http://samavar.wordpress.com 
Expatriate, 
Location 
Unknown 
28 Anti-dictator http://zobin-cost.blogspot.com Unknown 
29 Zekipedia http://zekipedia.wordpress.com 
Isfahan, 
Iran 
30 Brainless Money http://brain-less.blogspot.com LA, USA 
31 Talented Moron http://talentedmoron.blogspot.com Unknown 
32 
Anger Flame/Shadow of 
Freedom/Democtatorship 
http://anger-flame.blogspot.com , http://freedom-
sayeh.blogspot.com and http://democtatori.blogspot.com 
Unknown 
33 Sight http://tanzir-balatarin.blogspot.com Unknown 
34 Of Cowardice http://bozdelaneh.blogspot.com Unknown 
35 Serious Humour http://werraj.wordpress.com Iran 
36 Amjadiyeh http://amjadiyeh1900.blogspot.com Iran 
37 Basiji Jokes http://basijoks1.wordpress.com Unknown 
38 Dambooli http://dambooli.wordpress.com 
Tehran, 
Iran 
39 Iran's Green Revolution http://irangreenrevolution.wordpress.com Iran 
40 Iran Got Ruined http://hamid.thepersianland.com Unknown 
41 Dude http://melisagodwin.blogspot.com USA 
42 Green Man http://sabzemard.wordpress.com Unknown 
43 Vision Is the Truth http://visionisthetruth2.wordpress.com 
Tehran, 
Iran 
44 Green Alliance http://ettehadesabz.wordpress.com 
Tehran, 
Iran 
45 
Green Movement: We 
Are Countless 
http://nehzatsabz5.blogspot.com 
Tehran, 
Iran 
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Table 11 
 
Based on the above, the geographical distribution of the sampled bloggers can be condensed 
into the following chart: 
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46 Qom's Green Movement http://greenqom.wordpress.com Qom, Iran 
47 Green Musings http://worldqress.wordpress.com Iran 
48 Senaps http://senaps.blogspot.com Iran 
49 Balagari http://balagari.wordpress.com 
Tehran, 
Iran 
50 Hollywood http://hollywoodweblog.wordpress.com 
Shiraz, 
Iran 
51 Mir Ali Sabzineh http://miralisabzineh3.wordpress.com 
Tehran, 
Iran 
52 Mullah Hassani http://mollah.blogspot.com 
Toronto, 
Canada 
53 Khan Gor's Musings http://khangor.blogsky.com  and http://khangor.blogfa.com 
Mazandara
n, Iran 
54 Land of Iran http://persiatazmin.wordpress.com Unknown 
55 Moghilan Tree's Thorn http://naiem.wordpress.com Australia 
56 Other Side of the World http://onvaredonya.blogspot.com 
Copenhage
n, 
Denmark 
57 World of Humour http://hosseinpooya.blogspot.com 
London, 
UK 
58 Uncle Changiz http://www.bipfa.com/amoo-changiz Unknown 
59 Rebellious http://fetnegar01.blogspot.com Unknown 
60 Annamaz http://annamaz.blogspot.com Iran 
61 Hidden Sense http://chinejan.wordpress.com Iran 
62 Sober, the Little Prophet http://marooned9.blogfa.com Iran 
63 Iran Lover http://ashegiran.blogspot.com Unknown 
64 
Superstition and Broken 
Clock Hands 
http://khorafe.blogspot.com and 
http://mehdiyaghoubi38.blogspot.com 
Expatriate, 
Location 
Unknown 
65 Dried Whey http://kashkmyblog.wordpress.com Iran 
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A mapping exercise conducted on the eighteen assessed expatriate blogs reveals the 
individual countries in which their owners are based: 
 
 
Figure 32 
 
The results show that the Persian blogs sampled are nearly equally divided between North 
America, Europe and the rest of the world in terms of the location from which they are 
maintained. This suggests that Iran's top expatriate cyber-activists are mostly based in 
Canada, the United States and north-western Europe. There is a direct relationship between 
the migration pattern of the Iranian political exiles and political openness of their countries of 
settlement. It appears that most dissidents who leave Iran are inclined to settle in countries 
where they expect to be able to make the greatest impact on their homeland's future. 
 
In fact, a major contributor to the dysfunctions of the Iranian NIS is brain drain, or as the 
Wall Street Journal (2009) refers to it, a "spreading refugee exodus of businesspeople, 
dissidents, college students, journalists, athletes and other elite Iranians that is transforming 
the global face of Iran's resistance movement." Iran suffers from one of the world's largest 
brain drain effects (Daily Reveille 2013). If we accept that the majority of 'ground-breaking' 
technological innovations in a given country are made by a superiorly talented, highly 
educated young elite, then it cannot be deemed as promising for the country's NIS that Iran 
faces an annual loss of between 150,000 and 180,000 of its academic specialists, costing the 
country nearly fifty billion USD (BBC 2007). Currently, there are 250,000 Iranian scientists 
permanently residing only in the United States or Canada (BBC Persian 2011). Another 
50,000 Iranians are registered higher education candidates studying abroad (Iranian Embassy 
in Norway 2011), including many who will refuse to return home following graduation due to 
a lack of job security (New America Media 2011), and to an extensive restriction of social 
freedoms (Pars Times 2000). 
 
In the expert interviews, opinions on the influence of geographical location on the innovation 
activities of Iranian cyber-activists were highly polarised. Elahe Boghrat has very little doubt 
that expatriate Iranian dissidents have been more successful in such activities. This is "due to 
liberal nature of the Western countries where most of them reside," she explains. In full 
agreement with the above statement, Dr. James Fielder believes that the role of expatriate 
cyber-activists in the development of anti-censorship technology remains largely 
underexplored, and says that he can see this conceptual gap even in his own doctoral 
dissertation, explaining that "the link[s] between urban locals and expats are more crucial 
than links between urban and rural locals. A vigorous information pipeline depends on not 
only a robust network but also educated and savvy users." 
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Layla Hashemi, however, disagrees, stating that she believes "the call for political change 
should and must come from within the nation." Dr. Marcus Michaelsen fully acknowledges 
the contributions made by expatriate cyber-activists, but says he has heard from reliable 
sources that "Iranian activists from inside the country are very capable of finding ways to 
counter filtering and censorship." He, nevertheless, raises the question of whether the 
country's local activists have the technological capacity and infrastructure to do this 
efficiently. Dr. Nassim Nazemi also believes that despite their relatively smaller numbers 
local Iranian cyber-activists' "actions have a greater immediate impact on the regime," 
adding, "expats have a less important role to play." Finally, Pejman Akbarzadeh, journalist 
and producer at the Amsterdam-based Persian language radio station Radio Zamaneh, asserts 
that local activists' "views on the situation can be more realistic because they are inside the 
country." 
 
Based on the results of this research, expatriate Iranians are considerably more capable of 
engaging in 'conflict-friendly' technological innovations, which could be due to a range of 
factors including access to specialist educational opportunities on all levels, open political 
systems, and infrastructure with far superior connectivity when compared to their 
counterparts residing in Iran. A large proportion of Iranian university students enrolled 
abroad, especially those studying at the post-graduate level, are engaged in hard science 
programmes. If such courses of competitive quality were run inside the country, this would 
not likely be the case. In terms of its average internet speed (2.53 Mbps), Iran ranks (Net 
Index 2013) 163 out of 186 countries surveyed, preceded by Tunisia (2.55 Mbps) and 
followed by Lebanon (2.46 Mbps). Adding in Iran's position as the least free state on 
Freedom House's (2013a) Net Freedom list—beating China and Cuba by a few points—it 
becomes clear why academia has increasingly failed to address the true professional aims and 
aspirations of the country's top computer science students, who often either get banned from 
working in the field or emigrate shortly after graduation. This subsequently creates a void of 
expertise in the local market, making ICT imports even more vital to Iran. 
 
The Iranian ICT industry remains, for the most part, technologically hostage to the Islamic 
Republic's security-oriented policies. According to a report published by Freedom House 
(2013b), the TCI Ministry issued a directive addressed to all the ISPs, "asking . . . [them] . . . 
to separate internet traffic from intranet traffic, in line with the continued implementation of 
the National Information Network (NIN)." This would speed up access to 'approved,' locally 
hosted websites, while still keeping access to unfiltered websites hosted by non-Iranian 
servers painfully slow, making them awfully difficult to browse. Perhaps it is hoped that this 
clever technical trick will boost the country's currently very low position on the Net Index, 
allowing the authorities to escape some of the international pressure they face for their 
extensive violation of internet rights. 
 
Other experts refuse to grant technological leverage to any one group of cyber-activists based 
on their geographical location, and emphasise the differences between the two communities 
rather than the superiority of either's influence. Madeline Storck further elaborates on this 
perspective, explaining that "local cyber-activists played an important role in planning and 
organising protests, while expatriate cyber-activists' role was more in generating awareness in 
the wider world of the events taking place within the country in question." Dr. Ulises Mejias 
views the expatriate activists' actions as facilitating local ones, saying that the "expatriate 
community is mostly responsible for disseminating information about the movement, and [for 
ensuring] that the use of social media by local cyber-activists is limited but focused and 
effective." These two comments help confirm the existence of a single collaborative network 
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of interconnected Persian cyber-activists dedicated to pro-democracy dissent in place within 
the online sphere. If extensive filtering, vigorous surveillance and low speed connections 
were effective at preventing local Iranians from connecting to the 'outside world,' this would 
have been clearly reflected in interaction between cyber-activists based inside and outside the 
country. But the current structure of the internet—Web 2.0—seems conceptually too dynamic 
to get trapped by set, inflexible frameworks. Local and expatriate cyber-activists have shown 
over the years that there is very little that oppressive forces can do to limit their potent 
partnership. But the mere existence of a golden opportunity for innovation does not 
necessarily translate into a timely, efficient 'strike.' The evident reliance of local Iranian 
netizens on foreign ICTs seems to have restricted the output of a CIS that could otherwise be 
considerably more prolific. 
 
The Internet and Democracy Blog (2008) claims that its original content analysis of a 
selection of Persian blogs demonstrates that the "blogosphere [in question] is a . . . 
communication space where a wide variety of political, literary and artistic themes are 
discussed by Iranian expats and a broad cross-section of those living in Iran." The BBC 
(2009b) refers to the Iranian blogosphere as "a well-connected [network of] expats, experts 
and academics." American Thinker (2013) observes that at the height of Iran's latest 
presidential election the expatriates played a key role in "reporting that the revolutionary 
guards and the religious police are out in force, watching as citizens vote—ostensibly to 
make sure they vote for the 'right' guy." Aljazeera (2009), acknowledges the Iranian 
expatriates' role during the post-election unrest, quoting prominent blogger Potkin Azarmehr 
stating in an interview that "given how internet savvy the young Iranians are and the help 
they are getting from Iranian expats, whatever law Ahmadinejad passes, there will be a way 
round it." The Toronto Star (2013) dedicated an article to Ali Bangi and Mahsa Alimardani, 
two Iranian-Canadian internet security experts who designed ASL19 at the University of 
Toronto's Citizen Lab. "ASL19 facilitates internet access for people in Iran, where access is 
tightly controlled," the paper reports. Working closely with other major anti-censorship 
software developers, including those behind Psiphon, they warned (ASL19 2013) local 
Iranians in June 2013 about an allegedly fake version of the program rapidly circulating on 
the web, posting tips on how to distinguish it from the genuine file. 
 
Explaining innovation dynamics in Iran—a country divided against itself—calls for various 
adjustments to the traditional conception of NIS. Iranian expatriates have been integral to the 
pro-democracy movement (Aljazeera 2012b). Mostly computer-literate, politically active and 
based in industrialised democracies, Iranian expatriates have influenced online power 
struggles in several ways. They have developed and/or promoted anti-censorship software, 
organised boycotts against Western telecommunications firms that continue to do business 
with the Iranian regime, harassed pro-regime websites with DDoS attacks, and persuaded 
Western politicians and NGOs to systematically support the free flow of information in Iran. 
Some of these expatriates have been involved in the development of some of the world's most 
effective proxy software. Other members of the Iranian expatriate community are known to 
have been influential in improving the relevant databases needed for better functionality of 
such software, given their direct knowledge of the contextual realities of the target market. In 
terms of shaping international policies, the most prominent example is the Washington DC-
based National Iranian-American Council (NIAC), a non-profit that claims to have been 
lobbying for the improvement of human rights in Iran since its formation in 2002, and pushed 
for the Iranian Digital Empowerment and Stand with the People of Iran Acts at the United 
States Congress in December 2009. 
——— 
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Network Access, Computer Literacy and Online Innovations: Gender Equality 
as a Catalyst of Change 
 
Although the feminist movement has a rich history of engaging with pioneering technological 
innovations (Chen and Xiao 2011; Wajcman 2013), techno-feminism remains to be viewed 
by many (e.g. Puleo 2012; Rowbotham 2013) as one-dimensional and partisan. Nevertheless, 
the core significance of modern feminism lies chiefly in its keen focus on the social elements 
influencing technological trajectory at all stages of the innovation, adaptation and use. 
 
Classic feminism traditionally regards technology as gender blind, criticising mainly the 
patriarchy issue for women's unjustifiable exclusion from hard sciences. Techno-feminism, 
on the other hand, has a tendency to embrace social constructivism, simultaneously ruling out 
absolute neutrality and un-negotiable technical bias of the scientific innovations. This 
progressive approach has been imperative to the modern-day feminists in their breakthrough 
of some social barriers, and in helping them move along (Faulkner 2001: 92) toward "a 
practice that is more democratic and respectful of diversity." This particularly resonates in the 
field of ICTs, where "higher proportions of males than female [are] reporting access" 
(Selwyn 2004: 344). The requirement for the embedment of feminist philosophy within the 
theoretical construction of this thesis stems fundamentally from gender consciousness 
(Bierema 2003). Although many male sociologists across the globe have the most progressive 
of intentions in mind with regards to gender equality, some of their research approaches may 
be driven unknowingly by socially accepted patriarchal concepts and forces (La Pastina 
2006). 
 
The interplay between gender and ICTs is not merely of a historical or technical nature, but is 
also a product of the social conditions in which those technologies are adapted and used, or as 
Wajcman (2009: 7) refers to, a "seamless web or network combining artefacts, people, 
organisations and cultural meanings and knowledge." Therefore, understanding that the initial 
design of a given hardware or software does not necessarily determine the trajectory of its 
possible future transformations is imperative to the feminist techno-science research. 
 
The compulsory exclusion and voluntary abstinence of the female workforce from actively 
participating in the ICT-mediated industries is deeply interwoven with the contextual realities 
of the offline world, namely the patriarchal nature of the multinational corporate businesses 
(Menon 2015; Phillips 2014). As a result, the question of computer literacy becomes less of a 
relevant factor than the immediate need for attention to the women's struggle to choose 
between their social image and entering uncomfortable territories, or as Wajcman (2007: 289) 
puts it, "forsake their femininity" in favour of short-sighted economic gains. 
 
The techno-feminism approach to online innovations argues that no amount of pre-release 
technical tests can produce assurance in terms of future gender popularity or usefulness, and 
that a functional innovation system necessitates a "mutual adjustment of technologies and 
gender identities" (Oudshoorn et al. 2004: 13) over the long term. 
 
Gender, Democratic Legitimacy and Innovation: A Sociological Approach to 
Cyber-Activism in Iran 
 
Gender is another factor neglected by the conventional conception of NIS. Northern 
European nations are widely recognised as pioneers of gender equality, and arguably the 
world's freest countries for women to live in. 
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The following comparison of the Gender Inequality Index (GII) rankings in 2008 and 2011 
simply shows that the top 10 (out of 138 and 146 respectively) positions are almost entirely 
shared between the same countries, all of which (with the exception of Singapore) are located 
in the north and west of Europe. Moreover, the table demonstrates that countries with lower 
gender inequality in 2011 have also topped the same year's Human Development Index (HDI) 
ranking list: 
 
Gender Inequality Index: 2008 vs. 2011 
 
Country GII Ranking 
2011 
GII Value 
2011 
HDI Ranking 
2011 
GII Ranking 
2008 
GII Value 
2008 
Sweden 1 0.049 10 3 0.212 
Netherlands 2 0.052 3 1 0.174 
Denmark 3 0.060 16 2 0.209 
Switzerland 4 0.067 11 4 0.228 
Finland 5 0.075 22 8 0.248 
Norway 6 0.075 1 5 0.234 
Germany 7 0.085 9 7 0.240 
Singapore 8 0.086 26 10 0.255 
Iceland 9 0.099 14 13 0.279 
France 10 0.106 20 11 0.260 
Table 12 (United Nations Development Programme 2011) 
 
Such gender-neutrality, as D. Chen (2004: 3) suggests, is "an essential component of an 
effective economic and human development strategy." It is helpful to note that all these 
countries are among the most economically developed. But is gender equality a pre-requisite 
for economic success or is it the other way around? The above researcher quotes the World 
Bank (2003) as stating that "development policies and actions that fail to take gender 
inequality into account and fail to address disparities between males and females will have 
limited effectiveness and serious cost implications." This may help explain why Iran 
consistently ranks poorly in regards to both the gender gap and economic development. 
 
Gender inequality is not, as some may perceive, merely an issue of ethics and social justice. 
By systematically discriminating against women in academia and/or the workplace, a society 
deprives itself of roughly half its potential resources and expertise. Gender discrimination 
directly disrupts all elements of an NIS in its classic (i.e. Northern European) sense, and 
prevents any given national system of political economy from fully flourishing, regardless of 
fiscal investment. The world's increasing focus on gender equality "is a central component of 
the process of democratisation," as Inglehart et al. (2002: 21) argue. Without democracy, as 
previously argued, a country's NIS becomes tainted with negative surprises. The democratic 
nature of an NIS, therefore, can be considered a measure of its overall, long-term capability, 
functionality and sustainability—offering yet another reason why Iran is, on many levels, 
dependent on foreign technology. 
 
The country's consistently poor position on the Global Gender Gap (GGG) ranking list is a 
testament to this claim: 
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Global Gender Gap Report 2009 
 
Nation GGG Ranking Population 
Pakistan 132 176,242,949 
Saudi Arabia 130 28,686,633 
Iran 128 66,429,284 
Egypt 126 83,082,869 
Turkey 129 76,805,524 
Qatar 125 833,285 
Yemen 134 23,822,783 
Mali 127 12,666,987 
Chad 133 10,329,208 
Morocco 124 34,859,364 
Table 13 (World Economic Forum 2009) 
 
Meanwhile and in contrast to the north-western European states discussed above, Iran's HDI 
ranking remains just above average in the world and across the region: 
 
Human Development Index 2011 
 
HDI Ranking Country Score 
17 Israel 0.888 
30 UAE 0.846 
37 Qatar 0.831 
42 Bahrain 0.806 
56 Saudi Arabia 0.770 
63 Kuwait 0.760 
64 Libya 0.760 
71 Lebanon 0.739 
88 Iran 0.707 
89 Oman 0.705 
92 Turkey 0.699 
94 Tunisia 0.698 
95 Jordan 0.698 
96 Algeria 0.698 
113 Egypt 0.644 
119 Syria 0.632 
130 Morocco 0.582 
132 Iraq 0.573 
154 Yemen 0.462 
Table 14 (United Nations Development Programme 2011) 
 
 
——— 
 
Another outcome of this research worthy of reflection is the striking imbalance of the 
distribution of the interviewees in terms of gender. Although selected from a larger directory 
of carefully sampled online journalists, cyber-activists, and scholars of activism and 
computer and political science, a quick glimpse at both lists is enough to show that most—if 
not all—of these areas of expertise are dominated by males.  
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This phenomenon brings to mind the question of the relationship between politically 
motivated cyber-activism and gender, on which there happens to be no scholarly data. 
Psychological research (Eagly and Steffen 1986), however, shows that there is a direct 
relationship between gender and aggressiveness, demonstrating that males are both physically 
and socially more confrontational. This may help explain male domination of conflict-
oriented fields. 
 
While the role of gender equality on a country's economic development may be relatively 
easy to establish, there seems to be an escalating need for a coherent explanation for the 
relationship between the two and technological innovations, and further for a robust 
framework to address NIS inadequacy in repressive countries such as Iran. Reaching the bar 
set by largely innovation-focused north-western European economic powers seems to be a 
reasonable plan for these states. Danilda and Granat Thorslund (2011: 20) quote a paper 
published by Central Europe (2010), a European Union programme which encourages 
cooperation among nine central European countries, as stating that the "equal participation of 
men and women is essential . . . to exploit the full potential of innovative strengths—not only 
for demographic reasons, but also in case of innovation processes and results." They call for 
new policies that can effectively re-balance gender representation in innovation processes of 
business and research in favour of the professional female workforce. 
 
Andersson et al. (2009, cited by Danilda and Granat Thorslund 2011: 29) also emphasise the 
role of gender equality in economic development, claiming that "a more open working 
climate and a broader approach to developing products and services boosts the 
competitiveness of the individual organisations and the regional innovative environment." 
But the question still remains: how can the West rectify the situation through policy? 
Questioning repressive regimes on their discriminatory gender laws, such as Iran's ban on 
female enrolment in various university programmes, would be a promising start. Archibugi 
(2004: 181) argues that, at least in the case of the United States, we are facing a blatantly 
'schizophrenic' approach to issues such as gender discrimination, asserting that "It is US 
national policy to consider as anti-social, if not criminal . . . using gender-discriminating 
nouns. Yet such quibbles are soon forgotten when US policies assume a foreign dimension." 
 
A central part of this research, the results of a longitudinal (2009–2012) study of sixty-five 
politically active Persian blogs equally divided between locals and expatriates show that only 
one blog was maintained by a woman. This suggests that despite common perceptions 
holding the regime's ideology of male preference to be solely responsible for damaging the 
professional aspirations of Iranian women, even the stratum of society most devoted to 
change seems to suffer from the same degree of gender inequality, ultimately making it 
equally undemocratic in nature. 
 
Over one third of the surveyed experts acknowledged gender as an influential factor in cyber-
activism in the Iranian context, but very few had firm opinions or access to any recent, solid 
data on the issue. Dr. Alexander Dawoody insists that Iranian women, especially those 
educated in the West, have taken the lead and are in the forefront of the cyber-activist 
movement in Iran. According to him, they are "experts in finding ways to offset regime 
offenses through modest, yet determine[d] and continually developing technological solutions 
to TCI." Dr. Dawoody, however, does not substantiate this claim with any concrete evidence. 
Dr. Soheila Vahdati-Bana, a human rights advocate and expert in Electrical Engineering and 
Computer Sciences, claims that "women with children find it more convenient to connect 
with others via the web," yet also fails to provide evidence. While the latter claim falls 
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slightly outside of this research's zone of focus, the former does not correspond with data 
retrieved through blog content analysis, which suggest that women are heavily 
underrepresented in the country's cyber-activist community. There seems to be a growing 
need for empirical data on the participation of and attitudes of Iranian women towards cyber-
activism—a valuable resource from which this research could have greatly benefited. 
 
Dr. James Fielder claims that cyber-activism is a practice shared almost equally between 
Iranian men and women, as long as we are assessing urban areas. He suggests that "greater 
conservatism and fewer educational opportunities create larger gender cleavages [outside of 
major cities]." Yet this argument is not quite consistent with the results of the blog content 
analysis, which demonstrate a gender gap. Although the exact geographical locations of the 
sampled in-country Persian blogs remain undetermined in most cases, it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that they are run mostly from bigger cities. This is because in Iran the 
chance of having access to a broadband network connection, as well as the skills required to 
purposefully employ it to create content, rises sharply with the size of the city. Also, the 
majority of the competent Iranian universities are based in the country's most crowded 
provinces. 
 
A PBS (2008) report acknowledges the widespread presence of Iranian female activists on 
the internet and their engagement in a range of innovative activities, ranging from creating 
and circulating radio podcasts to disseminating information through expanding email lists. 
The report alleges that "for the first time, the women's movement is not restricted to a certain 
elite, but includes women of all ages and backgrounds, from big cities to small villages." The 
Women's UN Report Network (2010) cites Parvin Ardalan, prominent Iranian women's rights 
activist and winner of the Olof Palme Prize in 2007, stating in an exclusive phone interview 
that "every print magazine for women we had was closed, so we created a new world for 
ourselves in cyberspace." 
 
Similarly, CNN (2013) quotes Barbara Miller, winner of Amnesty International and WACC-
SIGNIS Human Rights Awards for her documentary about three international female cyber-
activists in exile (including an Iranian one), as saying that "a refusal to be censored unites . . . 
women across cultures and continents, as they use their blogs to connect with the world 
outside of the regime." The BBC (2002) seems to have a slightly different take on what 
motivates Iranian women to get online, arguing that "the web is providing a way for women 
in Iran to talk freely about taboo subjects such as sex and boyfriends." It also anonymously 
quotes a 'leading' female Iranian cyber-activist who explains: "I could talk very freely and 
very frankly about things I could never talk about in any other place, about subjects that are 
banned." While this information may not necessarily be accurate over a decade later, it may 
help explain why women are so under-represented in Iran's cyber-activism scene, despite 
their reportedly large presence online. 
 
Male dominance in the Iranian community of politically motivated cyber-activism does not 
coincide with advanced IT skills or ground-breaking anti-censorship innovations. The 
egregious gender gap within Iran's cyber-activist community is not, as some may assume, an 
outcome of discrimination in the country's higher education system, but instead the result of 
biases enforced at all levels of a conventionally male-dominated society. Evidence shows 
that, with the exception of only a few fields reliant on heavy labour, such as mining, auto-
mechanics and aerospace engineering, about seventy per cent (Masoud 2006) of graduates 
from engineering university programmes are women. Yet the fact that over half of the 
country's skilled forces have very little chance of contributing to their country's technological 
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development, in comparison to their—not necessarily more qualified—male counterparts, 
provides a reasonable explanation for Iran's distorted innovation structure. 
 
D. Chen (2004: 3) asserts that "there is a statistically significant positive association between 
gender equality in education and economic development," emphasising the positive influence 
of ICTs on both. Klasen (2002) spots a reciprocal pattern in his research, arguing that gender 
bias in education disrupts economic development by limiting human capital, which in return 
affects literacy. Yadav (2006: 2) explains that the "movement towards gender equality is not 
a technocratic goal—it is a political process. It requires a new way of thinking in which the 
stereotyping of women and men gives way to a new philosophy that regards all people, 
irrespective of gender, as essential agents of change." 
 
This insight is quite important for the idea of a 'genderless' innovation system as proposed by 
this research. Despite the popular perception that all debates regarding gender equality are 
psychological in nature, it is argued here that religiously and culturally motivated gender 
discrimination in Iran has had a noticeable impact on nationwide innovation processes. In 
other words, a lack of democratic features such as gender equality will most likely result in 
the distortion of a country's NIS. 
 
A content analysis of the Persian blogs sampled by this research demonstrates that a 
dominant ninety-four per cent (61 out of 65) of the bloggers were male, whereas only one of 
them was certainly a woman, while gender remained unknown for three of the bloggers: 
 
Persian Bloggers: Gender and Cyber-activism in Iran 
 
Number Blog's Name Blogger's Gender 
1 Political Humour Unknown 
2 Mullah Piaz Unknown 
3 What Kind of Country Is This?/What is Up Today? Unknown 
4 Khan Gor's Musings Female 
Table 15 
 
 
 
 
——— 
 
 
 
 
The disproportionate gender distribution of top Iranian cyber-activists is in blatant contrast 
with previous studies of the country's university graduates, especially those obtaining science 
and engineering degrees. Iranian women currently constitute about seventy per cent (LA 
Times 2012; Masoud 2006) of the 'hard' science and engineering university students 
nationwide—making Iran one of the world's top states in terms of female expertise. Suffering 
from an even more severe degree of workplace patriarchy, Al-Zahra, the IRGC's only all-
female unit (Taheri 2007), had no more than 400 'qualified' recruits (Cordesman 2007) by the 
end of year 2003. 
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Women and Higher Education: A Worldwide Comparison 
 
 
Figure 33 (UNESCO Data Centre 2010, Cited by Charles 2011) 
 
An empirical comparison between the number of Iran's female degree-holders and female 
representation in the professional workforce across all branches of hard science, along with 
the country's official position as the world's top nation in terms of female graduates in science 
and engineering programmes, leads to the conclusion that the Iranian NIS has a large and 
unnatural void of female experts—a practical obstacle not addressed by Freeman and 
Lundvall's original conception of NIS. When such a large percentage of potential experts are 
effectively barred from participating in developing new innovations, the resulting NIS cannot 
be truly functional. Although an extremely valuable contribution to the Innovations Studies 
literature globally, the existing NIS model tends to view nationwide innovation processes 
from a democratic, gender-neutral perspective—yielding a framework only relevant to a 
limited number of Western, industrialised nations. Such a 'clinical' model is not adequate for 
a country like Iran that has profound issues of gender inequality. Structural alterations will 
need to be made to the existing model for it to become fully applicable in this context. 
 
The lack of gender equality in either mode of Iran's NIS is not rooted in academia. Despite 
cultural limitations, Iran remains a world leader in terms of its number of female university 
graduates, outpacing an array of economically more developed countries. What makes Iran a 
poor guardian of women's rights, however, is a deeper, contextual issue. While many bright, 
professional Iranian women have complained about professional discrimination, statistically 
they also appear not to be integral in the 'alternative' political sphere, where participation is 
based more on voluntary engagement. This cannot be solely due to a state-inflicted lack of 
opportunities, instead reflecting the contextual realities, including the vulnerable place of 
Iranian women in virtually all of the country's discourse as an 'intellectually inferior' gender. 
This stereotype is commonplace, despite standing against (Woolley and Malone 2011) every 
concrete piece of evidence gathered to date. 
  
104 
Iranian women online therefore face additional roadblocks to participating in an efficient 
CIS. They not only encounter cultural obstacles to effective representation, but must also 
navigate the same technical impediments faced by all Iranian netizens. Iran has been a regular 
member of the world's least free internet access club for many consecutive years: 
 
Iran's Internet Freedom Status (0 = Most Free, 100 = Least Free) 
 
 2011 2012 
Access Restriction 21 21 
Content Control 29 32 
Individual Surveillance 39 37 
Total Score 89 90 
Table 16 (Freedom House 2012) 
 
All Iranian cyber-activists will benefit from well-researched and effectively promoted 
policies, led by the democratic world, that emphasise gender equality and the development of 
anti-censorship technologies while consistently denying the Islamic regime's access to dual-
use ICTs. 
 
Legislative Powers of the European Parliament: Policy as a Preventative 
Measure 
 
A great majority of the surveyed experts acknowledge the need for policy solutions to these 
issues, recognising that Western legislators, including the European Parliament, are among 
the most potentially powerful actors and have the ability to shift the pattern of online 
censorship in repressive countries in favour of local pro-democracy forces.  
 
 
Figure 34 
 
In his interview, Dr. Alexander Dawoody called for new laws to be adapted in four broad 
areas: 
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 Penalising companies such as NSN who do business with tyrannical regimes and 
support the suppression of opposition movements or any form of expression.  
 
 Rewarding innovations and companies that clearly support democratic aspirations, 
human rights and ethics in business. 
 
 Funding research aimed to further develop ICTs as a viable tool in civic mobility and 
civic action, through loans, grants, and donations. 
 
 Boycotting, criminalising, and sanctioning all business, research, and technologies 
associated with regimes that censor citizens and enforce tyrannical forms of 
governance against the will of its people. 
 
Similarly, Dr. Babak Rahimi sees an urgent need for international laws "prohibiting the sale 
and intelligence sharing of any computer-related technology that could be used for 
surveillance purposes." Elahe Boghrat explains that individual governments or the EU cannot 
currently really force any company to refrain from business with a repressive regime like the 
Iranian one. She suggests, however, that targeted sanctions would be an effective solution, as 
they would simply force corporations "to abide by the rules or else . . . face the 
consequences."  She claims that "the embedment of ICT-related knowledge and equipment 
into these sanctions can cause the regime many big troubles." Dr. James Fielder suggests as 
well that, once sanctions are placed, evading companies should be held accountable for 
contracts made with repressive regimes. He strongly challenges the argument that the 
European Parliament does not hold much power in the grand scheme of things, arguing that 
"While the European Parliament may lack direct coercive authority, it can apply incredible 
political influence that ultimately pressures states to toe policy lines."  
 
Dr. Nassim Nazemi says she cannot overemphasise the importance of sanctions, as the 
Iranian regime is highly dependent on technological imports. She believes that sanctions are 
"an efficient way to cripple this regime," while also pointing out that "the regime simply 
loves to spin the sanctions as a tool of the 'evil' West, thereby inflaming the famous passions 
of a prideful Iranian populace and in the process totally avoiding all discussion of what 
actually led to those sanctions: the regime's own actions." Neal Ungerleider sees "stiff 
sanctions and fines" as the only viable solution to the issue, but he underlines that individual 
governments (the UK, Germany and Italy in particular), rather than the EU, can most 
effectively "put [the] pressure on firms to adhere to existing but loosely enforced laws." Paul 
Holman, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the University of Maine, 
also puts the onus on the parliaments of individual Western countries [rather than the 
European Parliament], urging respective legislators to "increase government spending on 
research and development aimed at deepening our knowledge of internet issues in Iran, 
China, Russia, Syria and other countries where cyber-activists are being suppressed." 
 
If the ultimate goal is to standardise and refine the West's export policies with respect to Iran, 
would it be a positive contribution to that cause to leave the construction and enforcement of 
such legislation in the hands of individual governments with a range of economic strengths 
and political tendencies? The answer is no. It is inevitable that individual European Union 
Member States will have domestic priorities that affect international relations (Deutsche 
Welle 2012; Globe and Mail 2013). A national government is not necessarily all too different 
from a business conglomerate in that it has certain interests to protect. These interests do not 
always fully correspond to preserving and promoting human rights principles elsewhere. A 
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practical solution for this, as Kaeding and Voskamp (2011: 1) suggest, is "to turn to formal 
proceedings such as to the European Commission and its role as the guardian of treaties and 
treaty articles." 
 
There have been many notable examples in the past (Rangelov 2013) when individual 
European Union Member States have taken inconsistent and contradictory positions 
regarding an overseas pro-democracy movement, resulting in a policy deadlock as well as the 
transmission of confusing signals to both oppressors and the oppressed. Such circumstances 
are hardly of much long-term strategic benefit to Europe or other democratic regions of the 
world. 
 
Can the EU be more objective than the individual Member States? Perhaps not. But 
objectivity may be less important than consistently effective enforcement and sound ethics at 
this point. Feijt (2012: 10) insists that "neutrality and own interests are not combinable, since 
the interests of the EU are likely to influence . . . its neutrality in the mediation process." The 
inevitable truth is that in the case of any interference in a conflict by the EU, it "will be 
perceived as an enemy by the stronger party" (ibid: 10). Therefore, there may always be a 
temptation for Western powers to side with oppressive forces in favour of short-term peace 
and financial profit, at the expense of local justice. It should be noted as well that the 
dominant side of a conflict is not necessarily the numerically larger party. If the West sets 
democratic structure in its truly basic form as a primary measure of a movement's legitimacy 
and worthiness for assistance, the outcome can only be constructive for the grand scheme of 
international development. Once a commitment to assist has been achieved, the focus of 
policy can shift, as events develop, towards the protection of civil and minority rights through 
enabling religious and ethnic tolerance and bolstering an inclusive mode of political discourse 
based on free and open discussion. 
 
Other surveyed experts, however, do not defend state-initiated economic sanctions. Dr. 
Soheila Vahdati argues that guiding policies should arise from the ICT industry itself, while 
Layla Hashemi raises the question of whether Western governments should have the right to 
intervene in the first place. Dr. Tessa Houghton questions any regional form of governance, 
arguing that the fault lies with the "global capitalist system which places profit before 
anything else." Adding that "there is a lot of discursive hypocrisy going on in this respect," 
she highlights the behaviour of Western governments that criticise censorship in repressive 
countries, but do not, for political or economic reasons, do anything tangible about tackling it.  
 
Dr. Randy Kluver dismisses the European Parliament, not considering it to be an influential 
institution and viewing its capacity as strictly limited to symbolic moves. He argues that "if 
they try to impose strict controls on European or US involvement, then the Chinese will fill 
the hole." Dr. Jed Crandall, too, does not support any kind of government interference on the 
internet, but argues that Western governments should fund research into clarifying exactly 
what they can do, asserting that "if social media is to be an instrument of social change in 
places like Iran, we need a better notion of trust on the internet." 
 
The significance of Dr. Crandall's acknowledgment of Social Sciences as offering valuable 
approaches to tackling the issue of censorship cannot be overemphasised. If constructively 
reinforced in the wider scholarly community, this perspective could have momentous policy 
implications for the European Union. So far, almost all technologically deterministic 
'solutions' to internet repression that have been proposed in the West lack sufficient empirical 
and theoretical credibility. They rely on the assumption that telecommunications technologies 
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are inherently liberating. Meanwhile, occasional voices of reason, such as that of the techno-
realist Evgeny Morozov of Stanford University, who frequently warns about what he calls 
'the dark side of internet freedom,' have been drowned out by the overwhelming utopianism 
of most Western discourse on ICTs. Yet cynicism towards non-technical or multi-disciplinary 
strategies of change is not limited to Western computer engineers. Dr. Ulises Mejias remains 
highly sceptical of the viability of the use of legislation in regulating dual-use ICT exports, 
arguing that "the effectiveness of this approach remains to be seen, as the technologies that 
can be used for repression are the same ones that can be used for marketing." 
 
There is some justification for many scholars' disbelief that the EU can have a positive impact 
on online political discourse in repressive countries. Nonetheless, its powers are far from 
negligible. According to op-ed written by Tony Blair and published in the Daily Mail (2013), 
"the EU is the most powerful political union and biggest business market in the world," 
meaning that if there is one single institution that can affect international politics, it would 
have to be the European Union. If we agree that the EU holds a considerable amount of 
political influence globally, then the only issue holding it back from achieving its goal of 
promoting democracy is its static, non-localised foreign policy. Even if the EU does take up 
this key policy role, obstacles will remain. The ICT industry is so dynamic that even EU 
Parliamentarians who are true digital enthusiasts will have a hard time keeping up with its 
pace of change. Add to that varying contextual dynamics in place in different repressive 
countries, and the result is an overly complicated situation requiring committees of expert 
consultants from an array of disciplines, ranging from computer networking to political and 
social and international relations, from law to cultural and religious studies. Yet any other 
more one-dimensional approach, especially one that is merely technical, is bound to fail, due 
to lack of insight into target countries' contextual realities as well as into doctrines and 
processes that underlie modern socio-political movements. Scrutinising the techno-political 
culture in Ukraine during the events leading up to the Orange Revolution, the next chapter 
aims to highlight the significance of cross-context empirical evidence to the critical analysis 
of large, complex socio-technical systems in undemocratic environments. 
 
Telecommunications Technologies, Ethical Values and International Trade 
Policies: Towards a Comprehensive European Framework 
 
A constructivist approach to STS encourages social realism by reinforcing the idea that 
socially motivated individuals and human networks have a fundamental leverage over 
technical trajectories, contingent on them operating under a democratic, accountable system 
(Burgett et al. 2013; Lins-Ribeiro 2013; Tavokin 2011). From a sociological standpoint, the 
perception that the ICT innovations' social impacts depend on what they have on offer, can 
only stem from a techno-utopian vision (Lewkowicz and Rohde 2011; Neff et al. 2012). 
However, when financial profit takes precedence to public welfare due to corporate choices, 
the European Union's altruistic values can be instrumental in protecting the human rights in 
vulnerable nations. Naturally, ethical values alone cannot automatically develop into 
incentives or enforceable obligations – at least not on a cross-border level. Therefore, the idea 
of a blanket policy mechanism seems increasingly vital to the establishment of a fair and 
dynamic international ICTs trade framework. This sensitive issue, which becomes 
consistently relevant every time the dual-use telecommunications technologies and 
intercontinental business agreements collide, has been called by Collins and Evans (2002) as 
"technological decision-making", and has various serious implications for democratic social 
organisations and movements worldwide (Sawyer and Rosenbaum 2000). 
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From a European perspective, there currently remains a regulatory void for a blanket 
framework ensuring a reasonable balance between generating profit and ensuring 
preservation of the core humanitarian principles and values on which the EU was founded 
(Golding 2000). 
 
In a politically repressive context, the so-called technical decisions are not nearly as straight-
forward to implement as they are in the industrialised democracies. The inevitable alternative, 
in such countries, is not a nationally unified and functional system like those at work in open 
states, but instead a passive model in which major portions of the required innovations are 
eventually outsourced (Mansell 1999). Given this theoretical void caused by the 
predominantly Western themes running through the mainstream IS literature (Tenhunen 
2008), the developing world's need for the promotion of technological ethicality seems (Som 
et al 2004) increasingly to be a significant one. 
 
While the work of the classic Western scholars is known predominantly to form (Edwards et 
al. 2014) the foundation of STS as we know it today, some leading European politicians 
companies continue to justify their technological decisions based on a purely economic-
driven framework known in engineering circles as "sound science" and "positive innovation" 
(ibid), which essentially aims to eliminate the notion of social corporate responsibility from 
the equation in favour of on-going revenue streams (Wartini and Heriyanto 2014). 
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Chapter v: Ukraine, China and the Arab Spring: Cyber-
Activism and the Techno-Utopian Search for a Universally 
Transferable Model of Democratic Change 
 
With an increasingly noteworthy ICT-mediated onslaught of information involved in modern 
social movements across the developing world, a comparative analysis of major case studies 
can indeed be helpful in illuminating certain grey points about Iran. The fifth chapter is 
dedicated to the scrutiny of ICTs' influence on modern pro-democracy movements occurred 
both before and after Iran's June 2009 presidential election, with a threefold focus on 
Ukraine's Orange Revolution, the post-reform China, and the Arab Spring phenomenon. 
 
Ukraine's Orange Movement: Lessons in E-Revolution 
 
The term Orange Movement refers to an array of mainly street-based, but predominantly 
peaceful, protests that took place in Ukraine, starting in November 2004 and ending in 
January 2005. The movement emerged shortly after the run-off phase of the 2004 Ukrainian 
presidential election, which was widely believed to be rigged by security officials in favour 
of Viktor Yanukovych, the sitting Prime Minister, at the expense of popular opposition 
candidate Viktor Yushchenko. The government first labelled the remarkably vibrant 
occupiers of Kiev streets as narcotics users bribed by the West, but a chain of persistent 
protests fuelled by the viral circulation of tasteful political satire drove the Ukrainian 
Supreme Court to intervene and invalidate the election results and order a revote. The repeat 
run-off in December 2004 resulted in Yushchenko's victory and was unanimously approved 
by independent observers as free from fraud. The movement faded later in January 2005, 
following Yushchenko's inauguration. The Orange revolution is known as the world's first 
successful political uprising to make extensive use of ICTs. 
 
Although the true origins of cyber-activism during Ukraine's Orange Revolution are 
undocumented, it is widely considered among STS experts to be the world's first and most 
notable (Lysenko and Desouza 2010) example of a successful 'internet-mediated' political 
revolt. During the uprising various websites became central sources of information on 
breaking news locally as well as abroad, according to Hrycak and Rewakowicz (2009). As 
the Orange Movement flourished, Dyczok (2004) saw online news as the main source of 
information for professional journalists who relied on the internet to keep up with local 
events as well as global reactions to them. Kuzio (2005a) was possibly the first scholar of 
cyber-activism to call the Orange Revolution "the world's first" successful instance of its 
kind. According to Karatnycky (2005), this acclamation is well deserved in part because of 
constant online revelations of vast governmental corruption that came to be known as "the 
damning Kuchma tapes." A collection of other academic researchers, such as McFaul (2007), 
Noble (2008), Duffy (2010), Bozzoli and Brück (2011) and Zaluckyj (2012) have similarly 
endorsed the positive contributions of online media to this revolt, arguing that ICTs 
facilitated a wide range of political processes, including the announcement of voter fraud and 
the mobilisation, organisation and management of masses of discontented citizens. But much 
like the body of literature published on Iran's Green Movement and the Arab Spring, most 
scholarly assessments of the Orange Revolution remain technologically deterministic. 
 
Nearly a decade on and many political revolutions later, we now know that the internet 
cannot be deemed an unbeatable liberating force. Web 2.0 has proven to be a non-bounded 
(Ashuri 2013), non-hierarchic (Chardy et al. 2012) means of communication, and is therefore 
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full of underexplored opportunities for any party prepared to take systematic, creative 
advantage of it. Yet the scholarly community must carefully steer clear from preconceived 
utopian biases common in some disciplines. For instance, Kuzio (2005b) attempts to connect 
Ukraine's popular uprising to the internet's ability to inject a "Western mind-set" into a 
younger generation through restless dissemination of "popular culture" and educational 
programmes. Harasymiw (2007: 12) simplifies the issue even further, claiming that the 
Orange Revolution "bore the hallmarks of its contemporary counterparts—a youthful, non-
confrontational, and festive event making use of cell phone technology, the internet, and rock 
music . . . unlike the violent, bloody, and confrontational revolutions of an earlier generation 
in 1968." Although insightful in many ways, these two authors seem trapped in the 
excitement of 'post-revolution' journalistic literature. The fact that they are both of Ukrainian 
descent and the relative proximity of the dates when these studies were published to the 
height of the turmoil could have contributed to this theoretical void. 
 
There are many similarities between the Orange Revolution and Iran's Green Movement in 
the patterns of how young political activists deployed telecommunications technologies. It 
will, therefore, be helpful to scrutinise the Ukrainian example, in search of a policy model for 
enhancing democracy in repressive states that might apply in multiple contexts. Lysenko and 
Desouza (2010) emphasise the importance of including the Orange Revolution in any STS 
study of post-internet social movements, referring to it as "one of the few globally important 
events" greatly influenced by telecommunications technologies. Examining the Ukrainian 
example is a generally overlooked necessity; they argue that by studying it, "we may learn 
relevant lessons and use them to build a general framework for the effective use of ICTs 
during electoral revolutions." 
 
Despite a wide range of scholarly interest in the subject, the dynamic nature of the correlation 
between the internet and democracy remains insufficiently understood. Although the medium 
has been operational at the household level for nearly two decades, it was the emergence of 
Web 2.0 infrastructure that radically transformed its sociological influence. Yet Web 2.0 only 
spurred even more non-empirical, technologically deterministic literature. For instance, 
Filippova (2005: 138) suggests that this innovative and fully interactive generation of online 
technologies was, at least in the case of Ukraine, "a significant contribution to the 
development of [the] civil society and participatory democracy in ways not previously 
seen"—a largely techno-utopian assertion with no sociological justification of any kind. 
 
Perhaps the most analytical study of the scope of the Orange Movement's engagement with 
ICTs is that conducted by Shyyan (2008: 96), who empirically examines Ukrainian 
dissidents' engagement with online technologies during the uprising. Having directly 
interviewed a number of prominent cyber-activists, he quotes one of them as saying that "the 
ability to operatively create and transmit information even under extreme conditions allowed 
us to save time and increase the effectiveness of our efforts greatly." Yet Shyyan does not 
fully clarify his sampling method. It is fair to argue that a cyber-activist previously subjected 
to state prosecution for their online activities might have elaborated on the medium's 'political 
drawbacks.' Shyyan found that techno-savvy Ukrainian cyber-activists tended to be 
predominantly "male . . . residents of urban areas [and] individuals with formal organisation 
memberships"—a pattern also detected by this research in the case of Iran's Green 
Movement. He blames the weak participation by female activists in online activism on factors 
such as "traditional organisational or leadership expectations of men rather than women in the 
Ukrainian society," and stresses "the need [for] civic awareness programs and youth 
organisations for the female population in Ukraine" as an effective solution. Yet he does not 
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put forward a detailed plan, or refer to Western policy as a potential option. Despite its 
originality and exceptionally rare non-deterministic approach to cyber-activism, Shyyan fails 
to establish a robust correlation between indicators of democracy like gender equality and the 
technological competence of the Ukrainian CIS, or even to acknowledge the existence of 
such a 'system.' This undermines the authority of Shyyan's conclusions. 
 
Towards the end of the 21st century's first decade, a number of feminist scholars began 
addressing the routine lack of scholarly attention to democratic features of innovation 
systems at play in repressive states. For example, Hrycak and Rewakowicz (2009: 322) find 
blogging and internet publishing to be a central force in creating virtual feminist 
communities. Analysing such groups involved in the Orange Revolution and its aftermath, 
they assert that "at the core of virtual feminist networks are dozens of friends who are linked 
to each other through several communities concerned with feminism in Ukraine, most . . . 
based on the margins of academic institutions." Hrycak (2010: 165) argues that feminist 
tendencies and principles are now common not only among young female Ukrainian internet 
users, but also their male counterparts, and that "a new genre of creative writing called 
'Zhinoche Pysmo' (women's writing) has vastly expanded discussions among intellectuals of 
the complex, contradictory situation of women in Ukraine." Complementary to Shyyan's 
fieldwork on the Ukrainian blogosphere, both of the above studies led by Alexandra Hrycak, 
Professor of Sociology at the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, could be 
the foundation of a thorough study of female cyber-activists' IT literacy, participation in 
innovation and the extent of their contribution to Ukraine's CIS. 
 
Shyyan also investigates the extent of Ukrainian political dissidents reliance on ICTs—a 
prerequisite to determining their degree of innovation in this arena. He reports that "using the 
internet to advance one's political goals got agree or somewhat agree responses from 90.9 per 
cent of activists with significant international experiences and 70.3 per cent of activists who 
had not had such experiences." He also revealed that "none of the activists who had spent 
over three months abroad responded with a somewhat disagree answer to [the] item," and that 
deploying the internet for political purposes received "no less than 70 per cent of full or 
partial support" of the surveyed cyber-activists: 
 
Ukrainian Dissidents and Internet Literacy 
 
Survey Question Yes 
Mostly 
Yes 
Mostly 
No 
No 
Total No. of 
Respondents 
Do you know how to use 
the internet to support 
your political goals? 
49% (37) 28% (21) 14% (11) 9% (7) 76 
Table 17 (Shyyan 2008) 
 
The disproportionate IT literacy rates among Ukrainian cyber-activists—in favour of 
expatriates—are a good indication of the extent to which 'political exiles' contributed to the 
Orange Movement's success. This may be due to the repressive nature of the ruling regime, 
which restricted local netizens' access to such technology. Inside the country, the Ukrainian 
government's censorship of traditional print and broadcast media during the unrest helped 
divert a mass audience to alternative, so-called new media, where accurate, up-to-date 
information was more readily available and where there were opportunities to participate in 
creating new information without facing as much risk of being silenced or censored (Way 
2005). Reinforcing this observation, Ukrainian TV personality Ihor Kulias's (cited by Dyczok 
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2005) famously stated that obstructing the flow of information only works if the audience can 
be fully isolated, which is difficult and costly for repressive regimes in the post-internet era. 
"If the authorities monopolise a nation's media," argues Forster (2006: 14), “the opposition 
will likely receive no, or purely negative, coverage." Forster's position on the correlation 
between media censorship and innovative citizen behaviour is strongly supported by an array 
of cyber-activism scholars including Kyj (2006) and Duda (2010). This theoretical approach 
is more balanced, derives from an inter-disciplinary outlook and argues primarily that cyber-
activists facing systematic censorship in repressive countries will either have to innovate their 
way through or look to foreign aid. Yet this perspective suffers from a critical conceptual 
gap: it fails to recognise that innovation processes are complex and deeply rooted in the 
socio-political contexts in which they occur. An innovation system comprised of highly 
motivated young professionals could still fail miserably, if it were to be deprived of basic 
requirements, including the free, dynamic flow of knowledge between its core structural 
elements. 
 
At the time of the Orange Revolution, dynamic, fully interactive social networking tools as 
well as most advanced anti-censorship technologies were yet to be developed. The literature 
suggests that the Ukrainian government never systematically engaged in online censorship, 
perhaps because of the statistically low penetration rates of the medium across the Ukrainian 
population, who were mostly not computer-literate at that point. These factors may help 
justify the lack of evidence to indicate the existence of a single, vast, interlinked cyber-
activist community in Ukraine at the time, let alone a separate innovation system involving 
cyber-activism such as the one at work in Iran today. The underdevelopment of user-oriented, 
Web 2.0 applications in the Ukraine coincided with the regime's inclination to dismiss the 
internet as an influential medium. 
 
Regime censorship was countered through a number of static websites that helped Ukrainian 
protesters defy the national news monopoly, effectively neutralising the regime's attempt at 
an information blackout. Kuzio (2006: 56) argues that the internet functioned as an 
alternative to state-owned print and broadcast media, and that "the [Ukrainian] authorities 
never appreciated the power of the internet and had never been able to compete in [online] 
publications." McFaul identifies three main sites influencing the Orange Movement's success: 
Ukrainska Pravda, Maidan and Telekritika. According to him, "Ukrainska Pravda displayed 
the results of the exit poll most sympathetic to Yushchenko as well as detailed news about 
allegations of fraud. The website also provided logistical information to protestors . . . 
Maidan was a clearinghouse of information and coordination for protesters . . . [and] 
Telekritika emerged as a popular site for independent journalists during the campaign, and 
played an instrumental role in pressuring journalists working at Kuchma-friendly outlets to 
withdraw their support." 
 
The 'anti-censorship' capacity of counter-publicity on the internet explains the Ukrainian 
dissidents' increasing reliance on ICTs over the months leading to the Orange Revolution. 
Venger (2006: 21) argues that, at the time, online media were particularly beneficial to local 
"journalists who were not afraid to be critical of the authorities and who were willing to give 
the public an alternative account of events." It is logical to assume that activist communities 
worldwide are most inclined to employ media where they expect to face the least 
censorship—precisely the case with the Orange Movement. Today, cyber-activism in Iran 
(and possibly elsewhere) has evolved from simply creating media that counter official 
narratives to include more expansive practices such as end users' active generation, 
employment and diffusion of technological innovations to counter systematic censorship. 
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This blurs the line between formerly disconnected concepts such as journalism, news 
consumption and advocacy in a much more thoroughgoing way than during the relatively 
early days of internet activism in Ukraine. 
 
This convergence of roles, rather than a hidden trajectory within ICTs, is primarily why the 
traditional mass media's agenda-setting powers are increasingly irrelevant in the online 
sphere. The emergence of Web 2.0, in particular, has made interactions between oppressors 
and the oppressed much more dynamic. Today, the internet has given pro-democracy 
dissidents in repressive countries a voice—and consequently made them more vulnerable to 
prosecution. When scrutinising the relationship between ICTs and activism, the main 
intellectual emphasis, therefore, should always be put on the system in which a given 
community engages with online innovations, rather than on conveniently assigning a 
particular political rhetoric to telecommunications technologies, which are the product of 
complex socio-technical processes and often neutral by nature. 
 
According to Polyuha (2005), internet use grew by forty per cent during the months of the 
Orange Revolution. Mussuri (2005) also confirms a significant boost towards ICT-mediated 
forms of communication in Ukraine via an analysis of the donor support system available to 
the country's mainstream media. Tying it to Habermas's theory of public sphere, he suggests 
that "the public sphere has ideal conditions for discussion if every subject with the 
competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse, allowed to question any 
assertion, allowed to introduce any assertion and allowed to express his or her attitudes, 
desires and needs, and if no one may be banned from talking or coerced from talking." 
Venger (2006: 22) holds that ICTs can serve dissent and repression equally, depending on 
how they are employed, asserting that "the media represent resources that can be mobilised to 
demote or promote democracy." What he describes as the "triumph of the [Ukrainian] 
opposition on the internet" was largely due to its active employment of spontaneous, bottom-
up and context-driven techniques emerging from the core of the Orange Movement—a 
valuable advantage compared with the regime's failure to adequately re-strategise and adapt 
to the internet in a timely, efficient manner. This, according to Lysenko and Desouza (2010), 
led to the formation of an "Internet-based public sphere in Ukraine," where professional and 
citizen journalists suddenly found themselves free from censorship. 
 
Today, it is evident that the Ukrainian government, unlike most authoritarian regimes today, 
did not take the internet seriously enough to systemise its regulation, and gave precedence to 
more traditional forms of 'news media.' This model of cyber-conflict cannot be applied to 
Iran, where the regime has a strong, systematic online presence. This indicates that when it 
comes to the internet, repressive regimes can learn just as much from history as democratic 
movements. The Orange Movement's pioneering use of ICT-mediated means of protest was 
no less of a valuable example to Iran's Green Movement than was the Ukrainian regime's 
inability to acknowledge and utilise such technologies in an effective and timely manner an 
example for other regimes of what not to do in similar conflicts. Kyj (2006) likens the scope 
of the pro-Yanukovich camp's online activity to that of a "student group" using the internet 
casually and to address its daily chores. Only half a decade later, the internet was at the centre 
of Iranian security officials' war on dissent. 
 
The Ukrainian regime overlooked the 'security threats' of online media—and indeed only 
between three to eight per cent (Mussuri 2005) of the Ukrainian population was estimated to 
have regular access to the internet at the time. Given the government's firm control of the 
country's print and broadcast media, the situation appeared deceptively in hand. But the 
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immediate reach of a medium is not necessarily always the most useful indicator in 
determining its penetration rates within a given community. According to Kyj (2006: 79), in 
Ukraine the internet's "ability to simply get [the] information out to a limited audience was 
enough to set, in motion, a ripple effect." Lysenko and Desouza (2010) theorised this via 
extensive empirical scrutiny of cyber-activism in the Orange Revolution, arguing that online 
media's influence on the Ukrainian public, despite poor connectivity rates, was relatively 
high. This, they argue, happened in part because the first generation of the country's netizens 
were university "students and professors, young employees of the international and big 
national enterprises, collaborators of the research institutions, journalists [, and] 
politicians"—those perceived to collectively carry the most weight in determining the 
trajectory of social movements. 
 
On a political level, although there are a number of fundamental similarities between the 
Orange and Green movements, it is important not to ignore the differences between the 
systems they opposed. For instance, there are clear structural distinctions in the 
repressiveness of the two regimes. The Ukrainian government was, as Dyczok (2006: 224) 
describes, a "semi-authoritarian [system, which] allowed certain media outlets to exist," 
whereas its Iranian counterpart is an ideology-driven military dictatorship. The scope and 
dynamics of interaction between local and expatriate cyber-activists and the age composition 
of activists are other noteworthy areas where the two movements differ greatly. Explaining 
that a dominant portion of active political protesters in some autocratic states such as Iran 
tend to be in their late twenties and early thirties, Lysenko and Desouza (2010) argue that the 
internet "can have even higher [democratising] potentials" when users are predominantly 
young. Yet these scholars see the incapability of the Green Movement to "rouse the wider 
international circles to action," as the main reason behind its collapse, linking it to external 
factors including the "relative weakness of the Iranian diaspora worldwide"—an issue with 
much less impact in the case of Ukraine. 
 
This breakdown, however, cannot be solely laid at the feet of the interactional structures and 
patterns within the Iranian cyber-activist community, as Iran's 2009 turmoil is known to be 
the first time in history when a ruling elite went as far as 'pulling the plug' of the internet. The 
regime complemented the internet blackout by shutting down cell phone networks, blocking 
all outgoing international calls on landlines, and boosting its jamming of the satellite TV 
signals. Here is a crucial fact often ignored by some overenthusiastic advocates of online 
revolution—when the internet goes down, theories of cyber-activism, most of which are 
based on technologically deterministic premises, will cease to be applicable. This is precisely 
why an Innovation Systems (IS) approach is realistically relevant and needed in repressive 
contexts. Even if external actors were to offer a stable, tamper-proof, and high-speed parallel 
network connection to a given cyber-activist community in a repressive country, it would still 
be quite difficult and hazardous to verify the identity of the clients taking up such a service. A 
fully open network might coincide with the strengthening the regime's bandwidth and 
furthering the capacity for online crime—the main reason why most techno-utopian solutions 
for repression have failed to date. Such a ‘solution' would compare to providing anti-regime 
forces in repressive countries with deadly weapons without a chance to verify the legitimacy 
of the recipients, who may well turn out to be vicious villains. Just as Western countries have 
been vexed by moral questions regarding arming rebellions against murderous dictators, 
technological interventions in online power struggles do not necessarily have straightforward 
impacts and consequences. 
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Despite various demographic and educational advantages over Ukraine's pro-democracy 
dissidents, Iranian cyber-activists are less likely to achieve their aims, as they face a much 
more ferocious challenge: to overcome a secretive police state with plenty of resources to 
invest in foreign technologies. It is, therefore, vital to the democratisation process that Iranian 
cyber-activists' counter-innovations continue, as continued filtering and blocking of 
information will weaken dissent. Idealistic obsession with any particular online platform can 
only distort the process by ignoring societal factors that enable technological innovations. 
Lysenko and Desouza (2010) noted an overemphasis in the academic literature on the role of 
Twitter in Iran's Green Movement, reminding some commentators that security officials 
would have been foolish not to have individually processed all those public Tweets, many of 
which contained valuable details about the time, location, and scale of street demonstrations 
as well as the identities of organisers and participants. They suggest that "the Iranian 
opposition might have been better served by utilising more secretive technologies, as 
excessive information openness can sometimes play a negative role in events which naturally 
require some secrecy." 
 
Green Movement activists were also less able to attract external attention than their Orange 
counterpart, and Ukrainian cyber-activists benefited considerably more from foreign (i.e. 
Western) assistance. Often provided by Western NGOs and governments, humanitarian aid 
has historically varied from financial to technological to educational assistance. Some of the 
institutions making contributions to the Orange Movement include, according to Karatnycky 
(2005), the United States government, the European Union, "the National Endowment for 
Democracy and private philanthropists such as George Soros . . . [reinforcing] democratic 
values and [deepening] the public's understanding of free and fair electoral procedures." 
Many scholars including Kyj (2006), Polese (2008) and Duffy (2010) argue that the Orange 
Movement managed to successfully engage with advocates of democracy in the West through 
the internet, convincing them to help promote the cause either by travelling to the country to 
join the protests, or via making online financial donations to designated e-commerce 
accounts. Zaluckyj (2012: 25) relates that he sees the internet's 'democratic powers' in its 
capacity to offer a real-time "view from the trenches," stirring emotions and provoking 
excitement among foreign sympathisers of a revolt, who are able to "see and share the 
experience simultaneously." But she seems to give too much credit to this emotionally-driven 
viral effect. A similar phenomenon occurred during the Arab Spring—a wave of pro-
democracy movements characterised by severe internet censorship. 
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Arab Spring: Dawn of a Revolutionary Model or Dusk of a Techno-Utopian Dream? 
 
The extent to which ICTs were instrumental in the Arab Spring protests has not been 
examined in sufficient depth. Arab political activists reportedly resorted en masse to solutions 
allowing "secure online communication" (Hintz 2012: 95) during the revolts in question. 
Apart from journalists and scholars (e.g. Bresheeth 2012) who were fast to refer to the 
protests as 'unpredictable,' the relatively limited range of empirical investigations on the issue 
have largely explored conventional territory, failing to build constructively upon conclusions 
from previous case-studies, or to delve into underlying contextual factors influencing online 
mobilisation in emerging economies. What Ergul (2012: 1) refers to as the transformation of 
a common man into a "cyber-society effective in world politics" via new telecommunications 
technologies, may have deep roots in non-technological undercurrents, and may well be more 
efficiently explained from a constructivist perspective. If the relatively short history of cyber-
activism has taught us anything, it is that there is very little need for pre-conceived, 
deterministic biases in the field of STS. 
 
The main framework that social scientists consistently employ in most assessments of 
contemporary Arab movements is Social Movement Theory and its surrounding concepts. 
Some have proceeded to combine the theory with much more contemporary theories of 
cyber-activism and online communities in smart, creative ways. Yet insisting upon an entirely 
sociological approach with only limited understanding of online technologies would be just 
as damaging and fruitless as pressing for techno-utopian methodologies. 
 
While many of the models developed by researchers for the concept of politically motivated 
cyber-activism are theoretically useful and well justified, they incline to label movements in 
terms of specific technologies involved and are quite bounded by national contexts. By 
undertaking a dynamic, Innovation Systems approach, it should be possible to not only gain a 
more realistic perspective on the interplay between social movements and ICTs, but also to 
draft a broader model which could be extended to a wider range of political contexts. In order 
to achieve such a framework, scholars working in the field must closely examine, fully 
comprehend and analytically compare contextual characteristics of repressive states 
worldwide. There is a demand for STS research to shift from focusing mainly on just 
technology or only social processes to new approaches in order to develop a systematic 
explanation for how the two interact in repressive environments. 
 
Among the most notable aspects of the Arab Spring protests were the varying degree of 
repression that different regimes deployed against protesters and the inconsistent measures 
they were prepared to take in tackling their opponents. Yet the failure to address this in much 
of the literature, along with other significant conceptual gaps on matters such as the history of 
political activism, the penetration of higher education, the demographics of the population, 
and cultural attitudes towards new technologies and rights of women and minorities, justify 
Chokoshvili's (2011) criticism in calling the often heated debate over the absolute 
effectiveness or outright redundancy of the ICTs to political revolutions "a superficial one." 
 
The technological infrastructure of a country and the technological literacy of its population 
are influential in affecting the extent that ICTs can help a social movement in a repressive 
country. Currently, the average connectivity rate in the Middle East ranges quite widely—
from a mere five per cent in Iraq all the way to ninety per cent in Qatar. Interestingly, most 
scalable Arab Spring protests took place in countries with relatively high connectivity rates 
and predominantly young, educated populations. Yet it is crucial to always put the use of 
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ICTs in context. Otherwise, we would, as Wilken (2012: 188) argues, be ignoring "the longer 
history of technology use in political protest, as well as earlier forms of political protest and 
pre-digital social networking." This approach is supported by Ekwo (2012: 3), who draws the 
scholarly community's attention to the fact that "we have lots of instances of dictators 
overthrown before Facebook." The fact that the Arab Spring protests took place in countries 
where poverty, unemployment, inflation and inequality had reached record highs coupled 
with declines in GDP growth (Dewey et al. 2012), makes it evident that dissent has, as 
Stepanova (2011: 1) argues, a lot to do with "underlying socio-political and socioeconomic 
factors behind" what is sometimes mistaken for a 'purely online' phenomenon. 
 
The assumption that people with regular internet connections have more political powers than 
those without misleads scholars. Such an approach not only leaves itself open to the question 
of whether the same proportion of the population would still have been as politically active in 
a hypothetical absence of online technologies, but also ignores empirical evidence suggesting 
that cyber-activism has, in many instances, facilitated the identification and arrest of 
dissidents by repressive regimes. Such thinking also discounts the role of 'offline' protesters, 
such as Iran's Labour Movement and the Mothers of Laleh Park, who have been instrumental 
in forming and developing the country's pro-democracy movement(s). In such a 
technologically deterministic model, Mejias (2012: 147) suggests that for any noteworthy 
change to occur "everyone must be connected to the same digital networks." Perpetually 
putting the emphasis on digital networks as opposed to people "can . . . serve to obstruct any 
real critique of social media technologies, and to justify their use without the need to question 
their terms of use." 
 
Apart from superficial approaches and common exaggerations regarding the role of ICTs in 
Arab Spring protests, inept methodological designs and analytical frameworks mar some 
studies. Relative limitations of the literature include relying on unverifiable sources, making 
unsubstantiated claims, asking irrelevant interview questions, lacking contextual familiarity, 
exhibiting pre-existing bias and failing to triangulate data. Aday (2012: 15) likens the 
common emphasis on easily accessible data (as opposed to data best suited to the research) to 
"the proverbial drunk searching for his lost key under the streetlight because that is where he 
can see." The blatant forfeiture of accuracy in favour of convenience can subsequently lead to 
the exaggeration of the "size of the audiences . . . [failure] to grapple with the many 
differences [existing within] . . . the broader population of citizens" (ibid), as well as 
overestimation of the political significance of online social networking platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter. 
 
An empirical comparison of the innovative use of ICTs by Arab Spring protesters with that of 
their earlier counterparts in other parts of the world (especially central and eastern Europe) 
has so far been an extreme rarity in academic literature. This is perhaps due to the scholarly 
world's preoccupation with surface-level cultural similarities. The overemphasis on the 
contextual resemblance between the Arab states and Iran by some researchers has not, so far, 
resulted in any significant theoretical advances. It is sensible to assume that every political 
opposition movement seeks to learn from its predecessors regardless of geographical 
boundaries—as might repressive regimes as well. But Chokoshvili's (2011: 32) assertion that 
"Arab states with access to ICTs had been influenced by the success of Western democracies 
long before the 2011 revolutions," is, on its own, inspiration enough for a comparative 
analysis of two of history's most analogous post-internet mobilisation waves, namely Iran's 
Green and Ukraine's Orange movements. 
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While ICTs have historically proven to be useful to revolutionary movements, they have also 
shown themselves to be just as helpful to repressive states in combating dissent. Given the 
vast range of valuable resources many repressive regimes tend to control, they often have no 
financial reservations about resorting to costly foreign expertise in order to implement 
censorship plans. Evidence has revealed that an array of dictatorial regimes including Iran, 
Burma, China and Egypt have been routinely assisted in online censorship by Western 
telecommunications companies such as Cisco, Motorola, Boeing, Alcatel-Lucent, McAfee, 
Netsweeper, and Websense (Mejias 2012). The pattern detected in dictatorial regimes' 
reliance on Western technology draws attention to existing international regulations on 
technology trade, raising serious concern over academia's increasingly excessive focus on 
technology itself, as opposed to policies aimed at "changing the legal environment," as 
articulated by Hintz (2012: 96). 
 
Although Western firms' coordinated abstinence from cooperating with repressive regimes 
would be generally helpful to the democratisation process in the respective countries, 
ensuring consistent, timely external pressure at the time of political unrests can be another 
valuable lifeline to a pro-democracy movement, provided that such pressure meets other 
basic criteria determined by social and political scientists. This form of intervention, as 
Chokoshvili (2011: 23) acknowledges, makes "violent crackdowns or extreme human right 
violations . . . less likely." More importantly, the impact of such technological intervention 
seems to be more considerable in fully authoritarian states than in those where repression 
takes a milder form. 
 
Absolute dictatorships thrive on the blockage of information—breaking such blackouts can 
cause rapid destabilisation of ruling elites. These regimes, as Dewey et al. (2012: 4) observe, 
lack "appropriate feedback mechanisms that could warn them of the depth and characteristics 
of popular discontent, [and] are frequently incapable of identifying and addressing social 
unrest in a timely manner." Semi-authoritarian regimes, by contrast, tend to be more prepared 
for systematically combating dissent, perhaps because they face more educationally 
competent and persistent opposition. Semi-authoritarian regimes vary enormously, however, 
and include ones based in ideology like Iran, populist governments like Venezuela and even 
rich, sparsely populated Arab states like the UAE, where the regime's strategy relies on 
politically de-motivating the citizens by keeping them economically contented (Stepanova 
2011). 
 
While many scholars have argued for and against the idea that Iran's Green Movement was a 
political precursor to the Arab Spring, there is no proof to suggest that the protesters in the 
latter movements used or built upon technology developed by or for Iranian cyber-activists in 
the period since 2009. More importantly, there seems to be no record of any anti-censorship 
software specifically designed for the Arab context. This could be due to a number of factors, 
such as some Arab governments refraining harsh forms of online censorship (like in Iran and 
China) in the face of international pressure, and/or an underdeveloped cyber-activist 
community in those countries. As a result, the primary focus of researchers working in this 
area will need to be redirected from a 'predictive' mode to one of analysis, relying on concrete 
empirical evidence and contextually informed, academically proven concepts and models. 
Otherwise, as Ergul (2012: 1) warns, discourse will never go "beyond an essentialist 
approach subsumed under the primacy of inconsistency between Islam and democracy,"—a 
misleading, unconstructive supposition at best.  
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With a careful, methodical comparison of modern political movements in the undemocratic 
world, as well as close examination of the social contexts from which they tend to arise, it 
would be possible to develop a more inclusive policy framework in favour of the global 
promotion of democracy, or at least, as Stepanova (2011: 4) suggests, to transform online 
technologies into "a qualitative accelerator in the context of present or future protests" in 
repressive states like Iran. Unless such changes proceed, we will not be able to learn from the 
past, and our understanding of the interplay between technology and politics in repressive 
countries will, in Aday's (2012: 16) words, continue to suffer "from the same flaws as 
accounts of Iran's Twitter revolution, leading to faulty policy responses and unwarranted 
expectations." This also lies at the heart of why the West's reaction to the Arab Spring 
protests was not, in any significant way, timelier, better organised or more helpful than its 
response to Iran's Green Movement. 
 
Hi-Tech Telecommunications, Political Openness and Security Initiatives: The 
Case of Post-Reform China 
 
Today, the Chinese economy is regarded by some in the West (e.g. Dahlberg 2014; Wade 
2011) as highly developed, and an imminent threat to the global commerce leaders. However, 
the question remains if a top-down, pre-planned innovation system, however lucrative, can be 
truly deemed as a sustainable, socially just model for economic governance. The core issue 
with the revenue-driven rationale has been occasionally highlighted by the policy reformists 
worldwide (e.g. Van Berkel et al. 2012), which makes the Chinese model seem even further 
questionable in nature. If a successful economy were to be defined merely by its levels of 
financial income, then how can we distinguish an act of virtue from a morally illegitimate 
endeavour? Democracy can be portrayed in many different, and sometimes contradictory, 
variants. For instance, Habermas (1996; 2003) perceives democracy to be the provisional 
outcome of an on-going, negotiated political process. Nevertheless, the core principles of the 
Habermasian political ideology do not seem to hold as firmly when translated into the new 
generation of the telecommunications technologies. The rationale of Habermas misses a key 
STS principle: that even the most 'democratic' ICTs, as we know them, can often equally 
facilitate repressive ends. If there is one sociological lesson to be taken away from the online 
era, it will be that democracy can be a surprisingly fluid and unstable notion when applied to 
the virtual world (Laskowska 2014). While some of the internet's liberating promises 
continue to make sense in a broad range of terms, one cannot afford to overlook the socially 
decentralising effects caused by it as an interactive, participatory mass medium. 
 
Having essentially followed the Soviet Union's footsteps especially on the issues surrounding 
hard sciences and defence industries, China's communist party has an extensive history of 
approaching the technological innovations from a highly centralised, top-down position. 
However, since the major reforms undertaken during the 1980's, the Chinese regime has 
opened up the country's manufacturing sites to the West, causing a radical shift (Leydesdorff 
and Guoping 2001; Liu and Lundin 2007; Xiwei and Xiangdong 2007) in its previously 
constrained economy. 
 
Despite some right-wing Chinese critics labelling the communist party's liberal market 
changes as an irresponsible open-door policy, the reforms in question inspired the country's 
universities to actively seek more links with the local and regional industry leaders, as well as 
with leading Western research centres. However, according to Sun and Liu (2010) China's 
NIS continues to face two main disadvantages when compared to its Western competitors: 
the still very tangible control of governmental agencies over the otherwise independent 
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academic research projects, and the extensive role of non-sovereign, politically subsidised 
institutions in the nationwide R&D planning. During an enlightening study, Motohashi and 
Yun (2007: 1251) propose that, even in the post-reform China, the public and private sectors 
were "completely separated" in terms of R&D planning and research objectives. 
 
Perhaps a conveniently overlooked fact when it comes to the post-reform China is the 
government's reservation of the right to have mandatory representation on the directing board 
of nearly every large company across the nation. Under such dynamics, which is what Guan 
et al. (2009: 802) refer to as "preferential treatment", big profitable businesses are left with no 
choice but to pretend to "be conservative and value security over innovation" (ibid: 802) at all 
times. 
 
These top-down business practices are an everyday issue in the post-reform China. For 
example, Lu (2001: 930) argues that although the NIS theory has been designed to help 
ensure the functionality and advancement of national economies, the non-organic way in 
which states such as China have approached innovation has led to a self-restrictive system in 
which the "uppermost strategic resources [are] used, adjusted and controlled by the state." 
 
Another critical characteristic of the emerging economies overlooked by mainstream NIS is 
the often highly politicised nature of the domestic R&D firms and regulatory mechanisms. 
The mere quantity of the R&D budget in a given state cannot necessarily be a valid indication 
of its sustainability or self-efficacy. China and India, for instance, have been turning 
increasingly into "important sources of information technologies [by attracting] many 
multinational companies to set up R&D laboratories" (Sun 2002: 1060) within their borders, 
and subsequently by allowing them to "dominate [their] high-tech exports" capacities in strict 
accordance with their own industrial requirements (Sigurdson 2004: 5). The third world 
regimes' excessive focus on foreign expertise tends to have an adverse impact on their 
privately run local enterprises. In the case of China, for instance, there is a "significant 
productivity depression" (Fu & Gong 2008: 8) following the communist party's economic 
reforms in the 1980s. Moreover, the sheer volume of a nation's innovation system's output on 
its own cannot be a determinant of its full functionality, and "openness to competition and the 
intensity of spending on higher education are particularly important" to the genuine, bottom-
up economic progress (Wu 2007: 548) – a crucial essence fundamentally missing from the 
NIS in repressive countries like China and Iran. 
 
In South East Asia, tight production deadlines have become much more relevant to the mass 
economy than endogeneity of the academic output. The excessive focus on adaptation rather 
than innovation of advanced scientific knowledge, according to Sun and Du (2010: 542) is a 
direct consequence of the Chinese NIS being historically "plagued with many problems due 
to the legacies from the [communist regime's] planned economy." To unveil the real state of 
the ICT industry in the post-reform China, it suffices to mention that the communist party's 
online censorship apparatus "relied on 100 per cent of its acquisition of telecommunication 
equipment through imports" (Fan 2006: 361), while the genuinely private enterprises have 
been wiped out or ignored (Kanamori et al. 2007: 2) in "official thinking about technological 
issues." From the Chinese regime's standpoint, big business objectives must be "better met by 
the less risky course of procuring advanced technology from abroad" (Suttmeier et al. 2006: 
59). 
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The NIS theory in its classic form also does not determine (Gu and Steinmueller 1997) the 
healthy extent to which the political administration can or should interfere with a country's 
knowledge generation processes in relation with the Triple Helix model. 
 
The definitive solution to the conceptual shortcomings of NIS in relation to repressive states 
does not seem to lie in seeking a blanket framework aimed at addressing the world's 
censorship issues all at once. On the contrary, the main emphasis needs to be removed from 
theorising the so-called 'transferrable' social influences of ICTs, and instead to be placed on 
the "comparison of alternative system-level structures and their relative strengths and 
weaknesses . . . , [as well as the] differences in initial starting conditions" (Liu and White 
2001: 1092). Otherwise, the Chinese model will continue to be the emerging economies' best 
future hope. 
 
This is not to insinuate that the Chinese universities are not investing sufficiently in 
academia, but that the universities in China are held back by the same inward, technologically 
passive culture largely incompatible with the key actors originally outlined by the NIS model. 
Therefore, the country is largely bound to remain a "political economy characterised by 
active governmental involvement in business, both through ownership and through 
regulation" (Deng 2007: 72) or, as Gu et al. (2008: 11) put it, through "extraordinary rates of 
savings and capital accumulation," instead of by endogenous knowledge production. 
 
As a consequence of this reactionary approach to innovation, the political regimes in the 
emerging economies often choose to exploit imported technologies over indigenous 
expertise. This is chiefly due to their strong inclination to satisfy the global market, and to 
fulfil their finance-driven schedules. As Tan (2010: 2917) argues, it is exactly this "lack of 
innovation process that makes emerging and developing countries stay undeveloped." 
 
The fundamental difference between the processes involved in functional innovation systems 
where the concentration is on originality, and the so-called catch-up economies whose 
ultimate goal is to understand, employ and at the very best improve on imported technologies, 
marks a clear doctrinal division between the two models, suggesting strongly that the 
inductive patterns often "emerging from geographic studies of Silicon Valley or the City of 
London are inadequate for development of general theories" (Miao et al. 2007: 714) when it 
comes to the democratic implications of ICTs. 
 
 
——— 
 
 
This research argues that the recent pro-democracy movements in Ukraine, Iran, the Arab 
states and even China could have been more rigorously supported by Western, democratic 
governments, had they recognised the potential of supporting the CIS in such nations. The 
next chapter will examine some of the policy solutions that may help promote democracy in 
repressive countries.  
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Chapter vi: Fostering Democracy—Western Export Control 
Regimes, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Technology 
of Repression 
 
The widely documented contribution of Western ICT companies to online censorship in 
repressive states highlights a need for a Europe-led, more robust global regulatory system to 
control the exportation of dual-use technologies. The sixth chapter focuses mainly on 
assessing the policy implications of the results of this research, drawing on specific recent 
examples as gathered via weblog content analysis and document reviews. 
 
The ethically dubious business conduct of European ICT firms in conflict zones has come to 
the attention of high-ranking European Union politicians, some of whom found NSN's 
business activities in Iran inconsistent with policies to promote human rights and democracy 
in repressive countries. According to Cheng et al. (2011), in a meeting that took place on 8 
July 2010 in Paris, French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner and Dutch foreign minister 
Maxime Verhagen "recognised the complicity of European corporations in the Iranian 
crackdowns, and proposed an international agreement on restrictions to impose on private 
companies with regards to high-tech censoring equipment." The French company Alcatel was 
also accused in the same meeting of having sold similar technology to the Burmese regime. 
Similarly, "[United States] Senator Dick Durbin . . . proposed a bill penalising this conduct 
by American corporations" (ibid), which was more enthusiastically received. The problem is 
not a lack of regulation, but the complete void of a systematic legal mechanism to 
consistently enforce ethical business conduct across Europe. 
 
Trade Regulation, Western Policies and Power Struggles in Repressive States 
 
A European Commission (EC) regulation from 5 May 2009 acknowledges an immediate need 
to control dual-use technology exports. It clarifies that "dual-use items shall mean items, 
including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military purposes, 
and shall include all goods which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting in 
any way in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." It further 
explains that restrictions on 'dual-use ICT' refers to the "transmission of software or 
technology by electronic media, including by fax, telephone, electronic mail or any other 
electronic means to a destination outside the European Community; it includes making 
available in an electronic form such software and technology to legal and natural persons and 
partnerships outside the Community. Export also applies to oral transmission of technology 
when the technology is described over the telephone." While the EC has tightened its 
definition of dual-use technology when compared to a previous act adopted on 22 June 2000, 
in practice, the focus is predominantly on the exportation of innovations potentially useful in 
conventional military projects, such as the production of weapons of mass destruction. The 
need to develop a mechanism that acknowledges 'soft power' efforts as dangerous threats to 
humankind remains largely to be addressed across the region. In its latest move, the EC 
introduced a green paper on 30 June 2011, in which it suggests a number of significant 
improvements on the mechanism of control over the exportation of dual-use technology by its 
member states. Yet the exportation of dual-use ICTs to many repressive states in the 
underdeveloped world remains a serious problem. Current policy gaps have resulted in 
companies such as NSN finding legal justifications for engaging in behaviour that current 
regulations mostly frown upon, rather than forbid. 
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Interestingly enough, even from a purely financial perspective, engaging in business contracts 
with repressive regimes has not been a viable a long-term strategy for Western companies in 
many instances. Sohrabi-Haghighat and Mansouri (2010: 32) observe that the revelation of 
NSN's alleged contribution to online censorship in Iran "resulted in considerable reduction of 
[the brand’s] sales in Iran." While it is estimated that NSN's co-operation with the Iranian 
regime has cost the company somewhere between a quarter to half of its business in the 
country on a permanent basis, there is no evidence of their products and services having been 
boycotted in any other part of the world in solidarity with the Green Movement of Iran. 
Dawoody (2011: 16) also suggests that unethical technology sales ultimately harm the firms 
involved, arguing that "these types of businesses suffer from poor public relations through 
boycotts which force stakeholders rethink such endeavours in the future." The emphasis on 
the importance of an ICT firm's stakeholders is particularly noteworthy given the global 
search for a practical approach to dubious technology trade. Sturges (2010) spots a "capacity 
for the corporations to be questioned [by their shareholders] on the ethical dimensions of their 
policy which could be taken up by freedom of expression campaigners." Informing 
shareholders can be an effective way of influencing an ICT conglomerate's policies at 
minimum financial and political cost. 
 
Pressure from international human rights NGOs on European Union officials over the 
international business deals of NSN, Alcatel and Ericsson and other European companies 
persuaded the European Parliament to pass a resolution on 10 February 2010, stating in part: 
 
[The] European Parliament strongly criticises international companies, in particular 
Nokia-Siemens, for providing the Iranian authorities with the necessary censorship 
and surveillance technology, thus being instrumental in the persecution and arrest of 
Iranian dissidents. 
 
Russian news agency Ria Novosti cited a UN press release in 2010 announcing an EU 
decision to call "on the Iranian authorities to stop the jamming of satellite broadcasting and 
Internet censorship and to put an end to this electronic interference immediately." Xindex 
(2013), however, urged the EU to make a more concrete move to promote digital freedom 
abroad, arguing that "self-regulation and corporate social responsibility often do not go far 
enough to adequately address this issue." In an online article titled "Outwitting Iran's Cyber 
Censors," European Voice (2010) asserts that the EU and its member states should employ 
mandatory rather than voluntary measures, requiring companies to preserve human rights in 
dubious states, affirming that "the EU also needs to help Iranian civil society to unblock 
existing channels of communication or create new ones." Yet the EU needs to consider the 
contextual realities of individual nations before further developing its international anti-
censorship policy, so that it does not merely attempt to extend laws generally accepted in the 
West. To give an example of potential complication, according to the Financial Times (2008), 
one way Iranian youth defy governmental censorship is through sourcing bootleg DVDs. 
While such products are considered outright illegal violations of copyright law in Western 
states, they are viewed as 'cultural gems' in countries subject to censorship and repression, 
where the only way to catch up with the international arts scene is through 'illegally 
retrieving' what would otherwise remain out of bounds. 
 
Western lawmakers need to consider the cross-border effects of not only their foreign policy, 
but also their internal policies when it comes to ICTs. One prominent recent example was the 
attempt to pass the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA) in the 
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United States Congress—a law, which despite all its alleged 'legal' benefits, would have 
offered a crushing blow to cyber-activists operating in Iran and in other repressive states. 
 
 
——— 
 
 
The following table briefly compares some of the potential effects of the SOPA/PIPA and 
other similar proposed legislation on civilian lives in the West and in many underdeveloped, 
repressive regimes: 
 
Implications of 'Anti-Piracy' Policies: Western Democracies vs. Repressive States 
 
Typical Western Users 
Cyber-Activists Residing in 
Autocracies 
Some websites would be blocked TOR would be blocked 
Email providers could be forced to censor certain links Alternate DNS would be disabled 
Content shared on SNSs would be monitored and 
censored 
Proxy servers located in the United 
States and used in countries like Iran 
would become inaccessible 
Table 18 (Atlantic Wire 2011) 
 
Case Study: Nokia-Siemens Networks and the Iranian Market 
 
It was revealed in the aftermath of the 2009 Iranian presidential election that the Finnish-
German ICT firm Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) had sold a number of potentially 
repressive products and services to the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI), 
including mobile voice recognition technology that the government repeatedly used to track 
down and arrest political opponents. It further helped the regime set up a comprehensive 
internet censorship system. Between 2009 and 2010, angry consumers worldwide, who were 
sympathetic towards the protesters, as well as many European politicians, began to put 
pressure on the company. Costly consumer boycotts along with open criticism of the 
company's activities in Iran from the European Parliament, as well as a lawsuit filed in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against NSN by the legal 
representative of an imprisoned opposition figure, persuaded company officials to shift from 
denying the issue to acknowledging a major error on their part. In a public statement, the 
company subsequently promised to thoroughly revise its business codes for conduct in 
undemocratic states such as Iran, where it admitted NSN technology had been systematically 
employed by the regime's security officials to silence legitimate dissent. 
 
NSN and Policy Lessons for the Future: An Analysis 
 
On multiple occasions, NSN has officially responded on its international website to 
worldwide accusations of allegedly unethical business conduct in Iran. These responses can 
be divided into three main categories of denial, legal justification and finally admission and 
apology, which may indicate the relative power of public shareholders in Western political 
and economic structures. The following statement hails from NSN's (2009) first written 
response to the issue as found on its online database: 
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Nokia Siemens Networks has provided lawful interception capability solely for 
the monitoring of local voice calls in Iran. Nokia Siemens Networks has not 
provided any deep packet inspection, web censorship or internet filtering 
capability to Iran . . . The restricted functionality monitoring centre provided by 
Nokia Siemens Networks in Iran cannot provide data monitoring, internet 
monitoring, deep packet inspection, international call monitoring or speech 
recognition. Therefore, contrary to speculation in the media, the technology 
supplied by Nokia Siemens Networks cannot be used for the monitoring or 
censorship of internet traffic. 
 
Pressure from the European Parliament, international media and human rights advocates, 
including the Iranian Nobel Peace Prize winner Dr. Shirin Ebadi, mounted after a lawsuit was 
filed against the company in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia by reformist political figure Isa Saharkhiz, who claims he was located and arrested 
after briefly turning on his old regular cell phone while in hiding. The lawsuit was quickly 
followed by an inquiry launched by NSN shareholders, which led company officials to 
acknowledge the error. Yet as evidenced by the following statement, NSN continued to 
justify its contracts with Middle Eastern dictatorships: 
 
It is true that all modern mobile communications networks include a lawful 
interception capability; this capability became a standard feature at the insistence 
of the United States and European nations. These countries needed the capability 
for law enforcement reasons that are common throughout the world. It is 
unrealistic to demand that wireless communications systems based on global 
technology standards be sold without that capability. (NSN 2010a) 
 
The company eventually revised its business approach in Iran, took full responsibility for 
enabling the IRGC's abuse of its communications technologies and services, condemned 
online censorship in Iran and agreed to pull out of Iran at the next opportunity. At least four 
separate, official apologetic statements were published by NSN on its website during 2010. 
Here are some crucial extracts: 
 
Nokia Siemens Networks is aware of credible reports that the Iranian authorities 
use communications technology to suppress political activity in a way that is 
inconsistent with that government's human rights obligations. As a result of these 
credible reports, Nokia Siemens Networks halted all work related to monitoring 
centres in Iran in 2009. Nokia Siemens Networks divested its monitoring centre 
business in 2009 and will no longer provide monitoring centres to any country. 
The company has voluntarily restricted its business in Iran by not seeking or 
accepting new customers and by limiting its activities with its current customers. 
Prior to providing a monitoring centre to an Iranian mobile operator in 2008, the 
company believes it should have better understood the possible implications for 
human rights in Iran. (NSN 2010b) 
 
We share a concern for the welfare of dissidents and journalists persecuted for 
free expression in Iran and elsewhere. Accordingly, we call upon all countries to 
follow due process and provide humane treatment in accordance with their laws 
and applicable international agreements. (NSN 2010c) 
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Nokia Siemens Networks provided to Iran one monitoring centre necessary for 
effective use of the legally mandated lawful intercept capability . . . Nokia 
Siemens Networks's monitoring centre business was a small unit that, at the time 
of its transaction with Iran, was slated by Nokia Siemens Networks for sale 
because it was determined not to be an essential part of our core business. Nokia 
Siemens Networks divested its monitoring centre business in 2009 and no longer 
provides monitoring centres to any country . . . We do believe that, ultimately, the 
governments that misuse communications technology must be held accountable 
for that misuse. (NSN 2010d) 
 
While we do not intend to enter this business again . . . we halted all work related 
to monitoring centres in Iran in 2009, including service and support, we believe 
that we should have understood the issues in Iran better in advance and addressed 
them more proactively. There have been credible reports from Iran that 
telecommunications monitoring has been used as a tool to suppress dissent and 
freedom of speech. We deplore such use of a technology . . . While we cannot 
reinvent history, we can ensure we do better in the future. (NSN 2010e) 
 
This last statement raises a number of questions, which, if nothing else, could help clarify the 
reality behind such business affairs and prepare the ground for tighter regulation within the 
industry at large. An interesting detail in the company's latest statement was its defence of the 
contemporary importance of online filters around the world: 
 
While it is easy to say that there should be no filtering of any kind, we do not 
believe that would be a wise policy. The fact is that filtering technology is 
deployed in many, many countries, by many, many operators, for very legitimate 
purposes . . . On the other hand, there is filtering that we believe is inappropriate 
and would be inconsistent with widely accepted human rights . . . It is not 
inconceivable that filtering could be used for purposes such as blocking messages 
designed to coordinate the assembly of people in order to engage in legitimate 
political discourse. (NSN 2010e) 
 
This statement indicates that NSN executives were aware of the company's contribution to 
what they deemed, at best, to be 'legitimate' internet filtering in Iran. But their interpretation 
of local and regional laws abroad should not be seen as the benchmark for ethical behaviour 
when their practices and decisions could potentially endanger many civilian lives. In the 
absence of carefully and consistently enforced regulations, big businesses will continue to 
find new justifications for dodging voluntary limitations. While NSN officials may be correct 
that filtering software aimed at fighting online 'crimes' in Western democracies is legitimately 
produced and marketed, there is still a critical need for concrete, dynamic trade regulations 
capable of going beyond such a set definition of 'online crime.' When an authoritarian state is 
incapable of producing the innovative technologies it believes it needs to maintain control, 
due to a lack of democratic structures in its NIS, the political elite of such a regime will resort 
to foreign know-how. This will be done under seemingly legitimate covers, which may be 
followed up by 'upgrade' requests in return for hard-to-refuse sums of oil and gas dollars—
enough to persuade any ethical business to suspend its values for a short period of time. If the 
European Parliament—a largely democratic institution—gives precedence to self-regulation 
over compulsory directives, then outrageous comments such as the following will be par for 
the course in the ICT industry: 
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Consider the fact that the systems that we provided to Iran were designed to 
implement a right that the ITU has explicitly said is held by member states, and    
. . . required by law in the vast majority of those member states. Yet, when we 
help to meet those requirements, we are subject to considerable criticism, 
including in the European Parliament resolution on Iran of 10 February 2010. 
(NSN 2010e) 
 
Another issue that is often overlooked when it comes to Western corporations' international 
trade in ICTs is an East/West divide over the 'ultimate' definition of human rights. Given the 
history of civil rights abuse in many underdeveloped/developing countries, it is too 
convenient, yet also too naive, to presume that the contracting regime would be just as 
repressive without the technology it purchases. Nonetheless this sort of reasoning is implicit 
in NSN's actions, as is clear from the following statement: 
 
We believe that there is a broad consensus that telecommunications technology 
and the sharing of ideas and information that it enables, is a tool for social good. 
Thus, we do not believe that an absolutist policy entailing steps such as a full 
market exit in the face of evidence of human rights infringements would be a 
wise approach. (NSN 2010e) 
 
Techno-utopianism for ICTs in general seems particularly misplaced when a company is 
trying to wipe its hands of culpability for selling specific technologies designed to enable 
censorship and surveillance. Further, this blasé approach to the contextual impact of ICTs is 
especially callous when, according to The Economist's (2010) Human Rights Index, Iran 
ranks 158 out of the 167 assessed countries—tying for eighth worst in the world with Libya, 
and achieving the dubious honour of ranking third worst in the Middle-East. 
 
The predominantly techno-utopian view in some Western industrial circles ignores the dark 
sides of the internet, yet seems to be the best case scenario here. To tackle the issue, it would 
be necessary for ICT firms, their shareholders and their insurers to independently investigate 
prospective markets in advance and further revise their knowledge following every major 
political turmoil. This would help them avoid any accidental contributions to online 
censorship. Although, from a business perspective, one cannot be entirely unsympathetic with 
NSN's reluctance to pursue a sudden, total market exit after any minor sign of human rights 
abuse by contracting regimes, nonetheless, it is extremely important for Western ICT 
companies to understand the political impacts of technology in their target markets. At 
minimum, they should steer clear of solving 'technical' problems in repressive countries, 
without first carefully evaluating the 'social' context and consequences. 
 
Self-regulatory measures cannot replace external scrutiny. Frequently revised legislation 
combined with a standing regulatory task force, democratically elected from within industry, 
with the specific duty of regulating ICT exports would be an ideal remedy. One of the major 
socio-political factors influencing the legitimacy of ICT exports, as rightly recognised by 
NSN, is the human rights environment in a particular country during the lifespan of the 
foreign contracts (NSN 2010e). Yet NSN's business with Ahmadinejad's neo-conservative 
government was a simple result of a long-term collaboration started years before at the time 
of a more reformist government, many of whose officials fell victim to the very same 
technology they had commissioned. 
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On a technical level, Deibert and Rohozinski (2010) warn the international human rights 
community about new, harder-to-detect techniques of internet filtering already being 
implemented in repressive countries like Iran. These new methods allow authoritarian 
regimes to continue to control of the nationwide flow of online information while minimising 
negative external political side-effects of systematic censorship, such as foreign pressure. 
Referred to by Deibert and Rohozinski as techniques capable of "disabling or attacking 
critical information assets at key moments in time," they include hardware tinkering, such as 
shutting off power to the buildings where servers are located as well as software 
manipulations like tampering with domain name registration. Such methods enable 
authorities to deny accusations of illegitimate filtering. "In regions where internet 
connectivity can be spotty, just-in-time blocking is easily reasoned away as just another 
technical glitch with the internet," they further elaborate, warning researchers that modern 
internet censorship techniques are not limited to technological methods. With a firm sense of 
the dynamics of online censorship in repressive countries, they point to "the broad use of 
slander, libel and other laws to restrict permissible communications and to create a climate of 
fear, intimidation and ultimately self-censorship . . . [which] reflects a tactic of strangulation, 
whereby threats of legal action" go a long way in preventing cyber-activists from accessing 
and posting 'politically sensitive' content. 
 
Anti-Censorship Technology: Fostering Democracy in a Converging World 
 
The protests in Iran since 2009 seem to have shown many Western governments, especially 
the Obama administration, that current technological sanctions on Iran may be dysfunctional 
and contradict the original aim of the legislators. Some of Iran's local cyber-activists were 
doubly disadvantaged by being blacklisted by major American providers of instant 
messaging, email and social networking services, a few of which were not even blocked by 
the Iranian regime. Recognising this, the United States government was proactive and 
undertook a number of helpful steps, ranging from unblocking Iranian citizens on those 
online services to funding effective anti-filtering software projects. These efforts were 
intended to foster democracy through facilitating political communication among local cyber-
activists and reconnect local cyber-activists to the outside world. 
 
Such actions were widely supported by many scholars, including Nye (2010: 6), who believes 
the United States government's investment in anti-censorship technology in the aftermath of 
the 2009 crisis was a wholly legitimate "investment in physical resources that create Soft 
Power"—a concept he originally developed. Baker (2010) points at many distinct examples 
where Western intervention has helped promote Soft Power in repressive environments, 
highlighting the United States Senate's Victims of Iranian Censorship Act passed in July 2009 
as part of the Defence Authorisation Bill. This act permits the American government to 
develop means of circumventing online censorship on behalf of Iranian cyber-activists.  
 
Another prominent example of such efforts by the United States government is the Iranian 
Digital Empowerment Act passed in December 2009, which allows the export of "software 
and related services that enable personal communication or allow citizens to bypass 
government censorship" to Iran. The US State Department also issued a report to the US 
Congress suggesting that sanctions on "mass-market software for personal internet-based 
communications" should be waived in Iran's case. Leberknight et al. (2010) explain that the 
regime's crackdown on cyber-activists following the 2009 presidential election persuaded the 
US government to make Iran's netizens a foreign policy priority. They also report a list of 
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related acts that US lawmakers passed between 2002 and 2010, as well as their technological 
outcomes. 
 
As seen below, the United States government has paid particularly careful attention to the 
anti-censorship needs of oppressed nations, yielding the creation and release of many 
effective software solutions over the past decade: 
 
United States Congress and Anti-Censorship Technologies 
 
US Congress Policy Year Software Release 
Global Internet Freedom Act 2002 Anonymiser Anonymous Surfing, Ultrasurf, Dynaweb 
Global Internet Freedom Act 2003 Circumventor 
Global Internet Freedom Act 2006 GPass, Firephoenix, Psiphon, Twitter 
Global Internet Freedom Act 2007 JAP, GTunnel 
Global Internet Freedom Act 2010 Anonymiser Universal, Xi Xang Project (China) 
Table 19 (Leberknight et al. 2010) 
 
Yet it is not fair to imply that all the anti-censorship software developed in the United States 
for use in repressive contexts was initiated by the Senate or the Congress. 
 
Widely popular among Iranian cyber-activists for its effectiveness, speed and relative 
security, Haystack is a programme that was developed by the San Francisco-based non-profit 
Censorship Research Centre (CRC) directly response to the Iranian regime's crackdown on 
the post-election protests in June 2009. According to Heap (2010), the developer behind the 
project, it "uses a sophisticated mathematical formula to hide the users' real internet identity 
while allowing them to access websites blocked by Iran's government." 
 
Many other anti-filtering software projects were developed by single individuals—free 
speech advocates who are skilled coders and mostly reside in North America. In an interview 
with Shift.com (cited by Patterson and Smith 2005: 41), a well-known Canadian hacker, the 
founder and executive director of Hacktivismo known as Oxblood Ruffin, said he had 
developed "an anonymous tunnelling protocol program and a program to embed messages 
inside of gif images to bypass censorship filters," both of which he claims are being widely 
used in Iran. 
 
It remains unknown whether there is any major anti-filtering software wholly developed by 
local or expatriate Iranian cyber-activists, although there are at least two potential candidates 
within this category: Simurgh and Green Proxy. Denning (2007: 26) reports that she and her 
team of postgraduate researchers "did not find evidence of Iranians developing their own 
anti-censorship software." Denning's extensive contributions to the state of knowledge on the 
forms of online activism in repressive contexts are particularly noteworthy, given her 
reputation as a highly experienced scholar in the field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
——— 
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Leberknight et al. (2010) list thirteen distinct anti-censorship technologies utilised by 
software developers, each designed to fit a certain context, depending on project budgets and 
technological needs, as well as the types of censorship technology that are to be countered: 
 
Common Ways to Bypass Internet Censorship 
 
No. Anti-censorship Technology 
1 Alternative DNS servers/names 
2 Open Proxy 
3 Hopping IP servers and using popular servers 
4 Chopping up content across packet boundaries 
5 Concealing payload content by stegano/crypto methods 
6 Foundation code, network code, spreading code 
7 Change keywords with randomised chain reaction 
8 Social media 
9 Secure cloud computing 
10 Remote login to another computer 
11 Secure phase for pre-agreement of protocol 
12 Timing covert channels 
13 Extensive caching/translation 
Table 20 (Leberknight et al. 2010) 
 
Given that most of the above methods are useful in Western, developed countries where 
censorship is enacted only to a mild degree, many of these techniques can be easily filtered 
by a well-equipped repressive regime concerned with the rapid growth of cyber-activism. 
Much of the software aimed at people residing in states such as Iran and China relies on the 
first three technologies indicated on the above table. A Freedom House (2011) report lists the 
major anti-filtering software products commonly used by local Iranian cyber-activists, 
evaluating them based on the ease of use, practical effectiveness and security features, and 
scoring them on an overall basis: 
 
Anti-Censorship Software: A Comparative Evaluation 
 
No. Software Ease of Use Performance Support and Security Overall Score 
1 Dynaweb     
2 Freegate     
3 Freenet     
4 GTunnel     
5 Google     
6 GPass     
7 Hotspot Shield     
8 JAP     
9 Proxies     
10 Psiphon     
11 TOR     
12 UltraSurf     
13 Your Freedom     
14 VPNs     
Table 21 (Freedom House 2011) 
 
  
131 
The majority of the software listed above was developed in the United States and Canada, 
where many influential philanthropic organisations are headquartered and where nearly half 
of the Iranian expatriate community resides. VPNs, as confirmed in a number of the expert 
interviews, were the seen to be the most popular and effective anti-censorship tools among 
local cyber-activists. Freedom House analyses such 'solutions,' mapping them out according 
to their technical capacities and the socio-political contexts they might best serve. These 
software products were assessed based on download and upload speeds, as well as the levels 
of privacy and security they provide their users: 
 
Anti-censorship Technologies: One Size Does Not Fit All 
 
 
Figure 35 (ibid) 
 
As indicated in the above figure, UltraSurf, Psiphon and VPNs are the most efficient software 
products in their respective categories. What distinguishes them from numerous, less 
successful competitors seems largely to be the sophisticated, innovative technology they rely 
on. According to Roberts et al. (2009, cited by Shahab and Mousoli 2010: 10), tools such as 
Tor, JAP and Circumventor rely merely on peer-to-peer technology to enable cyber-activists 
to use their own computers as proxies to tackle blocking, while UltraSurf relies on 
"sophisticated anti-blocking technologies to outwit filterers. Because very few people use a 
given Psiphon node, it is less likely to be blocked." 
 
Given that the interviewees were chosen from across a range of no fewer than three distinct 
professional categories (e.g. academic, practitioner, and activist), they did in many key cases 
disagree with one another. In fact, the fundamental challenge arising from the interviewing 
process was not the design of a 'perfect' questionnaire, but the ability to arrive at 
sociologically meaningful conclusions. Regarding the analysis of the interview scripts, a set 
of criteria (see chapter iii) comprising mainly of the interviewees' background and 
accomplishments was implemented to determine the credibility of every interviewee's 
answer. 
 
Internet Activity 
Downloading (i.e. 
Reading & Audiovisual 
Streaming) 
Lower Privacy Levels 
(e.g. Freegate, 
GTunnel, Google & 
Your Freedom) 
Higher Privacy Levels 
(e.g. TOR, UltraSurf & 
JAP) 
Uploading (i.e. 
Publishing) 
Lower Security Levels 
Slower Speed (e.g. 
UltraSurf) 
Faster Speed (e.g. 
Psiphon, GPass) 
Higher Security 
Levels  
Slower Speed (e.g. 
TOR & JAP) 
Faster Speed (e.g. 
VPNs & Psiphon) 
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Hacktivism and Innovation: The Blurred Lines of Online Dissent 
 
The use of technological innovations by Iranian cyber-activists has never been limited to the 
passive use of anti-filtering software. Over the past decade there have been many credible 
reports of politically motivated hacking attacks against the regime's online propaganda arms, 
carried out from inside and outside the country mostly by anonymous, professional Iranian 
hackers. Certain verified, original, high-tech, 'zero-day' operations have been accompanied by 
hundreds of minor attacks carried out by more ordinary, less technically literate cyber-
activists. 
 
These smaller attacks tend to take the form of the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack and often employ pre-made, user-friendly hacking software, referred to by Knapp and 
Boulton (2006: 79) as "downloadable and graphic-interfaced tools," such as pagerboot.com. 
DDoS attacks are described as based on dynamic HTML templates to launch 'HTTP floods'—
making a given website temporarily unavailable via unusually excessive viewing demand. 
Such attacks are especially popular in developing countries, "where networks and 
infrastructure tend to be fragile and prone to disruption" (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010: 4). 
Asghari (2010: 18) has seen evidence of DDoS attacks escalating dramatically during the two 
weeks following Iran's disputed presidential election in 2009, arguing that these attacks were 
mostly directed towards "government-run news and media sites, as both a form of protest and 
to stop propaganda." He also stresses that these attacks were carried out from both inside and 
outside the country, with outsiders making up most of the participants, especially Iranian 
cyber-activists residing in the United States and Europe. Hearn et al. (2009: 3), similarly 
acknowledge that most DDoS attacks against Iranian sites were launched from "Western 
countries and in particular the United States of America." Rathmell (cited by Stohl 2007: 14) 
also verifies that exiled political opposition groups exploited Iran's online sphere, counting 
four main strategies deployed: "virtual sit-ins and blockades; automated e-mail bombs; web 
hacks and computer break-ins; and computer viruses and worms." Nazario (2009: 171), a 
senior security research manager at Arbor Networks, reported that his organisation's network 
recorded multiple signs of collective-organised mass DDoS attacks on Iran's governmental 
websites following the 2009 disputed presidential election, many of which were coordinated 
on popular social networks such as Twitter and Facebook. Yet the "attackers just as quickly 
suggested the attacks stop due to bandwidth consumption issues in light of the country's 
internet traffic filtering. It is unclear if the attacks had any significant impact on the target 
sites' availability." The following snapshot of a Twitter update posted by an anonymous 
Iranian cyber-activist shortly after the 2009 election invites the individual's 'followers' to join 
them for a DDoS attack against a selection of regime-run websites: 
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Twitter: DDoS Attacks Go Viral 
 
 
Figure 36 (Wired 2009) 
 
Based on this information, one could hazard that what was initially perceived by the 
international media to be the regime pulling the plug on the internet was, in fact, a direct side-
effect of Iranian cyber-activists clogging the country's very limited bandwidth through 
excessive traffic. If so, this would have mainly been due to Iran's centralised, state-controlled 
and deliberately incapacitated network infrastructure, which would not have been able to 
keep up with the development of the events. This means that if DDoS attacks are used as viral 
practice, they can cause just as much trouble for home web users as for government 
employees, by disrupting shared connections and eventually bringing services to a temporary 
standstill. This result would arguably favour the regime more than cyber-activists looking to 
the internet as a last resort to coordinate their activities 'in time' and to get first-hand news out 
of the country despite the ban on foreign media organisations. While Nazario chalks up the 
popularity of DDoS attacks amongst Iranian cyber-activists to their ease of use for non-
technical parties, Deibert and Rohozinski (2007: 34) believe that the effectiveness and 
relative security of such operations also play a role in their widespread employment. They 
assert that a DDoS attack is "particularly effective as [it] can occur anonymously, with no 
demands being made, and presents investigators with the difficult task of pinpointing the 
source of the attack." Yet they may be overlooking the fact that user-friendliness and safety 
are only valuable features as long as the network is up and running, and that if these 
techniques may shoot cyber-activists in the foot by disrupting internet service in general, 
cutting the flow of information, then they are ultimately serving the regime's censorship 
policies. 
 
This raises the question of whether Iranian cyber-activists are the only parties in Iran's online 
power struggles that employ hacking attacks. The Iranian regime has a history of launching 
advanced hacking attacks against both local and expatriate cyber-activists, as well as foreign 
governments. The exact scope of Iran's cyber-strength remains unknown due to 
inconsistencies of the available reports. Valeriano and Maness (2012: 147) found that while 
Iran had a considerable amount of control on the internet, its cyber-power was not as 
dominant as that of United States, Russia, China and Israel, concluding that "Iran falls 
somewhere on the lower end scale in that it has very little offensive capabilities but is also 
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less dependent overall and remains in control of access points." The following table 
demonstrates Iran's overall position as compared to the world's top four cyber powers: 
 
World's Top Cyber Powers under Scrutiny 
 
Country 
Cyber Offensive 
Power 
Cyber 
Dependence 
Cyber Defensive 
Power 
Total Score 
Iran 4 5 3 12 
USA 8 2 4 14 
Israel 8 3 4 15 
China 5 4 6 15 
Russia 7 5 4 16 
Table 22 (American Foreign Policy Council 2012; Ganji et al. 2013; Hastedt et al. 2014; Strinde 2011) 
 
If they can be relied on, these numbers suggest that the Islamic Republic's cyber-activities are 
designed largely for defence—meaning that despite having a relatively good ability to detect 
and stop incoming cyber-attacks, the regime's ability to break through the sophisticated 
firewalls of industrial states remains below average at best. The table also confirms that the 
country depends heavily on foreign-sourced technology and infrastructure with regards to the 
internet. While the regime's online intelligence unit may have conducted international 
operations, it has rarely hesitated to hack the websites and blogs of local cyber-activists and 
even many reformist political figures. This is cheaper, more effective and less politically 
fraught than publicly acknowledging that dissident voices are not tolerated. Patterson and 
Smith (2005: 42) found that the blog of Mohammad Abtahi, the former Iranian Vice 
President, "was hacked numerous times in response to his postings regarding the government 
torture of other bloggers." They report that the official website of ex-Presidential candidate 
Ali Larijani's was also hacked: "the attacks on the websites of Larijani and Abtahi indicate 
that elements within the country are attempting to silence the opposition." Deibert and 
Rohozinski (2010: 1) also confirm that Iranian authorities are no longer limiting themselves 
to pursuing old, passive-defensive filtering methods and "are taking active counter-measures 
aimed at controlling the spaces online for resistance and dissent." 
 
Whether the Iranian regime centrally controls the execution of attacks or contracts them out 
to professional hacker groups remains a question, as there is no substantial public evidence 
available on the issue. There seem to be enough indicators, however, to suggest that the 
situation is a hybrid one. Denning (2007: 27) argues that Iran has a large community of 
online security experts and scholars, including many who would be suitable for the job. She 
estimates "that there are 100 or more academics working in information security, publishing 
research papers in journals and conference proceedings, hosting and attending conferences, 
and teaching courses on network security topics." Yet it would be premature to draw any 
conclusions before assessing the background and political tendency of each and every one of 
those academics. Interestingly enough, Denning claims to have found evidence of "research 
in network security taking place within government labs," which cannot on its own be taken 
as a proof of hacking activity. Patterson and Smith (2005: 19) are certain that a large 
proportion of network security research in Iran takes place at the Sharif University of 
Technology, but they acknowledge that they found "no evidence that the school was using 
this education to promote hacking in any way." 
 
It is important to note that not all professional hackers who cooperate with security officials 
in such projects are financially driven, and that the regime can always find enough 
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conservative and religious academics to rely on, provided that they can make a convincing 
case for the 'harmfulness' of the voices to be silenced. Patterson and Smith (2005) say they 
have found substantial evidence of such politically and religiously motivated hacking attacks 
taking place in Iran. 
 
In conclusion, increasingly the argument over the democratic or repressive nature of the 
internet comes across as vain. Web 2.0 technologies are highly dynamic and the leverage that 
any party to Iran's power struggles can gain by using them cannot be taken for granted. 
Winning such exhausting and time-sensitive engagements takes persistence in remaining on 
top of the innovation pyramid—any anti-censorship innovation can and inevitably will, at 
some point, turn into just another abandoned, worthless piece of software, if not regularly 
evaluated and updated. The failure to acknowledge that online innovations are not 'timeless' 
is the main reason why technologically deterministic solutions to cyber-censorship introduced 
by the West have so far resulted only in the production of a handful of software products that 
intended clients 'used to' find useful at best. This outlook concurs with Deibert and 
Rohozinski (2010: 2) when they state that "not that long ago it would have been safe to 
assume the entrenched authorities were at a disadvantage, too inept to withstand digitally-
enabled social movements. Today, that is no longer a safe assumption." Whenever a brand 
new means of communication appears, history has shown us that efforts at censorship will 
eventually follow in due course. Drezner (2010: 41), however, insists that the long-term 
benefits of the internet and online technologies will fall to the favour of cyber-activists who 
can exploit them to damage authoritarian regimes, asserting that "over time, authoritarian 
governments will be faced with a difficult choice: accept a greater risk of popular revolt, or 
engage in costly acts of repression." From an SST perspective, the validity of Drezner's 
viewpoint on the long-term benefits of the internet for cyber-activism would depend strictly 
on his concept of 'exploitation'. Nevertheless, the latter part of the author's argument is too 
techno-utopian to fit the contextual realities of modern Iran. As we know, the Iranian regime 
manages to balance online censorship and crackdowns on street protests—it has hardly 
shown any real sign of weakening despite extensive international pressure. An online 
movement can only be sustained in the context of a democratic, functional innovation system, 
capable of the timely creation and diffusion of unique technologies, determined by immediate 
needs and truly bottom-up processes. Where this is not possible, as is the case in Iran, ICT 
imports can go a long way to fill in gaps—for either side of a conflict. 
 
The main conclusions of the study at hand follow in the next chapter. 
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Chapter vii: Conclusions, Practical Implications and Insights 
for Future Research 
 
The seventh and last chapter of this thesis comprises a thorough account of the conclusions 
drawn based on previous chapters and how they were arrived at, as well as providing 
experiential insights for future studies of similar nature. 
 
The results of this research chiefly confirm that Iran's NIS is bimodal. This bimodality is 
entrenched in the Islamic Republic's preoccupation with militaristic and ideological 
objectives, such as its nuclear programme. The divisions in this unconventional form of NIS, 
fall along the lines of the online power struggle in Iran—an ICT-mediated conflict between 
pro-democracy cyber-activists and actors employed by the ruling elite or who support it 
ideologically. The Iranian system stands in great contrast to Freeman and Lundvall's classic 
model of nationwide innovation processes, where academia, governmental institutions and 
business enterprises interact efficiently to serve national and at times international interests, 
rather than merely achieving pre-set technological goals championed by unelected officials in 
control of a political regime largely characterised by what Habermas (1989: 19) refers to as 
"personalised state authority." This illegitimate model of governance seems to take advantage 
of the Platonic-Aristotelian (Arendt 1961: 105) valid principle that "every well-ordered 
community is constituted of those who rule and those who are ruled." 
 
Outright Bimodality vs. Limited Diffusion: Can A Single NIS Serve Two 
Different Masters? 
 
The bimodality of Iran's system is not unique, but it is profoundly significant to the social 
diffusion of technological innovations. A thorough assessment of the IRGC's influence on the 
country's ICT industry shows that the civil sector's contributions to nationwide innovation 
processes in the field are marginal at best. This effect is hardly surprising in an undemocratic 
political system that exerts a firm hand on the national economy. Yet bimodality is not 
specific to the underdeveloped world. Perhaps the most notable contemporary example of a 
bimodal NIS is found in the United States. Beduya (2009) argues that two completely 
separate modes are at work in the National Innovation System of the United States, both of 
which are based on free-market capitalism: "one component that is founded on Eisenhower's 
so called military-industrial complex has already yielded such gems like the Internet and the 
GPS. The other part, mainly for downstream applications and commercial diffusion, is the 
linked University and venture capital firms that is, for example, the foundation of Silicon 
Valley." Despite this bimodality, there is no evidence to suggest that the NIS of the United 
State is weak or dysfunctional. But a large question remains regarding how genuinely 
democratic the US political structure is, when compared to that of the Scandinavian states, 
home of the NIS theory as we know it today. This line of inquiry is thoroughly underexplored 
and in need of much further scrutiny. 
 
In the case of Iran, the dominant, governmental part of the system is run by core regime 
officials mostly located within the IRGC and directly supervised by the Supreme Leader. The 
IRGC, furthermore, has a tendency to employ seemingly private front companies in order to 
achieve two goals: outcompeting its private sector rivals in profitable national projects 
without provoking criticism, and circumventing international economic sanctions by 
attempting to deceive Western companies into contributing to projects presented as having 
civil purposes. 
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The alternative, pro-democracy faction of the NIS structure under study, meanwhile, is 
largely civil, and thus has access to a much smaller budget. Consisting of an interconnected, 
virally active network of local and expatriate Iranian cyber-activists, this portion of the NIS 
empirically represents a much larger, as well as demographically more diverse, section of the 
population. Concentrated in the civilian universities and research firms, or performing as 
individual operators, these actors are deprived of any major share of the national research and 
development budget, while also being regularly subjected to thorough surveillance and 
occasionally to interrogation, arrest and criminal prosecution. 
 
These two sections of the Iranian NIS are political foes—hence the bimodality. With both 
sides' increasing reliance on ICTs due to digital globalisation, the secular forces' four-decade-
long power struggle against the Islamic Republic has largely shifted into the online sphere 
since early to mid-2000s and away from traditional, physical methods. This has resulted in 
the formation of a phenomenon known as the Persian online discourse, which consists 
predominantly of, but is not synonymous to, the Persian blogosphere—home of Iranian 
cyber-activists worldwide. 
 
The weblog sampling process was indeed a challenging one, posing a fundamental dilemma 
on whether or not the research should directly engage with the cyber-activists under scrutiny. 
While the initial inclination was to cross the boundaries of conventional trends, this 
preliminary strategy was later on dismissed following further supervisional consultancy, as 
well as on various ethical grounds. All things considered, the ultimate verdict was that even 
in the case of penetrating the technical barriers, there would have been no feasible way of 
measuring up the validity of data at least from a purely academic stance. Also, among the 
main factors compromising the pace and robustness of the  research were: the frequent 
discontinuation of many weblogs,  the technical incompetency of some bloggers who would 
otherwise be more vocal, the IRGC's occasional blanket disruptions of the blogging platforms 
at key political flashpoints, and of course the highly challenging issue of data authentication. 
 
While the weblogs discontinued in the early stages of data collection were automatically 
eliminated from the list, those doing so further down into the process were often considered 
to be kept in the loop. With regards to the blocked weblogs, it happened often that the 
blogger swiftly informed their core audience about their involuntary relocation through their 
fellow activist bloggers likely to share the same core audience, who were able to widely 
circulate the URL to their new homepage. At the time of government-imposed blackouts, 
however, the research was left virtually paralysed, as such episodes made it almost 
impossible to receive any live updates from the local cyber-activists for indefinite lengths of 
time and at the point they were most desperately needed. 
 
Despite the fact that Iran is the highest ranking country in the Middle-East in terms of web 
connectivity, it is vital to note that broadband internet remains a luxury afforded almost 
exclusively by those in more affluent urban areas, as is the case with most emerging 
economies. A distinctive characteristic of social sciences is the liberating ability to move 
beyond oversimplified notions such as the inevitable divide between the information 'haves' 
and 'have-nots'. But from a socially constructivist perspective (i.e. STS), issues such as access 
remain to be the cornerstone of a dynamic research design involving bottom-up social 
processes. For instance, few of the active anti-censorship bloggers studied by this project 
were based in Iran, whereas even more ICT fluent political activists than initially expected 
were expatriates. Such so-called resource-specific split proved during the course of the 
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research to be largely intact, however, between the native and expatriate cyber-activists, 
rather than the rich and the poor. 
 
IRGC Generals and the Militarisation of Iran's Civil Industries: The Birth of A 
Dysfunctional System 
 
For over a decade, since its recognition of the online sphere as penetrating and influential, the 
regime has made systematic, costly attempts to take control of political discourse therein. Yet 
it has had very little luck, largely due to the existence of a separate, parallel innovation 
system maintained by a tangled web of young, educated cyber-activists who, despite political 
isolation and resource deprivation, remain relatively competitive in an online struggle with 
the regime. 
 
This research verifies that the Iranian NIS is dysfunctional. The results also demonstrate that 
Western, mainly European, telecommunications companies have continuously influenced the 
country's political discourse by filling its growing technological void. They have extensive 
input into the online power struggles in Iran by engaging in questionable business 
transactions and contracts with the Islamic regime. 
 
Furthermore, the research finds a largely set pattern in the way Western corporations have 
contributed to the telecommunications technologies industry in Iran. While the list of the 
actors supplying the regime's needs consists, predominantly, of north-western European ICT 
companies, for the most part cyber-activists tend to rely on North American universities, 
strategic research centres, and philanthropic NGOs. An analytical comparison indicates that 
foreign contributions to the efforts of the Islamic Republic are merely profit-driven, whereas 
technological assistance aimed at cyber-activists is primarily humanitarian. I argue that the 
geographical basis of this distinctive division is a matter of policy. 
 
Transnational conglomerates have often been singled out by human rights organisations for 
their involvement in certain markets. The instance most relevant to this study is the lawsuit 
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against Nokia-
Siemens Networks by Iranian cyber-activists in the aftermath of the contested 2009 
presidential elections, in which the company was accused of providing the Iranian regime 
with online censorship technology. NSN is only one of many European corporations that 
have successfully plead ignorance of their contractual partners' repressive use of what such 
companies perceive to be peaceful, lawfully justifiable technology. Yet there is a world of 
difference between European and Asian legal systems with regards to conceptions of 
'criminality'—yielding a clash of ethics. A well-rounded policy would be one that carefully 
takes into account not merely what importing countries' regulations dictate, but more 
importantly inscribes codes of conduct based on liberal, European principles. That is the only 
way the European Union can ensure the success of profitable businesses while not at the 
same time disfavouring 'the oppressed.' 
 
The focus of a practical, dynamic policy must be twofold: it needs to effectively prevent the 
sale of sensitive, dual-purpose ICTs to repressive regimes, and further facilitate pro-
democracy movements' access to telecommunications technologies useful in countering 
repression as well as to resources to bolster their ability to innovate in the field. Currently, 
many policies in the European export control regime remain static and underdeveloped. They 
hardly ever keep pace with technological advances in ICT, and often result from technical 
perspectives that target entire systems, rather than recognising, evaluating and dynamically 
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engaging with the various socio-political elements at work within that system. There is a 
burgeoning need for the West's export policies to become more goal-oriented, more 
contextually informed and more socio-technically balanced. Currently they seem more or less 
like diplomatic gestures aiming to demonstrate to oppressive regimes that they are not 
scientifically self-sufficient. The dysfunctions of a repressive regime need to be seen 
primarily by the international community as a long-term threat to the welfare of its citizens, 
not as a profiting opportunity. Any other approach would not be consistent with codes and 
principles of corporate social responsibility. 
 
The dysfunctional nature of the Iranian NIS is not automatically caused by its bimodality, but 
rather by the undemocratic structure of its political system. There have been multiple 
instances where a country with a bimodal NIS has not become overly dependent on foreign 
technology imports. Among these is Norway, where according to a report authored by 
Herstad et al. (2011: 14), a dual NIS is in action: "the large capital region proportion of 
industrial activity collectively forms a context of dense internal buzz from face-to-face 
contact and individual knowledge worker mobility . . .  [whereas] firms in other Norwegian 
regions link up with and contribute to the construction of . . . domestic innovation 
collaboration networks." Characterised by diversity (Wicken 2007), Norway has one of the 
most successful National Innovation Systems in Europe and in the world (Haghi et al. 2011). 
 
While a bimodal NIS can, occasionally, remain functional, the malfunctions of the Iranian 
system result not necessarily from the state versus civilian division it faces nationwide, but 
rather chiefly from its socio-political divide into factions—itself an undemocratic, military-
oriented social construction. This brings to mind the dependency of the Unites States defence 
industry on Japanese technologies made for civil purposes towards the end of the 20th 
century (Alvarez 1989, cited by Institute for International Economics 2006a). At one point, 
only one third of the products using semiconductors in the United States were made in the 
heart of the industry in California (Irwin 1996)—the Pentagon relied increasingly on 
commercially-purposed Japanese products for convenience. But as a New York Times (1991) 
special report rightly pointed out at the time, "the spinoffs are now going the other way: A 
healthy commercial industry is considered necessary for the military." This observation is 
essential to understanding the political rhetoric behind innovation choices. The biggest 
consequence of this pattern—an unorthodox drift from Freeman and Lundvall's original NIS 
model—was, according to the aforementioned report, "that the United States, lacking a 
consumer electronics business and behind in production of certain types of semiconductors, 
[became] dependent on Japan and other nations for technology used in weapons." This is why 
scholarly arguments that rule out the potential power of the European Union to pressure the 
Islamic Republic are unconvincing. With Iran being thoroughly dependent on European 
ICTs, the EU is economically best placed to help make a major policy shift happen with 
regards to Iran (Ganor 1998). 
 
Why Democracy Matters: The Social Structure of an NIS and Its Technical 
Potency 
 
The absence of democratic NIS structure in Iran is not fundamentally dissimilar to the 
situation in the United States immediately after World War II—military-focused and divided. 
This study establishes that Iran's NIS is undemocratic in terms of both socio-political 
representation and gender distribution. It found that gender and location were both influential 
on the computer-literacy and connectivity of politically motivated Iranian cyber-activists, but 
did not significant affect their innovativeness. Recent statistics show that the nation's 
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household internet connections are almost equally shared between male and female users 
across the entire population. Therefore, the undemocratic nature of Iran's NIS seems to be 
due to the lack of democracy and gender equality that both the pro-regime and cyber-activist 
factions display. Again, only one of the assessed activist blogs was definitely maintained by a 
woman. 
 
As a final conclusion, it is hardly an accident that Ukrainian cyber-activists were mostly 
passive consumers of ICTs, as opposed to prolific innovators, at the time of the Orange 
Revolution. According to Transparency International (2011), "corruption in Ukraine is a 
systemic problem existing across the board and at all levels of public administration." In a 
country where there is tolerance for state corruption—a blatant sign of a lack of democratic 
structures—the NIS is inevitably distorted away from Freeman and Lundvall's natural model. 
The socio-technical similarities shared by the Iranian and Ukrainian case studies could be 
developed as an analytical dimension useful for future research on the interplay between state 
politics and NIS functionality in repressive environments. This would be particularly 
beneficial to Western policy-makers in their attempts to move away from symbolic standoffs 
towards practical anti-censorship solutions, in turn enabling democratic social movements in 
dictatorial states. 
 
Ukraine of the mid-2000s may not have had many significant cultural values in common with 
Iran later in the decade—a considerably more restricted nation in almost every aspect of 
social life. But when it comes to its NIS dynamics and processes, the resemblance is uncanny. 
The lack of systematic democratic assessment and consequently the absence of an adequate 
policy reform regimen in relation to repressive countries have both historically restricted the 
West's ability to fully utilise its vast potential to facilitate democratisation processes in 
emerging economies—demonstrated yet again during the Arab Spring protests. The best 
solution to this shortcoming, as this research has argued throughout, is a legislative one. The 
proposed framework stands in contrast to one-size-fits-all schemes that often do not reach far 
beyond symbols and metaphors. Without flexible, contextually informed and frequently 
revised policies advancing democratic political reform in repressive countries, nationwide 
innovation in such countries will remain distorted. This is a lost opportunity for the global 
promotion of democracy. The free world must step up its strategy to go all the way from 
disapproving of repressive conduct to discontinuing technological cooperation with non-
democratic elites worldwide. 
 
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine has more or less the same social goals and values in 
common with most other political movements of its time: civil liberties, financial stability 
and a minimal, transparent government. Ironically, it also shares the same roadmap with 
them: none. Contemporary popular uprisings and their international supporters often tend to 
be too focused on toppling oppressive regimes to pay enough attention to sociologically 
justifying the long-term impacts of their actions and strategies on worldwide stability and 
peace. The Orange Revolution was one of the first scalable attempts at the idea of a Western-
backed, colour-coded and non-violent political resistance movement against a totalitarian 
regime in the modern history of civil disobedience. Yet the departure of the dictator left 
behind a familiar phenomenon in all layers of the society's fabric, one we could refer to as the 
'culture of corruption'. This, along with the inexperience of the opposition, caused by years of 
regime monopoly across the political scene, is exactly why not many of those residing in the 
Arab Spring states can yet claim to be living in better conditions than they did prior to the 
power shift in their respective countries. The mere transition of control from one party to 
another, without activating a set of democratic safeguards to preserve minority rights 
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(including those of supporters of the prior regime) simply leads to what has been witnessed in 
Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. In Egypt, for instance, the same censorship technology that 
served President Mubarak was used by Muslim Brotherhood officials to control the internet, 
despite a fundamental regime change—a scenario all too familiar for those carefully 
following the aftermath of recent regime changes in other parts of the region. 
 
In Ukraine's case, the underdevelopment of counter-censorship activities was less deeply 
rooted in a lack of resources than in the defectiveness of its security-focused innovation 
system—a legacy inherited from Soviet Russia. This familiar pattern confirms that it is 
mostly human choices rather than newly emergent technologies themselves that ultimately 
define sophisticated technological concepts like usefulness and impact. If the sheer existence 
of a technical innovation could be sufficient to promote a major cause, then the phenomenon 
commonly referred to in the media as a 'Facebook/Twitter revolution' would have ultimately 
coincided with relatively higher levels of democracy in the associated countries. But instead, 
what happened in almost every case was the transfer of censorship technologies from one 
oppressive hand to another. The International Renaissance Foundation and Stefan Batory 
Foundation (2010: 63) reported over five years after the Orange Revolution that Ukrainian 
innovation processes are idle, explaining that "although the market economy has been de-
facto established in Ukraine . . . the manageability and efficiency of . . . innovation[s] is 
highly questionable . . . Several cases of re-privatisation motivated by non-transparent 
privatisation procedures have created uncertainties diverting potential investors." 
 
This is not to suggest that Ukraine performs inadequately in the academic sector, but to 
highlight the defective system through which Ukrainian universities interact with the 
government and major industries. According to Outsourcing Centre (2005), in the mid-2000s 
the country benefited from nearly one thousand colleges and six hundred thousand students. 
In the year of the Orange Revolution the Centre reported that "the National Academy of 
Sciences, whilst reduced in the course of the 1990s brain drain, employs almost 30,000 
engineers and researchers. Today, the Academy supports 170 scientific research institutes, 
including the internationally renowned Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics, and eight techno-
parks which address the challenges of innovation." From an NIS perspective, however, 
Ukraine ranked 71st out of 142 assessed nations in 2013—stuck around the halfway mark 
(Global Innovation Index 2013). This is a fairly improved position, given the country's 
position at the 85th place on the index earlier in 2005 (Blanke 2005). With regards to 
telecommunications technologies, however, "Ukraine has not been harnessing these new 
tools for growth, ranking 76th overall on the ICT sub-index" (ibid). 
 
Just like in Iran, dysfunctions in Ukraine's NIS resulting from the repression have widened 
the technological divide between the government and cyber-activists in favour of the former, 
once again highlighting the role of democracy and transparency in the construction of a 
unified, self-reliant innovation system at the national level. Although Ukraine seems to have 
an abundance of knowledge production firms to address such questions, its research and 
development funds are not diffused in a 'democratic' manner. It is not a lack of resources, 
knowledge or ability that makes its NIS relatively incompetent, but rather the notoriously 
high rates of corruption within Ukraine's political elite. While this led to an inevitable 
decrease of foreign investment in the Ukrainian market, corruption has not stopped Western 
companies from seeking business with governmental institutions in Iran and in other parts of 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This trend is influenced by a range of local and 
cross-border factors including the affluence of most natural-resource based MENA 
economies and the fear of another economic recession in the Euro zone, which makes it hard 
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for struggling EU businesses to refuse attractive deals on offer from repressive states rich in 
oil and gas. According to Forbes (2013), "Ukraine needs a business climate where 
agreements are fulfilled, investments are secure, and courts take independent decisions 
regardless of who the claimants are." If these weaknesses are all resolved, "international 
investors will flow in, small and medium business will develop, competition will foster 
innovation and efficiency, and the country will finally be able to fulfil its vast potential" 
(ibid). Heavy reliance on foreign technologies is never good news for a country's innovation 
system, and certainly represents a catastrophe for pro-democracy cyber-activists facing 
systematic governmental censorship. The dependence of the Iranian CIS on ICT imports 
seems to be a symptom of a dysfunctional NIS. The best, perhaps only, remedy would be a 
thorough democratic restructuring. 
 
By the same token, unless important democratic values and principles are fostered in Iran, 
ICT imports will remain generally more beneficial to the dictatorial regime than to pro-
democracy dissent. Regarding Ukraine, Salnykova (2006: 28) calls attention to the economic 
experiment implemented by the parliament from 1999 to 2002 affecting the country's ore-
mining and metallurgical enterprises, under which "enterprise profit tax (EPT) was set at the 
level of 30 per cent of the usual tax (that is only 9 per cent of profit) . . . [and] road funds fees 
were annulled, the state innovation fund fee was reduced to 50 per cent." Yet the scheme had 
no durable impact on Ukraine's NIS output. The reason for this failure is that while the 
Ukrainian parliament—the most democratic institution within the regime—was busy 
introducing potentially useful tax reforms, the extra-judicial faction of the regime led by 
Kuchma and Yushchenko engaged in high levels of corruption, conducted mainly via 
"presidential control over the Prosecutor General's office under both the 1996 and 2006 
constitutions" (Kuzio 2008: 4). 
 
Finally, despite receiving extensive Western financial aids, and while encountering a 
relatively limited scope of governmental censorship, pro-democracy dissidents in Ukraine 
have remained unable to make full use of the ICTs available to them in the years following 
the Orange Revolution. The fact that a transition of the country's pro-democracy discourse to 
the online sphere did not occur in a timely, effective manner could be one reason, among 
many, for why the Ukrainian protesters are once again struggling—with a now much more 
technologically experienced government, ironically headed by Viktor Yanukovych, the very 
same man they successfully defeated in 2005. According to Lutsevych (2013: 7), the 
Razumkov Centre, a leading Ukrainian think tank, "has 748 followers on Facebook, whereas 
the Moldovan Foreign Policy Association and the Institute of Public Policy in Chisinau have 
no Facebook presence at all," elaborating that "even for the most successful groups, the social 
media dynamic is weak . . . [and] poor media outreach weakens NGOs." Although there 
seems to be a need for Ukrainian and Moldovan political activists to scale up their 
'digitalisation' efforts, the Iranian opposition hardly suffers from computer illiteracy. The 
official Facebook page of Mohammad Khatami, Iran's former president and a father figure 
for political reformism in the Islamic Republic, has over 107,000 'likes' and counting—
despite the fact that Facebook has been officially blocked in Iran since 2007 (HAMSA) in 
what is the first known instance of an SNS being systematically filtered in a repressive 
country. 
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In Search of a Cross-Border Model for Democratic Change: A Universally 
Transferrable NIS? 
 
Empirical analysis of NIS in Iranian and Ukrainian cases has inspired this research to seek a 
fresh, cross-border framework useful to the West's global promotion of democracy. Even 
though the comparison of the two case studies at hand demonstrates that there is a direct 
correlation between NIS functionality and the level of democracy found therein, the idea of a 
collective solution seems a little too optimistic. In other words, although it is suggested here 
that the way to foster democracy and human rights in a repressive country ought to best pass 
through embracing legitimate technological needs and interests of pro-democracy dissidents, 
it remains unclear at this point if a globally applicable remedy could be an option. Yet the 
universal acceptance of the intellectual advantages of non-deterministic, context-driven 
approaches would be a positive step towards further progress in this mostly underexplored 
field. 
 
The idea of an internationally transferable model of a democratic NIS (or any other type of a 
socio-technical system for that matter) is one "beset by a fuzzy [form of] utopianism" 
(Warren 1996: 242)—an insight partly rooted in "the false cultural reification of the East by 
the West . . . or a responsive false cultural reification of the East by its more authoritarian 
leaders" (Morgan 2006: 97). An NIS can fail for a variety of interdisciplinary reasons. Instead 
of attempting to faithfully replicate 'successful' models in emerging economies, regardless of 
their unique characteristics, the West should focus on identifying, explaining and adequately 
addressing the contextual barriers that prevent a functional, independent NIS from flourishing 
in repressive countries. This gap in the literature, as Minogue (2001: 7) argues in regards to 
Western reform packages, creates a distorted scene in which "failures are largely blamed on 
the recipients . . . [and] successes are seized on and promoted [as] examples of the 
virtuousness of the donors." This only reinforces a discursive context "increasingly premised 
on the apparently indispensable precondition of one united, cultural identity and a common 
language" (Mishkova 2012: 675). Such top-down, idealistic plans have historically proven to 
be "difficult and costly" (Sofka 2005: 1)—and on many occasions impossible to execute. 
 
If we step away from what is known in some neo-conservative circles as "the requirement for 
international order" (Porch 2013: 28), we will realise that without the implementation of 
many crucial prerequisites in emerging economies, such as trust (Fukuyama 1996)—a 
sophisticated concept "inherent in the Western democratic model" (Secor and O'Loughlin 
2005)—an NIS may not be fully transferrable across geographical borders. The abrupt 
imposition of a complex socio-technical structure from one geographical territory to another 
will not necessarily successfully transfer the democratic norms and values that it 
fundamentally relies upon. Further, it is inherently undemocratic to attempt to democratise a 
sovereign system via top-down influence. Such an approach will ignore the inherent 
sophistications of existing political institutions, which according to Magone (2006: 103), are 
"cultural artifacts and . . . are subject to change to adjust to new situations." Technological 
innovations often best serve the social contexts for which they have been developed, and the 
chances of a given technology's successful cross-border application remain heavily dependent 
on a range of factors in the destination country's culture. Democratic progress in repressive 
states may become a reality if Western powers make a policy shift from attempting to 
unilaterally decide the pace and direction of change to patiently assisting bottom-up, context-
driven processes that will allow true democracy to flourish according to local cultural 
conditions. Thus, as Mohan (2011: 174) rightfully argues, "Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, 
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Kenya, China, and even Russia will adapt to democratic institutions only in harmony with 
their own national traditions." 
 
This techno-real approach adheres to Weber's (1922) philosophy, which held cross-cultural 
transfer of institutions to be quite restricted. The reason for this limitation, as Honigsheim 
(2003: 27) points out, is the accepted "balance established in some countries between 
bureaucracy and democracy and the attitude of majorities towards minorities." The relatively 
relaxed political culture currently at work in many parts of the West is not an overnight 
phenomenon; it clearly derives from a history of bottom-up democratic processes led by 
those directly benefiting from them. Conversely, the European Union's current approach to 
the global promotion of democracy tends to be rooted in that put forth by Dahl (2000), who 
strongly believed in the worldwide transferability of "democratic units". As appealing as such 
a concept may sound, wishful thinking is not a practical strategy. The EU's multiple attempts 
at transferring democratic institutions to repressive states have remained predominantly 
symbolic and contradict some of "the principles formulated [for] the creation of a socio-
economic environment favouring democratisation in the respective countries" (Paulsen 2007: 
29). Although neither Weber nor Dahl lived in—or perhaps even anticipated—a digitalised 
world like ours, Weber's insights on the international transferability of institutions seem to be 
considerably more relevant to the post-internet dynamics of political change than those of 
Dahl's. Today ICTs facilitate the cross-cultural transferability of innovations "through 
communications networks and . . . [through increasing] . . . the ability of firms to engage in 
global production" (Institute for International Economics 2006b). Even so, Weber's 
scepticism regarding the successful transmission of democratic systems remains highly 
relevant. Further, as digital globalisation amplifies the influence of foreign actors on a 
country's innovation output via the blurring of national borders, NIS theory has a critical need 
to adapt to these realities of the modern world, in order to stay relevant. 
 
The current lack of a universally transferrable model of innovation should not, by any means, 
be considered a policy dead-end. The West must invest the valuable resources it has into a 
dual strategy, on one hand developing a competent ICT export regimen, and on the other 
hand re-theorising its approach to fostering democracy in repressive countries, in part via 
commissioning relevant scholarly research with better methodological approaches. This will 
enable EU lawmakers to benefit from an 'action-oriented' mechanism relying simultaneously 
on recent academic output as well as accurate local knowledge. 
 
Despite its widespread applicability in the industrialised world, the NIS model is inaccurate 
and insufficient in states where foreign influence is a highly influential factor. GTZ (2008) 
argues that even if careful attention were paid when applying the NIS model to regional, 
supra-national contexts, the framework would still lack enough vision and complexity with 
regard to major channels that may potentially influence innovation processes. GTZ explains 
that "cross-border transfer of innovations happen through multiple channels—for instance, 
imports of new products and capital goods, cross-border flows of ideas and information, 
education abroad, employment of expatriates, [and] advice and support from buyers." In 
addition, Van Lobberegt (2012: 25) articulates that "the cross-national transfer of innovations 
is explained by the extent to which firms in different countries compete with each other in the 
global economy . . . [and that] codes are more likely to be developed in countries that are 
more integrated in the global economy, experience higher levels of liberalisation, and receive 
more investment from foreign institutional investors." The core message of these two 
statements, both substantiated by empirical evidence, highlights exactly why this research 
aimed to alter the NIS theory in its classic form. Yet despite certain shortcomings, NIS 
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remains one of the most robust, dynamically-structured models for explaining a county's 
innovation output, especially considering the fact that most revolutionary innovations in the 
modern history have "relied largely on fluid communications among professionals and firms 
in each country" (LaPier 1998: 106). 
 
Perhaps the greatest mental preoccupation for me in hindsight of the research has been the 
reflection on how the research could have been conducted differently, and if the alternative 
approaches would have produced more legitimate results in the end.  Perhaps the biggest 
lesson learned throughout the journey was the fact that online data collection methods can be 
highly challenging in nature when implemented in social research. Access and validation 
both arose to be major obstacles in the way of analysing weblog content. Also, as it emerged 
during the latter stages of the data analysis phase, settling for a pre-approved interviewee 
population can sometimes produce inconsistent results, regardless of how carefully the 
participants may have been vetted in terms of qualifications and expertise, and of the design 
of the interview questions.  
 
It can be argued that the snowballing strategy employed to recruit the interviewees might 
have resulted in homogeneity of the consultants in terms of political views, although there 
was no solid proof of this, as data analysis showed that the participants' views were extremely 
diverse on nearly all counts. In order to avoid disciplinary bias, the interviewees were chosen 
equally from three distinct groups of scholars, journalists and activists. Extensive background 
checks were also conducted to shortlist only those experts with no known history of extremist 
conduct or radicalism. For instance, many potential candidates from the preliminary list were 
excluded due to concrete, publicly documented evidence of unconstructive response to the 
2009 post-election unrest such as inciting violence through encouraging backlash or calling 
for foreign military intervention. While this research does not claim methodological 
perfection, it can confirm that reasonable steps were taken in the sampling of the interviewees 
to avoid any potential distortion of the final results. If I were in hindsight to redesign this 
element of the methodology, I would have probably elected to identify and narrow down the 
informants through active screening, which would have enabled much higher degrees of 
ideological diversity, as well as helping to more robustly safeguard the integrity of the 
collected data. 
 
Looking back critically, there are many places where I would have conducted this research 
differently. First and foremost, not only I would have minimised the project's reliance on 
second-hand data either directly or by proxy (i.e. interviewees quoting media accounts), I 
would have also reduced the number of claims I was so highly tempted to make, placing 
instead the main emphasis on the empirical and theoretical qualification of the core 
arguments of the thesis. Moreover, I would have abstained from depending as much on online 
data by identifying and tapping into alternative, less limiting offline data streams, as well as 
having been more rigorous in both sampling and data interpretation processes. As with the 
expert interviews, I would have gone the extra mile to design a more robustly justified 
sampling process, in hope of producing more concrete results. But most importantly, I would 
have crafted more rigorous criteria for data analysis, and one that would allow sharper 
degrees of data triangulation. This would have been undoubtedly a major advantage in my 
search for deeper answers. With regards to the employed case studies, I would have dedicated 
a much larger ratio of my resources to study the Chinese NIS, which emerged in retrospect to 
hold more invaluable lessons compared to Ukraine for this research than I had previously 
anticipated. 
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Finally, the post-project reflections indicate to me that a scholarly researcher's personal 
beliefs and commitments can indeed influence the trajectory of an even well-designed 
research. While my background as an ex-local, Farsi speaking journalist and activist was 
crucial to my ability to undertake this PhD, my personal sentiments and aspirations proved at 
times to impose a limitation on, rather than providing a boost to, the authenticity of the 
results. In hindsight, I find each and every dilemma faced during the journey to have been an 
invaluable lesson in scholarly research, all of which have collectively helped me become 
better equipped for encountering any challenges that may arise in my future research 
endeavours. 
 
Innovation Processes and Political Movements: Ideas for Future Research 
 
This research suggests that a thorough, cross-border revision of NIS theory will not only 
extend its relevance to a greater part of the world, but will also help promote democracy 
around the world by addressing political barriers standing in the way of often highly talented 
cyber-activists' access to anti-censorship technologies. Further, it offers mechanisms for 
preventing regimes with poor track records on human rights from acquiring Western ICTs 
potentially useful in online censorship. This project was not able to establish a coherent 
relationship between CIS functionality and sociologically interrelated concepts such as 
political humour and viral qualities of modern communication. This was mainly due to a lack 
of time and funding, dictated by the conventional limitations of a full-time PhD programme. 
 
Researchers interested in further exploring the field are best advised to stay sufficiently 
critical, if not sceptical, of static, deterministic approaches. They should design and prioritise 
their core aims and objectives in strict accordance with available resources. It will be vital 
that they understand the perils of pre-conceived theoretical and methodological biases for the 
validity and practicality of the outcomes of their research. Also, while funding, access and 
validation continue to be hurdles in the way of researching the emergence and use of online 
technologies in repressive countries, working closely with influential Western stakeholders 
such as the European Parliament could help overcome such problems. 
 
Difficulty in gaining access to cyber-activists who often operate anonymously as well as an 
inability to penetrate into databases of governmental institutions both remained issues 
throughout this research. The latter is due to the secretive and intimidating nature of the 
Iranian regime, and the severe ethical complications that a hypothetical over-emphasis of the 
research design on retrieving guarded data could have imposed on this project. On the other 
hand, fluency in the Farsi language, as well as close familiarity with and direct knowledge of 
Iran's contextual realities proved to be invaluable to the successful completion of this thesis. 
 
As the hard-line core of Iran's political elite is being pushed back by a moderate and reformist 
coalition for the first time since the end of President Khatami's government in 2005, it will 
become increasingly possible for Western legislators and academics to understand bottom-up 
socio-technical practices employed by Iranian pro-democracy cyber-activists. Policy 
solutions work best when government officials in both source and destination countries are 
open to at least some degree of positive interaction with one another. With anti-extremist 
currents presently and coincidentally in charge of both Iran and the United States, the 
circumstances seem even more suitable for the European Union to weigh in as a potent 
liberalist force in favour of democratisation. In this light, major future research opportunities 
for STS scholars interested in the subjects of this thesis to engage in more in-depth 
exploration of the issues at hand, including the relationship between gender inequality and 
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innovation in dictatorial countries as well as empirical analyses of the influences of exiled 
diaspora communities on their homelands' online pro-democracy discourse via systematic 
online innovations. Well-timed studies can make a tangible difference to victims of political 
oppression across the globe. Goal-oriented, constructive cooperation among Western 
academic institutions and research centres, regardless of their disciplinary differences is 
highly recommended in order to accelerate democratic change in emerging economies. By 
establishing and expanding a dynamic, responsive interface between academia in its 
expanded sense and counter-censorship activism in autocratic states, it may be possible to 
introduce a new, collaborative framework capable of further utilising ICTs for democratic 
ends, and of better serving egalitarian developments everywhere. 
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Blog Analysis Questions 
 
1. What is the location of the blogger? 
2. What is the gender of the blogger? 
3. What is the main focus of the updates? 
4. Does the blogger use their outlet as a means to circulate protest/petition/strike calls? 
5. What level of computer literacy does the blogger exhibit? 
6. Does the blogger use their outlet as a means to share or obtain technical tips about 
countering the regime's repressive technology, such as how to bypass internet 
filtering, un-jam satellite TV signals, protect online identities, increase network 
security or launch hacking attacks on the websites associated with the regime's online 
police? 
7. How many regular contributors does each blog have? 
 
 
Analysed Blogs 
 
1. Blog title: Political Humour 
Blog address: http://tanze30ya30.blogfa.com 
Blog description as written by the author: This weblog belongs to no particular political 
personas or parties and is directly run by the enemy itself. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Unknown 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, religion and/or superstition, literature/poetry, 
regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, and technology in relation with 
filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: More than one (number unknown) 
 
 
2. Blog title: Political Humour: Jokes about Ahmadinejad and Khamenei 
Blog address: http://ba27.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, democratic movements in the Arab world, 
sex, religion and/or superstition, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance 
and/or network security, and regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
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3. Blog title: Arman Dekami (author's real name) 
Blog address: http://g791.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Religion and/or superstition, sports, economy and/or financial transparency 
and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, Green movement and/or its leaders, technology in relation 
with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, and regime's high-ranking officials 
and/or key institutions 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
4. Blog title: Alireza Rezaee (author's real name) 
Blog address: http://alirezarezaee1.blogspot.com and 
http://www.khodnevis.org/persian/author/alireza_rezaei 
Blog description as written by the author: This blog is just about humour. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: France 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement, democratic movements in the Arab world, sports, regime's 
high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, expatriate opposition parties and/or 
personalities, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights, and torture and/or 
violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
5. Blog title: Green Iran Forever 
Blog address: http://greeniranfrorever.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Toronto, Canada 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, religion and/or superstition, literature/poetry, 
and regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
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Question 7: One 
 
 
6. Blog title: Short Messages 
Blog address: http://tweatter.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Democratic movements in the Arab world, Green movement and/or its leaders, 
regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, expatriate opposition parties and/or 
personalities, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak 
incident, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights, women's rights and/or 
feminism, reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran, Valentines' day, and sports 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
7. Blog title: Gameron 
Blog address: http://gameron.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Nothing in the world is too holy to be critiqued. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Bandar Abbas, Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, religion and/or 
superstition, Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran, sex and/or porn, homosexuals' 
rights, capital punishment, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or 
network security, alcohol and/or drugs, Basij and/or Sundis, elections and/or referendum 
and/or military coup, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
8. Blog title: Mr. Asghar 
Blog address: http://www.asgharagha.com 
Blog description as written by the author: The first and longest-lasting expatriate journal 
since the foundation of Islam! 
 
Blog assessment: 
Question 1: London, UK 
Question 2: Male 
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Question 3: Literature and/or poetry, religion and/or superstition, sex and/or porn, election 
and/or referendum, Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or 
key institutions, reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran, political prisoners' and/or 
prisoners of conscience's rights, nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, and 
technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, foreign-
based satellite channels, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or 
subsidy cuts, and Basij and/or Sundis 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
 
 
9. Blog title: F. M. Sokhan (author's nickname) 
Blog address: http://www.fmsokhan.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Culture and/or arts, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance 
and/or network security, religion and/or superstition, regime's high-ranking officials and/or 
key institutions, sex and/or porn, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the 
Balatarin incident, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the 
Kahrizak incident, nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, capital punishment, 
political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights, literature and/or poetry, Basij 
and/or Sundis, and expatriate opposition parties/personalities 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
10. Blog title: Seyed Ebrahim Nabavi (author's real name) 
Blog address: http://www.enabavi.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Belgium 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, Green movement and/or 
its leaders, students' movement, culture and/or arts, and democratic movements in the Arab 
world 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
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11. Blog title: Nikahang Kowsar (author's real name) and Nikahang's Musings 
Blog address: http://www.khodnevis.org/persian/author/nikahang and 
http://nikahang.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Toronto, Canada 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, democratic movements in 
the Arab world, expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, Green movement and/or its 
leaders, culture and/or arts, Valentines' day, reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran, 
and torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
12. Blog title: Eghbal Mahoori (author's nickname) 
Blog address: http://www.khodnevis.org/persian/author/eghbaly 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, reformist parties and/or 
personalities inside Iran, religion and/or superstition, culture and/or arts, and Green 
movement and/or its leaders 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
13. Blog title: Mullah Piaz 
Blog address: http://www.khodnevis.org/persian/author/mullahpiaz and http://mullahpiaz.net 
Blog description as written by the author: Mullah Piaz (onion) lives in modern, troubled Iran. 
His constant struggle with new technologies and his absurd but logical philosophy make him 
the remote cousin of Dilbert and Mullah Nasreddin. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Unknown 
Question 3: Women's rights and/or feminism, religion and/or superstition, culture and/or arts, 
civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, democratic 
movements in the Arab world, capital punishment and sports 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
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Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
14. Blog title: Mehran (author's nickname) 
Blog address: http://www.khodnevis.org/persian/author/mehrancartoonist 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, democratic movements in 
the Arab world, Green movement and/or its leaders, religion and/or superstition, torture 
and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, reformist 
parties and/or personalities inside Iran, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's 
rights, Basij and/or Sundis, nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, and capital 
punishment 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
15. Blog title: Darush Ariaee (author's nickname), Uncensored, and Persia Royal 
Blog address: http://www.khodnevis.org/persian/author/darush , 
http://sansornashode.blogspot.com , and http://persiaroyal.blogspot.com  
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, religion 
and/or superstition, sports, expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, democratic 
movements in the Arab world, Basij and/or Sundis, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' 
systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, technology in relation with filtering and/or 
surveillance and/or network security, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's 
rights, human rights, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy 
cuts, and literature and/or poetry 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advanced 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
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16. Blog title: Mana Neyestani (author's real name) 
Blog address: http://zamaaneh.com/zamtoon/cat 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
Question 1: Malaysia 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak 
incident, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights, women's rights and/or 
feminism, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, Green 
movement and/or its leaders, culture and/or arts, and elections and/or referendum and/or 
military coup 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advanced 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
17. Blog title: Maatine 
Blog address: http://maatine.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Culture and/or arts, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, Green 
movement and/or its leaders, reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran, expatriate 
opposition parties and/or personalities, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty 
and/or subsidy cuts, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, 
and technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advanced 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
 
 
18. Blog title: Rain in the Half-opened Mouth 
Blog address: http://www.debsh.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Malaysia 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, sex and/or porn, culture and/or arts, literature and/or poetry, torture and/or 
violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, women's rights 
and/or feminism, and reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran 
Question 4: No 
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Question 5: Advanced 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
 
 
19. Blog title: In Between 
Blog address: http://andarmal.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Capital punishment, sex and/or porn, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, democratic movements in the Arab world, nuclear power and/or war on Iran 
and/or sanctions, Basij and/or Sundis, Sports, religion and/or superstition, economy and/or 
financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, torture and/or violence and/or 
detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, reformist parties and/or personalities 
inside Iran, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights, and Green movement 
and/or its leaders 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
20. Blog title: What Kind of a Country is This? 
Blog address: http://mamlekate.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: In search of a lost homeland 
 
And 
 
Blog title: What is Up Today? 
Blog address:  http://emroozchekhabar.blogspot.com  
Blog description as written by the author: All the authors are required to be wearing tuxedos 
while contributing to this weblog. 
 
Blog(s) assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Unknown 
Question 3: Sex and/or porn, Basij and/or Sundis, foreign-based satellite channels, sports, 
economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, torture and/or 
violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, democratic 
movements in the Arab world, expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, religion 
and/or superstition, culture and/or arts, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, 
literature and/or poetry, and political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Beginner 
Question 6: No 
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Question 7: Three 
 
 
21. Blog title: Our Future 
Blog address: http://ayandema.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Tehran is my Mecca, and this is my notebook. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Christ Church, New Zealand 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, democratic movements in the Arab world, torture and/or violence and/or 
detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, culture and/or arts, sex and/or porn, 
Basij and/or Sundis, and expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
22. Blog title: Tahkhand 
Blog address: http://tahkhand.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: A satirical weblog 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, democratic movements in the Arab world, reformist parties and/or personalities 
inside Iran, elections and/or referendum and/or military coup, torture and/or violence and/or 
detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, sex and/or porn, sports, Basij and/or 
Sundis, nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, economy and/or financial 
transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, and religion and/or superstition 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
23. Blog title: Today's Front Pages of Newspapers 
Blog address: http://safhehaval.blogspot.com and http://sepehr1970.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
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Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, Basij and/or Sundis, civil 
liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, and technology in relation 
with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
24. Blog title: Mr. Khosn in Exile 
Blog address: http://blog.hasanagha.org 
Blog description as written by the author: I am an apostate blogger who believes in atheism. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Oslo, Norway 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, democratic movements in 
the Arab world, capital punishment, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance 
and/or network security, religion and/or superstition, elections and/or referendum and/or 
military coup, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, 
nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' 
systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, culture and/or arts, human rights, and civil 
liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
 
 
25. Blog title: Prophet Yarou (War Be Upon Him!) 
Blog address: http://yaarou.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Religion and/or superstition, sex and/or porn, alcohol and/or drugs, technology in 
relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, regime's high-ranking 
officials and/or key institutions, homosexuals' rights, women's rights and/or feminism, 
literature and/or poetry, and Basij and/or Sundis 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Beginner 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
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26. Blog title: Facetious Sayings 
Blog address: http://www.hazl.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Any resemblances to real persons are by no means 
coincidental. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: California, USA 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Religion and/or superstition, culture and/or arts, Green movement and/or its 
leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, literature and/or poetry, 
democratic movements in the Arab world, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' 
systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, and capital punishment 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
27. Blog title: Samovar 
Blog address: http://samavar.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Motivated to create this weblog by my love for 
opium, I would like to dedicate it to the leader of the Islamic revolution Khamenei from the 
very south of my heart (somewhere near my colon). Having lived in exile since 1998, I long 
for a liberal and religion-free Iran, for I think religion is a strictly personal matter. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Expat, exact location unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, regime's high-ranking officials 
and/or key institutions, Green movement and/or its leaders, democratic movements in the 
Arab world, Basij and/or Sundis, literature and/or poetry, sex and/or porn, nuclear power 
and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, religion and/or superstition, alcohol and/or drugs, sports, 
elections and/or referendum and/or military coup, women's rights and/or feminism, torture 
and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, economy 
and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, and culture and/or arts 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
28. Blog title: Anti-dictator 
Blog address: http://zobin-cost.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
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Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak 
incident, sex and/or porn, nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, regime's high-
ranking officials and/or key institutions, economy and/or financial transparency and/or 
poverty and/or subsidy cuts, democratic movements in the Arab world, religion and/or 
superstition, and culture and/or arts 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Beginner 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
29. Blog title: Zekipedia 
Blog address: http://zekipedia.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Isfahan, Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Democratic movements in the Arab world, regime's high-ranking officials and/or 
key institutions, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak 
incident, religion and/or superstition, literature and/or poetry, economy and/or financial 
transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, sex and/or porn, human rights, civil liberties 
and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, Green movement and/or its 
leaders, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, and 
sports 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Beginner 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
30. Blog title: Brainless Monkey 
Blog address: http://brain-less.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: LA, United States 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, human rights, religion and/or 
superstition, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak 
incident, capital punishment, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin 
incident, Basij and/or Sundis, women's rights and/or feminism, sports, sex and/or porn, Green 
movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, and 
elections and/or referendum and/or military coup 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: Yes 
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Question 7: One 
 
 
31. Blog title: Talented Moron 
Blog address: http://talentedmoron.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Literature and/or poetry, Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-
ranking officials and/or key institutions, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the 
Balatarin incident, sports, religion and/or superstition, capital punishment, human rights, 
torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, culture 
and/or arts, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, 
alcohol and/or drugs, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy 
cuts, and nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
32. Blog title: Anger Flame, Shadow of Freedom and Democtatorship 
Blog address: http://anger-flame.blogspot.com , http://freedom-sayeh.blogspot.com and 
http://democtatori.blogspot.com  
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, expatriate opposition 
parties and/or personalities, religion and/or superstition, Green movement and/or its leaders, 
democratic movements in the Arab world, economy and/or financial transparency and/or 
poverty and/or subsidy cuts, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or 
the Kahrizak incident, students' movement, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of 
conscience's rights, Basij and/or Sundis, human rights, nuclear power and/or war on Iran 
and/or sanctions, elections and/or referendum and/or military coup, civil liberties and 
freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, culture and/or arts, and capital 
punishment 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
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33. Blog title: Sight 
Blog address: http://tanzir-balatarin.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: This is where I share my insights about my 
surrounding issues, giving them a chance to be critiqued. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, Green movement and/or 
its leaders, religion and/or superstition, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic 
rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty 
and/or subsidy cuts, culture and/or arts, foreign-based satellite channels, sex and/or porn, 
Basij and/or Sundis, human rights, women's rights and/or feminism, and political prisoners' 
and/or prisoners of conscience's rights 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
34. Blog title: Of Cowardice 
Blog address: http://bozdelaneh.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, nuclear power and/or war 
on Iran and/or sanctions, Basij and/or Sundis, economy and/or financial transparency and/or 
poverty and/or subsidy cuts, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or 
the Kahrizak incident, Green movement and/or its leaders, democratic movements in the 
Arab world, reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran, political prisoners' and/or 
prisoners of conscience's rights, capital punishment, sex and/or porn, culture and/or arts, 
religion and/or superstition, literature and/or poetry, and technology in relation with filtering 
and/or surveillance and/or network security 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
35. Blog title: Serious Humour 
Blog address: http://werraj.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
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Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, Basij and/or Sundis, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape 
and/or the Kahrizak incident, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or 
subsidy cuts, sports, religion and/or superstition, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press 
and/or the Balatarin incident, literature and/or poetry, and capital punishment 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
36. Blog title: Amjadiyeh 
Blog address: http://amjadiyeh1900.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, democratic movements in the Arab world, 
torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, 
regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, expatriate opposition parties and/or 
personalities, Basij and/or Sundis, sports, and capital punishment 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
37. Blog title: Basiji Jokes 
Blog address: http://basijoks1.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, Basij and/or Sundis, 
nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, democratic movements in the Arab world, 
Green movement and/or its leaders, religion and/or superstition, and torture and/or violence 
and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
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38. Blog title: Dambooli's Musings: Everything from Everywhere 
Blog address: http://dambooli.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Dealing with thousands of unanswered questions, I 
am currently looking for myself. Until a few years ago, I was so religious that never missed a 
single prayer. I used to listen to the words of the local mosque's Imam so carefully that they 
would become tattooed in my brain. I would fast every Ramadan, as well as attending all 
religious ceremonies throughout the year. This all was the case until I began thinking for 
myself, which I have realised is what the preachers of all major religions work hard to stop 
one from doing. They say: "listen only to us if you want to go to heaven, and never question 
our ways, as it is exactly what Satan wants." I am at the moment studying religions, and the 
more I read, the less religious I become. Unfortunately, I have often found the unreligious to 
be much more sensible as compared to the religious. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Tehran, Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Basij and/or Sundis, elections and/or referendum and/or military coup, regime's 
high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, democratic movements in the Arab world, 
human rights, capital punishment, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape 
and/or the Kahrizak incident, religion and/or superstition, foreign-based satellite channels, 
Green movement and/or its leaders, women's rights and/or feminism, reformist parties and/or 
personalities inside Iran, sex and/or porn, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or 
the Balatarin incident, and children's rights 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
39. Blog title: Iran's Green movement 
Blog address: http://irangreenrevolution.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: The Iranian people's Green Movement for 
democracy and freedom 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, democratic movements in the Arab world, expatriate opposition parties and/or 
personalities, women's rights and/or feminism, children's rights, civil liberties and freedom of 
speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran, 
torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, Basij 
and/or Sundis, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights, capital punishment, 
human rights, and foreign-based satellite channels 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
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40. Blog title: Iran Got Ruined 
Blog address: http://hamid.thepersianland.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Just another weblog in the land of Persia 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Sex and/or porn, literature and/or poetry, religion and/or superstition, regime's 
high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, Basij and/or Sundis, women's rights and/or 
feminism, culture and/or arts, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights, and 
torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
41. Blog title: Dude 
Blog address: http://melisagodwin.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: I have no wish but freedom. Every time a fellow 
Iranian is killed, humour dies in me all over again, and the smile is wiped off my face, giving 
its place to a bitter and poisonous frown. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: USA 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, women's rights and/or feminism, religion and/or superstition, civil liberties and 
freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, sex and/or porn, literature and/or 
poetry, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, and 
economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
42. Blog title: Green Man 
Blog address: http://sabzemard.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, 
democratic movements in the Arab world, capital punishment, religion and/or superstition, 
  
218 
torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, 
political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights, reformist parties and/or 
personalities inside Iran, sports, and women's rights and/or feminism 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
43. Blog title: Vision is the Truth 
Blog address: http://visionisthetruth2.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Tehran, Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, religion and/or superstition, reformist parties 
and/or personalities inside Iran, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the 
Balatarin incident, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the 
Kahrizak incident, sex and/or porn, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, 
expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, technology in relation with filtering and/or 
surveillance and/or network security, women's rights and/or feminism, capital punishment, 
culture and/or arts, democratic movements in the Arab world, and foreign-based satellite 
channels 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
44. Blog title: Green Alliance 
Blog address: http://ettehadesabz.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: I am a secular and liberal green. Green, for me, is 
a symbol of unification against the fascistic regime in Iran, and does not represent Islamist 
reformists who only believe in minor democratic changes. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Tehran, Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, democratic movements in the Arab world, reformist parties and/or personalities 
inside Iran, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, 
literature and/or poetry, culture and/or arts, religion and/or superstition, and technology in 
relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
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45. Blog title: Green Movement: We Are Countless 
Blog address: http://nehzatsabz5.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Once upon a time we stood up to get our votes 
back. But now we are determined to reclaim no less than our well-deserved right to freedom. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Tehran, Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, students' movement, culture and/or arts, 
literature and/or poetry, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, elections 
and/or referendum and/or military coup, capital punishment, expatriate opposition parties 
and/or personalities, reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran, Basij and/or Sundis, 
torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, and 
religion and/or superstition 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
46. Blog title: Qom's Green Movement 
Blog address: http://greenqom.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Qom, Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, democratic movements in the Arab world, technology in relation with filtering 
and/or surveillance and/or network security, culture and/or arts, Basij and/or Sundis, 
Valentines' day, religion and/or superstition, literature and/or poetry, reformist parties and/or 
personalities inside Iran, and torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or 
the Kahrizak incident 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
 
 
47. Blog title: Green Musings 
Blog address: http://worldqress.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Today's interesting news and pictures 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
  
220 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, democratic movements in 
the Arab world, religion and/or superstition, culture and/or arts, technology in relation with 
filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, Basij and/or Sundis, economy and/or 
financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, capital punishment, and foreign-
based satellite channels 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
 
 
48. Blog title: Senaps 
Blog address: http://senaps.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Analysis of Iran's daily issues 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Culture and/or arts, religion and/or superstition, and economy and/or financial 
transparency 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
49. Blog title: Balagari 
Blog address: http://balagari.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Waiting for you 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Tehran, Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Culture and/or arts, religion and/or superstition, economy and/or financial 
transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, torture and/or violence and/or 
detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, technology in relation with filtering 
and/or surveillance and/or network security, women's rights and/or feminism, Green 
movement and/or its leaders, democratic movements in the Arab world, capital punishment, 
civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, nuclear power and/or 
war on Iran and/or sanctions, and Basij and/or Sundis 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
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50. Blog title: Hollywood 
Blog address: http://hollywoodweblog.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Shiraz, Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Culture and/or arts, literature and/or poetry, technology in relation with filtering 
and/or surveillance and/or network security, students' movement, torture and/or violence 
and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, regime's high-ranking officials 
and/or key institutions, nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, sports, sex and/or 
porn, religion and/or superstition, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty 
and/or subsidy cuts, Basij and/or Sundis, and political prisoners' and/or prisoners of 
conscience's rights 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
 
 
51. Blog title: Mir Ali Sabzineh (author's nickname) 
Blog address: http://miralisabzineh3.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Every day, I think about what I am capable of 
doing for the Green resistance of Iran. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Tehran, Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, women's rights and/or feminism, capital punishment, economy and/or financial 
transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of 
conscience's rights, reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran, nuclear power and/or 
war on Iran and/or sanctions, expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, torture and/or 
violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, Basij and/or Sundis, 
religion and/or superstition, and sex and/or porn 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
52. Blog title: Mullah Hassani 
Blog address: http://mollah.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Toronto, Canada 
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Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, 
democratic movements in the Arab world, religion and/or superstition, regime's high-ranking 
officials and/or key institutions, Basij and/or Sundis, expatriate opposition parties and/or 
personalities, Green movement and/or its leaders, elections and/or referendum and/or military 
coup, capital punishment, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the 
Kahrizak incident, and sports 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
53. Blog title: Khan Gor's Musings 
Blog address: http://khangor.blogsky.com  and http://khangor.blogfa.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Responsibility has nothing to do with ability; it is 
instead a product of awareness and ethicality. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Mazandaran, Iran 
Question 2: Female 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, technology in relation 
with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, economy and/or financial 
transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press 
and/or the Balatarin incident, religion and/or superstition, torture and/or violence and/or 
detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, and sports 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
54. Blog title: Land of Iran 
Blog address: http://persiatazmin.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Heartfelt scribbles of a brain-dead 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, elections and/or 
referendum and/or military coup, students' movement, torture and/or violence and/or 
detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, sex and/or porn, nuclear power 
and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, and Basij and/or Sundis 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
  
223 
55. Blog title: Moghilan Tree's Thorn 
Blog address: http://naiem.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Irritating nonsense from a rotten mind 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Australia 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, human 
rights, capital punishment, religion and/or superstition, democratic movements in the Arab 
world, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, 
torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, sports, 
Basij and/or Sundis, nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, literature and/or 
poetry, culture and/or arts, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or 
subsidy cuts, expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, political prisoners' and/or 
prisoners of conscience's rights, and reformist parties and/or personalities inside Iran 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
56. Blog title: Other Side of the World 
Blog address: http://onvaredonya.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Denmark is a small country with a very few Iranian 
citizens as compared to its neighbourhood countries like Sweden and Germany. We, 
therefore, have a harder time making the world aware of our political activities. Wheels are, 
nevertheless, in motion here and we are hoping that our activities would be appreciated by 
the resistance movement inside Iran. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Copenhagen, Denmark 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, torture and/or violence 
and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, religion and/or superstition, 
capital punishment, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, 
culture and/or arts, literature and/or poetry, women's rights and/or feminism, democratic 
movements in the Arab world, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or 
network security, nuclear power and/or war on Iran and/or sanctions, students' movement, 
and Basij and/or Sundis 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
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57. Blog title: World of Humour 
Blog address: http://hosseinpooya.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: I have been writing satirical poems and plays for 
over past twenty years, during which I have been a dedicated supporter of the National 
Council of Resistance of Iran NCRI). I fight for subversion of the theocratic regime and 
empowerment of a secular republic in Iran. 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: London, England 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, Basij and/or Sundis, 
literature and/or poetry, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy 
cuts, democratic movements in the Arab world, technology in relation with filtering and/or 
surveillance and/or network security, culture and/or arts, nuclear power and/or war on Iran 
and/or sanctions, Green movement and/or its leaders, capital punishment, torture and/or 
violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, elections and/or 
referendum and/or military coup, foreign-based satellite channels, and reformist parties 
and/or personalities inside Iran 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: No 
 
 
58. Blog title: Uncle Changiz 
Blog address: http://www.bipfa.com/amoo-changiz 
Blog description as written by the author: Don't be scared of my presence, all I'm bringing 
with me is loneliness. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, 
capital punishment, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, economy and/or 
financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, religion and/or superstition, 
women's rights and/or feminism, democratic movements in the Arab world, Basij and/or 
Sundis, sex and/or porn, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the 
Kahrizak incident, human rights, civil liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the 
Balatarin incident, and Valentines' day 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
 
 
59. Blog title: Rebellious 
Blog address: http://fetnegar01.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: I hope to be able to serve freedom of speech by 
contributing to this weblog. 
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Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Capital punishment, religion and/or superstition, regime's high-ranking officials 
and/or key institutions, elections and/or referendum and/or military coup, human rights, 
political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights, torture and/or violence and/or 
detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, technology in relation with filtering 
and/or surveillance and/or network security, Basij and/or Sundis, democratic movements in 
the Arab world, Green movement and/or its leaders, culture and/or arts, foreign-based 
satellite channels, and sports 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: Yes 
Question 7: One 
 
 
60. Blog title: Annamaz 
Blog address: http://annamaz.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: Annamaz is a Turkish word meaning idiot. I am an 
idiot, because I don't understand people, the logic behind their behaviours, and their habitual 
misunderstanding of things. This is a place where I write my daily confusions. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, democratic movements in 
the Arab world, religion and/or superstition, women's rights and/or feminism, culture and/or 
arts, Basij and/or Sundis, capital punishment, technology in relation with filtering and/or 
surveillance and/or network security, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty 
and/or subsidy cuts, and sex and/or porn 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
61. Blog title: Hidden Sense 
Blog address: http://chinejan.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, democratic movements in 
the Arab world, Green movement and/or its leaders, reformist parties and/or personalities 
inside Iran, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak 
incident, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, Basij 
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and/or Sundis, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network 
security, culture and/or arts, political prisoners' and/or prisoners of conscience's rights, 
religion and/or superstition, and expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Intermediate 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
62. Blog title: Sober, the Little Prophet 
Blog address: http://marooned9.blogfa.com and http://marooned9.blogspot.com  
Blog description as written by the author: Ivan Ilyich is thrown in jail; they broke his violin 
too; but all his family does is bragging about being related to him. 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, reformist parties and/or 
personalities inside Iran, religion and/or superstition, culture and/or arts, sports, Basij and/or 
Sundis, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak 
incident, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or network security, 
expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, democratic movements in the Arab world, 
economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, Green movement 
and/or its leaders, and sex and/or porn 
Question 4: No 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
63. Blog title: Iran Lover 
Blog address: http://ashegiran.blogspot.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Unknown 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, regime's high-ranking officials and/or key 
institutions, religion and/or superstition, Basij and/or Sundis, ethnic/religious minorities' 
rights, culture and/or arts, technology in relation with filtering and/or surveillance and/or 
network security, and torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the 
Kahrizak incident 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
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64. Blog title: Superstition and Broken Clock Hands 
Blog address: http://khorafe.blogspot.com and http://mehdiyaghoubi38.blogspot.com  
Blog description as written by the author: After the tyrant, it will be time for the oppressed to 
speak out. 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Expatriate (exact location unknown) 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or subsidy cuts, 
regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, religion and/or superstition, sports, 
women's rights and/or feminism, labourers' rights, students' movement, Basij and/or Sundis, 
torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak incident, sex 
and/or porn, expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, literature and/or poetry, civil 
liberties and freedom of speech/press and/or the Balatarin incident, democratic movements in 
the Arab world, capital punishment, ethnic/religious minorities' rights, and culture and/or arts 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
 
 
65. Blog title: Dried Whey 
Blog address: http://kashkmyblog.wordpress.com 
Blog description as written by the author: none 
 
Blog assessment: 
 
Question 1: Iran 
Question 2: Male 
Question 3: Green movement and/or its leaders, democratic movements in the Arab world, 
regime's high-ranking officials and/or key institutions, reformist parties and/or personalities 
inside Iran, torture and/or violence and/or detainees' systematic rape and/or the Kahrizak 
incident, labourers' rights, economy and/or financial transparency and/or poverty and/or 
subsidy cuts, foreign-based satellite channels, religion and/or superstition, Basij and/or 
Sundis, sports, culture and/or arts, expatriate opposition parties and/or personalities, literature 
and/or poetry, and human rights 
Question 4: Yes 
Question 5: Advance 
Question 6: No 
Question 7: One 
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Interview Scripts 
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Dr. Alexander Dawoody (31 Aug 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and the cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
The power struggle between the regime and cyber activists in Iran today is no longer a 
frontline issue because of the manipulation of regime forces on most social networking and 
its near control of ICT in Iran. The utility of petro-dollar to purchase sophisticated software 
from companies, such as Nokia or domestically-manufactured technologies that can monitor 
and control communication, and forcing citizens to purchase only government-approved 
electronic devices or exchange those they had with newly-government issued 
telecommunication medium had paralyzed the opposition's ability to mobilise while using 
ICT as an effective medium. Except for the wide use of Iranian Diaspora for such means, the 
interconnectedness between citizens within Iran and with Iranian abroad in issues related to 
confronting the regime is very limited. 
 
 
2. What is the contribution of the government/IRGC-owned companies and institutions 
(i.e. universities) to the development of the Iranian regime's censorship/surveillance 
infrastructure? 
 
A great deal. Such contributions had strengthened—at least for now—the regime's stronghold 
on power and caused great damage to democratic mobilisation and town hall-types of cyber 
meetings. Such pre-emptive strategy at the aftermath of the Green Movement is a lesson to 
other movements that intend to utilise ICT as an opposition means for popular expression and 
demonstration of criticism of unpopular policies or political platforms. It also forces 
researchers to retool in order to better remedy such defects and envision new developments in 
the cyber frontier in order to counter-balance reactionary regimes' attempts to circumvent the 
effectiveness of ICT as a mass communication device, especially for democratic movements 
confronting unpopular policies. One of such innovations, perhaps, is to increase orbited 
satellites that can offset the function of tyrannical cyber injections, and enable citizens to 
connect through global cyber balloons when other forums of networking are censored or shut 
down. 
 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
With worldwide boycotting of Nokia for its role in supporting the Iranian regime in censoring 
its citizens, the regime was able to overcome Nokia's reluctance to honour full participation 
by forcing researchers and universities in Iran itself to produce such devices that can do the 
job—let us call such devices tyrannical cyber injects, or TCI. Although TCI are currently 
effective in helping the regime in suppressing its populace, the shift may tilt as global 
awareness demands new innovation in order to maintain an active link in support of human 
rights and democracy between ICT and cyber activists. 
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4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
NSN has caused the case of democracy in Iran and the world a great damage for being the 
pathfinder in establishing TCI. Such companies—at least their leadership—ought to be 
accountable for their action not only in the court of public opinion but in international 
criminal courts. Yes, some may argue that NSN's contract with the Iranian regime was legal 
within the international business framework. This has to change, especially when regimes 
such as Iran are facing global sanctions. Businesses no longer can divorce profit from ethics 
and they have to balance between profitability at all costs, which is a form of piracy, and with 
that of responsible and ethically-driven conduct. The Iranian regime learned from NSN and 
adapted its technology in creating its own domestic form of TCI. Thus, NSN cannot escape 
the judgment of history in supporting the Iranian regime in its attempt to censor its citizens 
and end all forms of opposition. 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
New laws must be adapted that can focus on the following: 
 
 Penalising companies such as NSN who do business with tyrannical regimes and 
support the suppression of opposition movements or any form of expression. 
 
 Rewarding innovations and companies that clearly support democratic aspirations, 
human rights and ethics in business. 
 
 Providing funding through loans, grants, and donations for researches aimed to further 
develop ICT to continue become a viable tool in civic mobility and actions. 
 
 Boycotting, criminalising, and sanctioning all business, researches, and technologies 
associated with regimes that censor citizens and enforce tyrannical forms of 
governance against the will of the people. 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
 
There is a return now in Iran to a traditional form of mass communication among activists 
that utilises small neighbourhood-linked units. The problem with this is that it is too slow, too 
isolated, and too easy to intercept by regime forces. The lack of political leadership at the 
opposition adds to the dilemma and leaves anti-regime forces with continuous circulation 
between despair, hopelessness, looking to the west for an answer or rescue, or surrendering 
with contempt to the unpopular regime in hope of internal fractions within regime camp that 
can capitalised on for further development. 
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7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists? 
 
Reality is the mother of all inventions. There is no one particular source and most software 
used by Iranian cyber-activists are home-made and still lack sophistication to create effective 
networks. This is where global innovations can help in enabling such network through space 
ballooning without necessarily having special devices and software available to link with 
them. 
 
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
 
Remarkably, Iranian women are taking the lead in such activities and presenting themselves 
as experts in finding ways to offset regime offenses through modest, yet determined and 
continually developing technological solutions to TCI. Especially among them are those 
educated abroad. The irony, though, even with these leaders' level of expertise, they remain 
localised because of lack of access to sophisticated technological mediums. This may change 
as the solutions that they are adapting are increasingly becoming more adaptive. 
 
 
Any further comments? 
 
ICT is a new frontier in popular movement. It is responsible for the birth of the Global 
Participant Observer (GPO) and the interconnectedness between people beyond place or 
particularities. ICT, however, has its many weaknesses and side effects. Among those are the 
reduction in traditional human/social contacts, increased reliance on technology instead of 
other scientific explorations and human networking, an increase in individualism at the 
expense of communal sprit, and saturation of information at the expense of vigorous research 
and without means to separate between facts from fictions. This is why it was easy for 
regimes such as that in Iran to manipulate these weaknesses in ICT for its own advantage. 
ICT and cyber-activism must not relinquish traditional communal and human contacts and 
use ICT only as a support mechanism to broadcast suppressed voices to the world and 
maintain internal dynamics. The lessons from the Egyptian and Syrian revolutions ought to 
be admired. When the Mubarak regime used the same techniques as the Iranian regime is 
doing now in utilising TCI, opposition forces in Egypt did not surrender to the enforced 
reality. Instead, they maintained their network through small community units and vigil 
committees while bridging through mass demonstrations that refused to give up public space. 
In Syria the same was true and the public space—squares, streets and neighbourhoods—
remained filled with demonstrators on daily basis despite massive regime crack down. The 
opposition remained peaceful for many months, and only when solders defected, armed 
struggles begun in order to protect these demonstrators against regime attacks. 
 
Cyber revolution alone will never work. This is the mistake of Iran's opposition movement. 
The human presence and voice in the public space must remain defying tyranny in order to 
make a difference. Only the genuine human voice can be heard, not an electronic version of 
it. The cyber voice can easily be manipulated, changed or censored. At best, it is nothing but 
an echo of the human voice. Nevertheless, it is an echo that is effective and can reach far 
beyond and prevent complete silence when popular movements are crushed. Assad's father 
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massacred an entire city in 1982 and he was able to get away with it. No one remained alive 
to witness it and speak out against it, at least no one with a true human decency or conscious 
inside regime forces. Today, however, his son cannot get away with his crimes. ICT made it 
impossible for such crimes to go silent into the night. When Assad's henchmen kill innocent 
Syrian women and children, the next day the whole world is aware of it. They may not do 
much as global politics still seems to be entangled there while hundreds of thousands are 
been killed in cold blood, but at least history is a witness with both recorded images and 
sound. The cyber activists in Iran ought to learn from Egypt and Syria. Although each place 
has its particularity, tyranny, however, has one common thing: it must be confronted each and 
every day, in every opportunity, every space, and with every means. 
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Dr. Babak Rahimi (30 Aug 2012) 
 
1.  
2. 1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and the cyber-activists in Iran? 
3.  
Mostly government infrastructures but also certain news sites that may be critical of Iranian 
government.  
 
 
2. What is the contribution of the government/IRGC-owned companies and institutions 
(i.e. universities) to the development of the Iranian regime's censorship/surveillance 
infrastructure?   
 
We have to distinguish IRGC's private sector and intelligence units within the paramilitary 
force. It is the latter that are in charge of censorship/surveillance infrastructure. 
 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
Since 2010, they have most likely borrowed or copied surveillance technology from Nokia-
Siemens Networks and Chinese companies. 
 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
It played a role in the 2009 elections, but since 2010, Iranian surveillance regime has become 
more domestic-based. 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
Prohibiting the sale and intelligence sharing of any computer-related technology that could be 
used for surveillance purposes. 
 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions?  
 
VPNs. Widespread and relatively inexpensive.  
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7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists?   
 
Most likely imported from outside of Iran, produced by American and European companies. 
 
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor?   
 
The differences between local and expat are largely a matter of network ties offline, but 
online is a different matter as the boundaries between outside and inside Iran are broken 
down between the activists. Yes, gender and age play a critical role. It has to do with 
generational changes in lifestyle and everyday practices, with technology playing a central 
role. 
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Elahe Boghrat (13 Sep 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
Clearly, the regime has more power to disrupt and censor in the virtual world compared to the 
protesters. On the other hand, as online activism—at least for now—does not usually lead to 
torture and violent death, cyber activists and human rights advocates have been able to 
employ modern tools such as social networks and hacking attacks to a considerably useful 
extent. 
 
 
2. What is the contribution of the government/IRGC-owned companies and institutions 
(i.e. universities) to the development of the Iranian regime's censorship/surveillance 
infrastructure? 
 
There is no doubt that the above entities altogether spend billions on complex technological 
infrastructures to sniff [out] and neutralise online dissent. Therefore, the more the protesters 
turn to the internet as a means of political activism, the more funds and human resources will 
be required by the regime to fight back. This is indeed challenging for the government given 
the on-going economic sanctions imposed on it by the west. Under such circumstances, the 
only option left would be for the regime to take a more radical, North-Korean-style 
censorship approach, which is exactly why it is now speaking of replacing the internet with a 
'halal' (filth-free) network. But even this looks currently far from feasible due to the sanctions 
and gradual collapse of the country's economy. The regime is now forced to a point where it 
has to prioritise its expenses and online censorship is being pushed back in the queue by the 
more vital—and extremely costly—operations such as street crackdowns nationwide and 
various secret governmental projects. 
 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
The regime itself always insists to convince everyone that they are entirely independent and 
reliant on in-house scientists and scientific innovations. That is while not even the technology 
but often the technicians the government speaks of are rented from the west either lawfully or 
illegally. Of course, there are also some Iranian scientists working in the area, as even the 
imported—or in many cases smuggled—knowledge or equipment need to be handled by 
experts and will be wasted otherwise. 
 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
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Corporations are not founded on humanitarian grounds and are not there to simply help the 
democratisation process in underdeveloped countries! Instead, their main goal is always 
generating profit, and the identity of the buyer doesn't really play a role in their big business 
decisions. 
 
The only time such companies may avoid transacting with dubious entities is when they are 
pressurised by their governments—which hardly happens in democratic countries—or by 
their people in such a fierce way that they see the deal as a serious long-term threat to their 
overall business—e.g. boycotts in the overcrowded Middle-Eastern markets, hefty fines, etc. 
At any rate, the Iranian regime's extensive relations with foreign companies show the 
emptiness of their self-reliance claims! 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
Due to legal complications caused by complete independence of many Western trading 
companies from their respective governments, neither the individual governments nor the EU 
can really force any companies into or out of business with anyone. All they can do, 
therefore, is to advise them on the consequences and hope for such advice to be reflected in 
their business decisions. 
 
Sanctions, however, work completely differently. When it comes to sanctions, corporations 
are simply forced to abide by the rules or else they will have to face the consequences. The 
fact that even Iran's Supreme Leader has recently called the sanctions "sadistic" shows how 
seriously such efforts—again, despite the regime's independence claims—have hit the 
country's economy, particularly the government's financial resources. The embedment of 
ICT-related knowledge and equipment into these sanctions can cause the regime many big 
troubles. 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
 
Anti-filtering software, along with the fluid/viral nature of online activism, can certainly help 
the opposition movement to sustain. However, I personally find satellite radio and TV more 
effective on the country's socio-political discourse. This is mainly due to the mainstream 
Iranian public's lack of access to either the internet or sufficient technical knowledge to help 
them make proper use of it. 
 
 
7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists?  
 
I am not aware of the identity of those involved in the development of such software. But 
these tools have always found their way to the Iranian netizens, assisting the growth of a 
democratic culture within them. Unfortunately—due to politically-motivated censorship on 
the regime side—the internet is widely viewed among Iranians as an exclusively political 
instrument and there is hardly any elaboration done on its social, cultural and economical 
influences, or even its negative impacts on certain things! 
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8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
 
Naturally, expat Iranian activists are more successful in establishing a dialogue with their 
audience as compared to their native counterparts, due to [the] liberal nature of the Western 
countries where most of them reside. With regards to age and gender, while I'm sure they are 
quite influential, I can't say much as there are no scientific surveys or statistics published on 
this specific issue. 
 
 
Any further comments? 
 
Given what we have been through, and regardless of our geographical location, we Iranians 
tend to react rather emotionally—instead of rationally—to certain events both in the online 
and offline worlds. Therefore, I, for one, take the Iranian online political scene for what it is 
and refuse to make more of it than I believe I should. This opinion is formed particularly 
based on my experiences as a professional journalist with the internet over the past five years. 
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Dr. James Fielder (30 Aug 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
My assessment is that cyber-activists have leaned significantly more towards social networks 
rather than hacking. Maintaining reliable communication channels appears more important, 
and the hacking that's employed is used to evade censors rather than to carry out offensive 
attacks. Social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook are particularly useful in that 
they allow users to broadcast real time information to thousands, particularly expatriates and 
outside audiences. 
 
 
2. What is the contribution of the government/IRGC-owned companies and institutions 
(i.e. universities) to the development of the Iranian regime's censorship/surveillance 
infrastructure? 
 
In truth, in my research I never found specific development links to the IRGC or Iranian 
universities. As researchers worldwide say: gads, I'd better go Google that real quickly and 
make myself look smart! 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
Iran is largely self-sufficient. Speaking broadly, Iran, in my experience, has been fairly 
successful at producing a wide variety of defence-related materiel despite the long-term 
embargo, particularly small arms, aircraft parts and even the Zulfiqar tank. Even with an 
embargo, Iran has access to significant resources and [the] resilience of a mixed economy, in 
contrast to oil rentier states such as Saudi Arabia.  In addition to embargo limitations, Iran 
also seeks self-reliance in order to avoid risks associated with foreign company software 
security holes, particularly deliberately installed backdoors. 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
NSN in particular claims to have only provided cell phone-tapping capability. In 2009, ONI 
reported that US company Secure Computing provided Iran filtering software, based on 
electronic forensics, but the company denied doing so. I have some sympathy for the 
companies, in that their primary mission is to sell products. Altruism sounds good, but is bad 
for the balance sheet!  In addition, should ICT companies be held liable for how regimes use 
legally purchased products? That's a question I can't answer. I'd personally be in a moral 
quandary if I were working for a company that made all decisions solely on sales with little 
regard for ethical decisions. 
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5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
In contrast to the layers of profit/ethical issues discussed previously, purposeful evasion of 
multilateral sanctions is a different matter. In those cases, the companies in question should 
be held accountable for contracts made after sanctions are placed. Some observers may argue 
that international legislative bodies lack sufficient enforcement capabilities, and the efficacy 
of sanctions suffers when states don't cooperate. That said, I assess that international forums 
are the best place for states to come to unified agreement. Thus, while the European 
Parliament may lack direct coercive authority, it—and other IGOs—can apply incredible 
political influence that ultimately pressures states to toe policy lines. 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
 
Activists typically use VPN connections, specific tools such as the TOR network, BitTorrent, 
and Simurgh, and other various proxy servers to evade censorship (both blocking and 
surveillance).  I underline "various" since Simurgh is technically a proxy software program 
created in Iran. However, there are a variety of hardware and software proxy server solutions 
such as CC Proxy and EZ Proxy. I even once experimented with an embeddable html proxy 
script—the file name escapes me.  Basically, the only practical and reliable method to evade 
Iran's censorship regime is through an unblocked proxy server. It becomes a game of cat and 
mouse between the activists and the regime, with the activists finding or building new proxies 
as Iran's Ministry of Communications and Information Technology sniffs them out.  
 
 
7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists?  
 
With the exception of Simurgh, anti-censorship/surveillance software is Western-made; at 
least, Simurgh is the only home grown product I'm aware of. In addition to software, activists 
can access overseas hardware proxies directly, typically through a simple web or numerical 
IP address. Numerical addresses are often more reliable, as they don't trip keyword filters. 
My understanding is that numerical IP proxies eventually fail once censors identify increased 
traffic to and from the address. 
 
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
 
I think expat influences are grossly overlooked; indeed, I saw it as a weakness in my own 
dissertation! Expats serve two primary functions: as information sources for local activists 
and as broadcasters to overseas audiences. I also assess that the link between urban locals and 
expats are more crucial than links between urban and rural locals. A vigorous information 
pipeline depends on not only a robust network but also educated and savvy users, both of 
which are more likely in urban centres. I definitely assess that younger users are more likely 
to be cyber-activists, again particularly well-educated urbanites. For younger users, the 1979 
revolution is, at the very least, a dim memory. Indeed, [for] those my age (late 30s) the 
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horrors of the Iran-Iraq War probably carries greater emotional weight.  As for even younger 
users, they have no personal knowledge of either event.  Thus, younger users are less likely to 
have an emotional stake in the revolution.  Moreover, having grown up with increased ICT 
access, I assess younger users are more likely to be ICT savvy than older cohorts. I also 
assess that both young men and women are equally likely to engage in cyber activism, 
particular in urban areas.  In addition to less ICT in rural areas, I also assess greater 
conservatism and fewer educational opportunities create larger age and gender cleavages. 
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Dr. Jed Crandall (03 Sep 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
I think social networking can be a powerful tool for social change, but only if the people 
using social networking sites are protected in terms of their anonymity. Unfortunately, with 
weaknesses in the Certificate Authority system it's no longer the case that activists can know 
for sure that they're talking directly to, e.g., Facebook or Gmail's servers when they use the 
internet. The government could be using man-in-the-middle attacks to steal their username 
and password and then monitor their activities and tie particular people to specific social 
media posts. Without a basic level of trust, it becomes difficult for activists to use social 
media sites outside the country. I don't have any specific comments about politically 
motivated hacking attacks. 
 
 
2. What is the contribution of the government/IRGC-owned companies and institutions 
(i.e. universities) to the development of the Iranian regime's censorship/surveillance 
infrastructure? 
 
I don't know anything specific about this other than what I've read in the media and heard 
from others, the main thing being that Western companies built a centralised routing 
infrastructure for Iran where they can observe and manipulate any international traffic in 
fairly advanced ways. 
 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
Again, I don't have any specific information about this. I think the Iranian government has 
demonstrated some serious innovation in terms of making the best use of the capabilities they 
have. Attacking the Certificate Authority system was a huge blow to those who are fighting 
for human rights in Iran, in my opinion, because the basic level of trust on the internet that 
you're really talking to a particular Western company and not to someone in the middle when 
you use the internet basically fell apart. 
 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
I only know that they reportedly built the system in Tehran that is used as a chokepoint for 
the internet, and that this chokepoint is critical because it makes man-in-the-middle attacks 
relatively easy to implement. Few other countries have that kind of capability. 
 
  
242 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
I don't necessarily advocate government interference on the internet or in the Certificate 
Authority system, but an issue the government should be aware of is that when a dissident in 
a country like Iran downloads an operating system and/or web browser, there are trust 
relationships built into that. For example, if you download Firefox there are about 70 
companies that Firefox trusts to sign certificates and authenticate websites like Facebook and 
Gmail to you. Several of those 70 companies were not trustworthy and were basically hacked 
by someone who was possibly affiliated with the Iranian government. This meant that for at 
least a short period of time internet users in Iran who thought they had a safe, encrypted 
connection to sites like Facebook and Gmail could have been in fact communicating directly 
with an Iranian government server in Tehran that was designed to, for example, collect 
usernames and passwords. If social media is to be an instrument of social change in places 
like Iran, we need a better notion of trust on the internet. Funding research in this area is one 
thought that comes to mind in terms of what the government could do. 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
 
I'm not the right person to answer this question. The TOR project may be the right people to 
contact if you'd like an answer to this question. 
 
 
7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists?  
 
Again, this is outside of my research area and I'm not able to answer this question. 
 
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
 
My research is mostly about internet censorship in China, so I can't answer this question. 
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Kevin G. Coleman (04 Sep 2012) 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
The topic area you ask about is perhaps the area of most interest for me. Not just as they 
relate to Iran but in general. The advancements in the use of social media by special interest 
groups and virtual organisations are substantial and growing. They can communicate both 
overtly and covertly, recruit followers, coordinate activities and get their message out to the 
masses. 
 
In fact one area of research I am currently involved in is the emergence of virtual states. My 
current and generally accepted working definition of a virtual state (VS) is a nebulous 
community of people that self-identify and share a common social, political and/or 
ideological conviction, ideas and values. The VS is unbound by geographic specification. 
Virtual states are directed by administrators that are charged with coordinating the 
establishment of the entities overall course based on the motivation of the community. Once 
the course is established, their efforts are to influence or force governments, nations or other 
identified groups to change; to align with the virtual state's social, political and/or ideological 
convictions. Hacking is just one of many cyber-weapons and tools that a VS or group has at 
their disposal to influence another entity. 
 
I believe the internet has become the primary medium of interaction for a vast number of 
people worldwide. Messages are coded and hidden in interactions that take place over the 
internet routinely as well as in your face marketing and positioning campaigns. It has 
somewhat levelled the playing field between well-established large entities with significant 
resources including money and groups that have far fewer assets. The struggles inside of Iran 
as well as other areas of conflict and disagreement are examples of the power hacking and 
social networking sites bring. 
 
 General social networking sites' power as demonstrated to date: 
- Would rank a 4.0 with a potential of 4.4 (1 = Low, 3 = Medium, 5 = High) 
 
 General Hacktivism Power as demonstrated to date: 
- Would rank a 3.5 with a potential of 4.2 (1 = Low, 3 = Medium, 5 = High) 
 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
Given the unique characteristics and resiliency of virtual states and those that closely 
resemble the cyber-activists in Iran, self-reliance does not matter. It is like they are shooting 
bullets into the air. There is nothing really to hit until they (VS or cyber activists) strike and 
most of the time it is with infrastructure assets outside of Iran's control—often in another 
country. If Iran were to strike the cyber infrastructure assets of the cyber activists in another 
country—that would be very dangerous! 
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4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
Cyber-activists and most virtual states for that matter are quite resilient due to their 
architecture and the fact they operate without being tied to any physical location or 
technology or piece of communications infrastructure. They are typically vendor agnostic! So 
any actions that focus [on] a specific type of equipment would have limited impact. I am 
aware that there are multiple investigations into telecommunications firms that allegedly 
conspired to illegally ship hardware and software purchased from US tech firms and others to 
entities inside of Iran which is a violation of several US federal laws and a trade embargo 
imposed on the outlaw Islamic nation. So I will not comment further. 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
I believe they have already through sanctions and through the export restrictions! Are there 
those that work to circumvent these controls—YES, and they will pay the price once they are 
discovered. 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
 
The most common cyber-operations modality that best illustrates virtual states and cyber-
activists is a semi-filled balloon. If you apply pressure with your finger in one place—it just 
pushes outward in other areas. This is the basic architecture of virtual states and most 
activists. Even though the cyber-activists you are interested in—[are] heavily concentrated 
(physically) in Iran their membership reaches around the globe. Most cyber-activists have an 
operational model similar to that of a virtual state. The appearance of the cyber-activists in 
Iran is much closer to a real virtual state than other groups. 
 
 
Any further comments? 
 
Given how closed the Iranian environment is to the outside world—there is an absence of 
facts and only opinion! 
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Layla Hashemi (31 Aug 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
Social networking has become a key component in Iranian politics not just because of its 
power as a medium of expression, but more so as an extension of the use of traditional media 
as a platform for socio-political claims by the public. Iranian women involved in the likes of 
the Equal Rights Campaign utilised social media tactics learned from Tunisian women, and 
the entire phenomenon we regard as the Arab Spring continues to learn from its 
neighbours/peers and collaborate as they plan events and protests. 
 
 
2. What is the contribution of the government/IRGC-owned companies and institutions 
(i.e. universities) to the development of the Iranian regime's censorship/surveillance 
infrastructure? 
 
The Iranian government clearly has its act together when it comes to utilising ICTs to its 
benefit. Through either direct or indirect means, the state has both recognised the power of 
technology and harnessed this power to cater arenas such as the world wide web to its 
specifications and interests, whether this be through the establishment of government funded 
websites and weblogs or through censorship of information. 
 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
They have complete control because they own and control everything. 
 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
While the primary force for change should ideally come from within a country, the growing 
influence of foreign telecommunications companies is an essential factor in defining the 
future boundaries of Iran's—as well as every other nations'—cyberspace. A good example of 
this is Haystack in Iran or Google Inc. in China. We are increasingly at risk of losing what is 
now seeing as one internet. After the recent media hype over the controversial film Innocence 
of Muslims, the debate over freedom of expression within cyberspace has reached a new 
level: one where religion and cultural traditions are seemingly the main ingredients. But as 
demonstrated by online communities such as #Occupy, anti-SOPA/PIPA groups and 
Anonymous, internet users are not about to give up their freedoms so easily. These 
individuals are young, tech-savvy, and constantly on the move—as some like to say, they 
have "no return address." At the end of the day it is much too difficult, and not to mention 
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costly, to stop the hacker who is helping hide IP addresses for political activists or 
contributing to the takeover of a state or corporate-run website. The 21
st
 century state faces an 
increasingly sophisticated, resource-rich, and untraceable adversary. While many scholars 
have previously questioned the waning power of the state, contemporary technologies are 
giving non-state actors—as well as their respective governments—some of the most powerful 
tools they've had yet. The resulting cyber wars between and within nations will define how 
conflict is played out in this century. 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
This is a tough question, because the first thing I'm tempted to ask is: should they or do they 
have a right to intervene at all? 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
 
In addition to being one of the first nation-states to utilise the internet to disseminate 
information about presidential candidates, a variety of online tactics [have been] used by both 
the Iranian public and the state since the initial appearance of the technology in the country at 
the turn of the 21
st
 century. These actions are commonplace and practical for all parties 
involved; to be technologically ‘with it' these days is deemed as critically linked to public 
opinion and activism. Any state would be wise in trying to harness a developing technology 
as powerful as the internet. In fact, any state not trying to do just that is doing itself—and 
arguably sometimes its people—a great disservice.  
 
 
7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists? 
 
Are we referring to filter breakers here? I don't have much knowledge on the subject but it 
makes me think of all of the illegal satellite dishes in the country and various online dissent 
groups. To a certain extent, breaking censorship laws is almost accepted as a petty crime as it 
is often portrayed in Iranian media and pop culture as being something practiced by Iranians 
of a wide range of socio-economic strata. 
 
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
 
Regardless of the country in question, I believe that the call for political change should and 
must come from within the nation. 
 
That being said, I feel there is a large, young Iranian expat community that longs to reconnect 
to their homeland. New social media and the internet in general have become great resources 
to meet this end. Whether it is catching up on the latest musical, cultural or fashion trends in 
Tehran or keeping in touch with a distant relative in Khuzestan or Kansas, tools like Orkut or 
Facebook make these tasks much more feasible for both the native and expat Iranian.  
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With regards to gender, while I do not have much first-hand experience, through research I 
have learned that many Iranian women both inside and outside of the country use aliases 
online to disguise their gender. While much can be said about this phenomenon, I think it is 
important to both recognise and attempt to dissect the reasoning behind such actions in order 
to fully address global equality and general gender roles and norms. 
 
 
Any further comments? 
 
In this age of globalisation, many second-generation Americans have developed an identity 
crisis, and young Iranians growing up in foreign—mostly Western—countries are no 
exception. Often upon sharing that you are Iranian or Iranian-American, the first response 
you get is horrified or deeply strained facial expressions and the occasional "is it safe over 
there?" With all of the misperception and lack of information, it often becomes difficult to 
successfully counter-balance the Western media's clamour about the axis of evil, uranium 
enrichment, and the on-going "war on terror." The reality is that the majority of the world's 
citizens do not know enough about politics—or the current global nuclear arms race—to 
make an informed decision or opinion about Iran. The unfortunate result is that many people 
in the world perceive these "rogue nations" as dangerous and untrustworthy, further feeding 
into what we in International Relations call the security dilemma. These perceived images of 
the "evil other" have the darkest corners of history, but the potential for misinformation 
increases parallel to the increased frequency and volume of information accompanied by new 
social media. Also, with the emergence of the internet meme culture, many of these 
perceptions have been overly simplified and made easily digestible through the use of info 
graphics and humour, making these myths of "the other" easier to swallow for any audience.  
As much as I would love to say that new communications technology like the world wide 
web will turn this destructive, self-help system around, that would be like saying that by 
having a hammer, one is in sufficient a situation to build an entire house from scratch. 
Nothing good comes without hard work, and the idea of liberal democracy seems too 
appealing to come easily for any country. 
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Madeline Storck (03 Sep 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and the cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
The media latched on to the catchy phrase ‘Twitter Revolution' to describe the trend across 
the Middle East of young and techno savvy activists using the internet as a weapon against 
authoritarian and repressive governments. However, this impression relies on broad 
assumptions about the democratic nature of the internet, ignoring the importance of context, 
both cultural and historical. The Iranian government is known to have one of the most 
advanced systems of networked authoritarianism in the world, perhaps second only to China. 
The internet is a dialectical force, and though recently its potentials for strengthening pro-
democracy movements have been given much attention, when monopolised by an 
authoritarian state, it has equally dire consequences. My understanding of the political 
situation in Iran is superficial, but I would argue that so far, since the 2009 elections and 
more recently in the events of the Arab Spring, social networking has played a significant 
role in three ways: as an organisational tool for networking activists, as a means of generating 
awareness in the international community of the events taking place in authoritarian 
countries, and finally as an alternative press. The rise of citizen journalism has altered the 
traditional state-based monopoly over information. 
 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
Though technology used to track down activists was sold to Iranian mobile phone companies 
by NSN, the programmes are not considered unlawful—this was determined at a European 
Union hearing. This has also happened with a system by Ericsson sold to Belarusian mobile 
phone operators. In European countries, the same lawful intercept technology is used to track 
criminals. However, in the Iranian example, the definition of criminal is clearly being 
stretched. 
 
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
 
While I don't know if this is the case in Iran, in the Egyptian example, local cyber-activists 
played an important role in planning and organising protests, while expat cyber-activists' role 
was more in generating awareness in the wider world of the events taking place within the 
country in question. During the 2009 elections in Iran, social media users provided an 
important source of information for the US government. The US and Iran have had no formal 
diplomatic relations for three decades, and thus, new media has proven to be an outlet for 
information not only to citizens of Iran but the wider international community. Regarding age 
and gender, I would say that both can be determining factors in activists' use of new media. 
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Though use of social media, blogging in particular, has increased dramatically in the last 
decade, I would argue that it is important not to forget about the digital divide. I came across 
this trend while researching my dissertation. It is easy to assume that the dialogue taking 
place via social media is representative of the wider anti-government movement. However, 
this is often not the case. When interviewing Egyptian students for my own research, they 
constantly reiterated that most internet users are usually young, educated, often speak English 
and usually from cities. Therefore, we are hearing from a small percentage of the population, 
relatively speaking. 
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Dr. Marcus Michaelsen (30 Aug 2012) 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
 
Iranians are one of the biggest user groups on TOR—I've heard the number of 50,000 daily. 
This concerns not only the activists but also the ordinary people seeking to access different 
kinds of blocked content. Someone from TOR told me that the Iranian authorities are not very 
successful in discovering connections to the TOR network and that the TOR people were able 
to quickly counter the few attempts made with deep packet inspection. 
 
 
7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists?  
 
As for the sources behind anti-censorship software, I still believe—and maybe I'm being 
naive here—that support mainly comes from activist networks and individuals outside Iran 
who have the motivation, expertise and knowledge to fight censorship. They might get 
funding from some governments and institutions, but I am not really sure if the US or the 
European countries have any substantial programmes or long-term budgets to help the 
activists in Iran. 
 
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
 
Some cyber-activists told me that Iranian activists from inside the country are very capable of 
finding ways to counter filtering and censorship. I don't know about the networks and 
cooperation between exiles and activists in the country. There are definitely exiles engaged in 
hacking and attacks against regime websites, though the question would be if/how people 
inside the country have the technological capacity and infrastructure to participate. 
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Dr. Nassim Nazemi (09 Oct 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and the cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
With regard to social networking, I believe it is important to distinguish between the value of 
social networking in helping disseminate truthful news reporting of so-called dissident 
Iranian activity to audiences outside of Iran—something that is no doubt of great value to 
Iran's civil rights movement—and the value of social networks in helping to facilitate pro-
democracy cyber activity within Iran. It's my understanding that social networking is not 
nearly as powerful a tool for mobilising social movements within Iran as it is in Europe or the 
US. It's simply too dangerous for individuals within Iran to expose their political leanings on 
networks like Facebook. Politically motivated hacks, on the other hand, are a valuable tool in 
the Iranian cyber-activist's arsenal. It goes without saying that Iran's theocracy is, like all 
modern governments, increasingly dependent on networked technology and as such grows 
increasingly vulnerable to cyber-warfare with each passing day. 
 
 
2. What is the contribution of the government/IRGC-owned companies and institutions 
(i.e. universities) to the development of the Iranian regime's censorship/surveillance 
infrastructure? 
 
Unfortunately, I cannot claim to have specific information on this point. Nevertheless as a 
general matter, we know that the regime has a hand in virtually every profitable venture and 
as such is able to attract the best and brightest of Iran's remarkably well-educated populace. 
Iran's universities and businesses are just as captive as the average Iranian citizen, and so we 
have every reason to believe that their best minds are being plundered in furtherance of the 
regime's censorship and domestic surveillance schemes. 
 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
This is a very difficult question and honestly I doubt if anyone could answer it with any 
accuracy. The regime is very good at hiding the inner workings of its domestic surveillance 
apparatus. That said, I believe we have decades of evidence indicating that the regime is quite 
adept at copying—and improving—technologies originally developed by others. It's a 
scrappy sort of self-reliance and I would be very surprised if the regime was not largely self-
sufficient at this point.  
 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
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Again, this is an extremely difficult question for the reasons explained earlier. If I had to 
guess, I would say that the regime's reliance on formal relationships with foreign telecom and 
technology companies is a red herring. Iran does not need formal business arrangements to 
acquire foreign technology. It's important to remember that Iran does not abide by any patent 
or copyright norms. There is nothing to stop it from appropriating whatever technology it 
requires. 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
I cannot overemphasise the importance of sanctions. Iran can steal digital technology because 
it is easy to copy. But Iran cannot steal everything, and it is highly dependent on all manner 
of imports, from refined fuel to airplane parts. It has become fashionable of late to decry 
sanctions as only harming the Iranian people. I fear that the intelligentsia who circulate this 
common lament have handed the regime a gift on a golden platter. The regime simply loves 
to spin the sanctions as a tool of the evil West, thereby inflaming the famous passions of a 
prideful Iranian populace and in the process totally avoiding all discussion of what actually 
led to those sanctions: the regime's own actions. The world has underestimated the Iranian 
regime's shameless taste for demagoguery and the blinding national pride of its people. 
Sanctions are, quite simply, an efficient way to cripple this regime and end Iran's decades-
long occupation under an unelected and oppressive theocracy. 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
 
Cyber-activism is a dangerous business in Iran. They evade detection and circumvent 
censorship primarily by routing traffic through proxies and masking their IP addresses—
methods that are cumbersome even on high-speed internet connections. I believe network 
latency is the main reason that technologies like Tor, for example, are not more widely used 
within Iran. 
 
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
 
Local cyber-activists are probably smaller in number than their expat compatriots, but the 
former's actions have a greater immediate impact on the regime. I don't mean to belittle the 
role of expatriate activism—indeed I would count myself among that group. But expats have 
a very different role to play. They are the true ambassadors of the Iranian people and their 
voices are influential in shaping public opinion abroad. It is hard to measure the direct in-
country impact of cyber-activism abroad, but to the extent that local activists continue to rely 
on proxies, traffic routing, and other technologies that funnel data through network 
connections outside of Iran, expats—and other netizens—can aide local Iranian activists by 
simply donating a bit of bandwidth on a volunteer-run anonymity network like Tor. I am 
unaware of any gender or age effects in this regard. 
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Neal Ungerleider (21 Sep 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
I argue that social networking's most important role is connecting the Iranian activist 
diaspora—and their sympathisers—with Iranian cyber-activists. YouTube, Facebook, 
Twitter, and Skype are infinitely better tools than telephones or snail mail. 
 
The Iranian regime, from what I have seen—and I recognise this is as a non-Persian speaking 
Westerner—seems to be more interested in stifling social networking than attempting to win 
the hearts and minds of cyber-activists via social media. 
 
Hacking attacks—DDoS, malware and phishing attacks—against cyber-activists are common 
at the hands of the Iranian government and regime supporters. With that said, they seem to be 
on the decline. It's easier to use filtering software or pull DNS malarkey than to do 
unsophisticated hacker attacks. 
 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
Not self-reliant at all. Even the USA, the world's arguable leader in software, routinely uses 
foreign-created software in their own—private sector—net-filtering or cyber-warfare efforts. 
Iran has plenty of talented coders, engineers and IT folks, but there are too many structural 
issues preventing a 100 per cent home-grown internet censorship regime. 
 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
Massive. As a journalist, I'm not comfortable going on the record without solid evidence of 
illegal sales of surveillance technology by EU and American firms to the Iranian government 
or to government-affiliated companies. With that said, Privacy International has done 
impeccable research on the subject that speaks for itself. 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
Stiff sanctions and fines. I'd argue that the onus is not on the European Parliament, but on 
individual governments—UK, Germany and Italy especially—to put pressure on firms to 
adhere to existing but loosely enforced laws. 
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6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
Everything from HTTPS to Tor to burner phones to VPNs. I would say they're commonplace 
but not practical—the learning curve around many of these tools ensures only techies use 
them. 
 
 
7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists? 
 
[The] main source behind development is the ethos of the hacker and techie culture—the idea 
of information being free at all costs and moral opposition to censorship. Funding of 
development, however, is another story. I would argue it is a mix of idealistic individuals, 
companies hoping to later monetise these technologies in different contexts, and government 
actors—US and EU—embracing the Iranian opposition for their own interests. 
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Prof. Paul Holman (23 Sep 2012) 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
The overwhelming majority of Americans opposes the current drift toward war and laments 
the hostile behaviour of Israel, Iran, and the United States. The parliaments of all democratic 
countries should work urgently to deepen cultural and educational ties between their peoples 
and the people of Iran. They should stress 'people to people' contacts, such as exchanging 
students, community leaders and religious groups. Legislators should increase government 
spending on research and development aimed at deepening our knowledge of internet issues 
in Iran, China, Russia, Syria and other countries where cyber-activists are being suppressed. 
Clearly, legislation is needed to regulate the behaviour of our telecommunications companies 
in Iran and elsewhere. They should not be allowed to help autocratic regimes monitor, harass, 
and suppress their own peoples. 
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Pejman Akbarzadeh (03 Sep 2012) 
 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
Definitely not too much. You are, of course, aware about the European and Chinese 
technology, which [has] been offered to the regime especially in 2009 and 2010. 
 
Regarding China, perhaps we cannot blame them so much, because they never have claimed 
that China is a democratic or pro human rights state but in Europe, [where] human rights are 
considered as a basic issue, the governments did not show a strong reaction against the 
companies which offered Iran's government the technology to trace the activists. 
 
So it makes the people more disappointed that always the priority is economic interests for 
European states and practically human rights values [are] mostly a verbal game. 
 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
Offering the technology to Iranian authorities to trace the activists and repress the 
demonstrations quickly. 
 
But we need to consider this issue that Persian people also are not united to follow such cases 
seriously and systematically. I mean, following the cases through legal organisations. Those 
who are inside practically are not able to do something effective and those who are outside 
mostly think of their own interest. The controversy remained mostly on a media level, and 
did not go much farther. 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
They can be quite effective, but in my opinion the priority is economic interests, not 
supporting human rights movements in Iran. As far as they do not change this policy we can't 
be hopeful to change things through EU. 
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
 
Those who are outside, freely and quickly spread the links and news; the materials coming 
from the insiders, I mean. But those who are inside, their priority is transferring the data in a 
safe way, but at the same time their views on the situation can be more realistic because they 
are inside the country. 
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Any further comments? 
 
Years after the 1980s, it was finally revealed that many Western governments who seem pro 
human rights were aware of providing Saddam Hussein with products used in making 
chemical bombs. Nothing happened. Same will happen about the 2009 demonstrations in 
Iran. Although parts of the story like the Nokia incident or the German torture equipment 
have been already revealed. 
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Dr. Randy Kluver (30 Aug 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking 
attacks in the online power struggle between the regime and cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
I am not entirely sure what you are asking here, but I will take it to mean how influential 
do I perceive each of these to be. 
 
As to social media, I think that in and of itself, social networking is not all that important. 
It can be used, however, to develop networks of resistance, as it were, but only within 
certain conditions. It does allow people to recognise others with like motivations and 
intentions, and thus can be a powerful organisational [and] mobilisation tool. 
 
As to hacking, I think this can be pretty important, depending upon the skill and number of 
hackers. Most hacking is primarily symbolic, and has no real function other than to say: 
"we were here." But hacking that began to undermine governmental effectiveness or the 
ability of the government to control public narratives could be very important in 
undermining public support. 
 
 
2. What is the contribution of the government/IRGC-owned companies and 
institutions (i.e. universities) to the development of the Iranian regime's 
censorship/surveillance infrastructure? 
 
I am not an expert on Iran, so I can't speak about Iran specifically here. However, generally 
speaking and in other authoritarian regimes, these partnerships between the government 
and government financed organisations are critically important. 
 
In China, for example, GLCs (government linked companies) have had tremendous impact 
in changing the actual hardware/software configurations of technological infrastructure 
components, allowing the government to more or less dictate surveillance capacity at a 
level that was not heard of a dozen years ago. 
   
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
Again, I can't speak directly to the Iranian situation, but my guess would be that they are 
not very self-reliant. I know there is an ongoing investigation into the relationship of 
China's IT manufacturers, such as Huawei, and the Iranian government. The economist had 
a recent article on Huawei's recent ascent in the global IT marketplace, and China's 
government historically would support that kind of partnership. So, Iran does have some 
tech capacity, both in manufacturing and programming, but I don't think it would need a 
tremendous amount to mount a successful surveillance regime. 
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4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
I cannot speak to European companies. I wouldn't think that the European companies 
would be that important, given my earlier comments. 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
There is not a tremendous amount of leverage the EP or other global bodies can [have] 
here, other than [via] some symbolic moves. If they try to impose strict controls on 
European or US involvement, then the Chinese will fill the hole.  
 
 
7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists? 
 
I cannot speak specifically to this, since I don't have contacts myself within Iran. I do know 
that the TOR project, Haystack, and others like it, have their origins in the work of many 
European and US-based project groups. 
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Dr. Soheila Vahdati-Bana (04 Sep 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
I wouldn't exactly call it a power struggle. In my view, that is the least of the cyber-activists' 
concerns, because it all is overt and the activists can take appropriate precautions to be 
prepared for hacking, etc. I think that infiltration is a more serious issue to the cyber-activists, 
which is often achieved through politically motivated hacking attacks. 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
I don't think if censorship should be selective. It should be banned in all countries. Hence, 
there should be policies to prohibit contributing to censorship in any way by the information 
technology industry. 
 
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
 
Yes, gender and age do play a role in choosing the internet as a medium for communication. 
The young people tend to be more computer-savvy, and women with children find it more 
convenient to connect with others via the web. 
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Dr. Tessa Houghton (14 Sep 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
I would say that out of the two, social networking sites—in my opinion—represent a greater 
potential threat to the regime that hacking attacks, purely because of the fact that they have 
the potential to facilitate organisation and solidarity amongst much greater numbers of people 
than single instances of hacking attacks—by hacking attacks, I assume you are referring to 
DDoS or defacements. However, the problem, of course, is that they can be blocked, and 
their owners can sometimes be implicit in any censorship imposed by the regime. 
 
 
2. What is the contribution of the government/IRGC-owned companies and institutions 
(i.e. universities) to the development of the Iranian regime's censorship/surveillance 
infrastructure? 
 
I really don't know a lot about this issue re: Iran, so don't have much to say in response! If the 
situation is anything like it is in China, then these companies and the universities will play a 
large role in providing the regime with a pool of talent from which to draw their cyber troops 
from—to find skilled staff to work on their infrastructure and systems. 
 
 
3. To what extent is the Iranian regime self-reliant in terms of producing 
censorship/surveillance technology? Why is that? 
 
Somewhat self-reliant in terms of on-going maintenance and the manpower needed to keep 
such systems running, but also heavily dependent upon global TNCs who provide the base 
infrastructure for such censorship regimes. 
 
 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
 
Very large. Most of the technologies and infrastructure used by repressive regimes around the 
world is provided by transnational corporations, e.g. Siemens, Cisco. 
 
 
5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
 
I'm not sure that any regional form of governance can necessarily have a lot of impact, even 
if the willingness to impose restrictions was there. The unfortunate reality is that these 
companies operate in a global capitalist system, which places profit before anything else. 
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Hence, we have national governments preaching the benefits of internet freedom and 
decrying censorship while doing nothing at all to rein in such corporations or even speak out 
against them, because to do so would contravene the dominant profit logic, and therefore 
might impact negatively upon their political popularity. There is a lot of discursive hypocrisy 
going on in this respect. 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
 
I really don't know any holistic data of the top of my head, but from what I do know/can 
make out, proxies and other firewall-circumvention tools would be the most commonly used 
technologies, and these are not just used by cyber-activists per se, but by many 
people/citizens. I think these tools are very practical, and in the same vein—and related to—
the use of SNSs, great for promoting solidarity and co-ordination using platforms which 
might otherwise be unavailable. I think these kinds of technologies are also very important 
for disseminating news and information not just amongst Iranians within Iran, but to the rest 
of the world, so we can see what is going on, and thus exert pressure for change either 
indirectly or directly. 
 
 
7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists?  
 
My perception is that a lot of the tools being used by citizens and activists within repressive 
regimes all over the world are coming from technological activist groups primarily located in 
less repressive environments, who presumably have greater freedom in terms of developing 
and distributing these tools in the first instance. In this sense, there is an interesting political-
economic alignment between the transnational/global power structures of both control and 
resistance: the infrastructures of both censorship/surveillance and its circumvention are 
coming from—largely—Europe and North America. This is not to say that Iran and other 
countries do not contribute at all in terms of providing the infrastructure/knowledge behind 
these flows, but my perception is that the majority of the tech and expertise on both sides of 
the struggle is coming from geopolitical centres/cores. 
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Dr. Ulises Mejias (24 Sep 2012) 
 
 
1. Where do you place a) social networking and b) politically motivated hacking attacks 
in the online power struggle between the regime and cyber-activists in Iran? 
Social networking can be a tool for organising activism and disseminating information, but it 
is not as directly confrontational as politically motivated hacking attacks. 
 
If we are to agree with Ethan Zuckerman's Cute Cats theory of social media and activism, 
then the fact that people use social networking services to produce both political and non-
political—cute cats—content can make this practice a) harder to censor, b) accessible to a 
broader audience than hacking attacks, and c) safer. This last point, however, is debatable in 
the case of Iran, where the government has at its disposal the same tools other governments 
have to monitor, track, and block online activities, but is willing to use them more overtly to 
stifle dissent.   
 
2. What is the contribution of the government/IRGC-owned companies and institutions 
(i.e. universities) to the development of the Iranian regime's censorship/surveillance 
infrastructure? 
I am not that familiar with the Iranian case, and everything I know is from secondary sources, 
as I have not conducted any primary research myself related to this area. However, from what 
I know, it sounds like it is no different from other cases in the sense that you have the 
confluence of academic research interests, corporate interests and government interests. 
 
I think it would be difficult to find cases of military technologies and counter-insurgency 
technologies anywhere in the world that have not emerged as a result of the marriage of these 
three interests. Again, the case of Iran might represent a more extreme example in the sense 
that these are technologies developed to oppress Iranian citizens, as opposed to the citizens of 
other nations. But let's not forget that Iran's censorship/surveillance infrastructure was 
developed, in part, with the help of Western corporations like Nokia and Siemens. 
4. What is, if any, the role of foreign, particularly European, telecommunications 
technology companies such as Nokia-Siemens Networks (NSN) in the repression of 
cyber-activists in Iran? 
The case of Iran—along with others like China, Egypt, Libya, etc., where corporations have 
helped governments repress dissidents—demonstrates that capitalism trumps any ideals that 
European or US governments might profess to have about promoting democracy in the world. 
These governments are only slightly less responsible than the corporations, because they have 
been promoting policies of corporate deregulation that allow the companies to do what they 
are doing. But this is nothing new, as the case of IBM collaborating with the Nazis 
demonstrates. 
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5. How do you think international legislators (e.g. the European Parliament) can 
address the above issue through policy? 
I understand some governments are beginning to formulate legislation that would control the 
export of technologies that can be used for censorship and surveillance. But the effectiveness 
of this approach remains to be seen, as the technologies that can be used for repression are, 
ironically—or not—the same ones that can be used for marketing. 
 
 
6. What are the main anti-censorship/surveillance methods used by Iranian cyber-
activists? How common/practical are such solutions? 
I don't know enough about the specifics to answer this, but from what I understand, these are 
technologies developed not just for the Iranian context, but for worldwide application. 
 
7. What are the main sources behind the development of the anti-
censorship/surveillance software currently used by Iranian cyber-activists? 
Again, I can't talk specifics, but it seems to me that it's mostly coming from a global but 
decentralised hacker community.  
 
8. How do you differentiate the 'local' and 'expat' Iranian cyber-activists' role in the 
power struggle with the regime? Do you find gender/age to be a determining factor? 
I don't know enough about the Iranian context, but if it's the same as in the rest of the world, I 
think we can assume that the expat community is mostly responsible for disseminating 
information about the movement, and that the use of social media by local cyber-activists is 
limited but focused and effective. 
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Western Technology Export Control Policy References 
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EU 
Dual-use Export Controls in the EU 
 
Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls 
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UN 
Lists of Items Prohibited for Export to and Import from the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 
 
Available at: 
https://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/exportimport.shtml 
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US 
Commerce Control List Categories: Telecommunications 
 
Available at: 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/444-
category-5-part-1-telecommunications 
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Glossary of Terms 
 
Assembly of Experts is a parliament-like body of Muslim clerics directly in charge of the 
assignment (and possible removal) of the Supreme Leader, as well as monitoring his conduct. 
 
Arab Spring is a popular phrase created in reference to the chain of pro-democracy 
movements taken place in Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria) 
since December 2010. 
 
Basij is an Iranian paramilitary militia organisation with extra-judicial powers in an array of 
sensitive issues ranging from inland security to foreign policy. 
 
Bonyads are tax-exempt, often oversized non-petroleum business firms subsidized by the 
regime, said to be responsible for about 20 per cent of Iran's GDP. 
 
Clicktivism is a type of online activism focused on the application of advertising techniques 
to joining and defending a socio-political cause. 
 
Color Revolution is a media-driven concept referring to a range of civil movements, which 
have taken place mainly in the post-Soviet Union and Balkan states since the year 2000, 
which has also been extended by some commentators to certain phases of the Arab Spring. 
 
Cyber-activism refers to the use of ICTs in facilitation of promoting a socio-political cause 
through online techniques to help deliver certain types of information to a large [and 
otherwise unreachable] number of audiences. 
 
Cyber-activist Innovation System (CIS) is a term coined by this research, which refers to an 
interconnected network of computer-literate, pro-democracy, online activists focused on 
counter-censorship ICT innovations. 
 
Cyber Warfare refers to a set of online techniques used by a variety of individuals and groups 
ranging from criminals to political dissidents to disrupt and destabilise the networks and 
services run by (or supporting) the opposing force. 
 
Digital Divide is the (often) class-based inconsistency in different individuals'/groups' extent 
of connectivity to the online world and the services it offers across a given society. 
 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) describes ICT-based attacks aimed to make an online 
network temporarily inaccessible to its potential users. 
 
Diffusion of Innovations is a scholarly theory initially developed by Professor Everett 
Rogers in 1962, which endeavours to explain how and why innovation processes spread in a 
given country. 
 
E-democracy refers mainly to the use of ICTs in (and by) democratic states to facilitate 
political processes. 
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Expediency Discernment Council is an assembly of veteran politicians and clerics appointed 
directly by the Supreme Leader, which seeks to resolve potential disagreements between 
Majlis and the Council of Guardians. It also functions as a consultant to the Supreme Leader 
in matters of national security. 
 
Green Movement of Iran refers to a civil movement born in June 2009, following an 
allegedly rigged presidential election leading to the appointment of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
to presidency for a second term, during which the protestors demanded his replacement with 
Mir Hossein Mousavi, the statistically rightful winner of the polls. 
 
Guardian Council is a 12-membered committee as set by the Islamic Republic's constitution 
with many important duties ranging from the supervision of all elections to the approval of 
candidates to participate in them. 
 
Hacktivism is a term coined by Cult of the Dead Cow in 1996, which refers to the use of 
hacking (such as DDoS) attacks to uphold socio-political causes. 
 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) refers mainly to the integration of 
traditional communication techniques with online networks through cabled or cable-free 
connections. 
 
Internet Censorship refers to the interception or prevention of private communications often 
(but not always) conducted by governments or their affiliated institutions.  
 
Innovation System (IS) refers to the systematic flow of information among actors needed in 
order to transform ideas into tangible results. 
 
Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) is an online-oriented division of the Iranian police founded in 
January 2011. 
 
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is a regime-subsidised Iranian corporation in 
control of all broadcast media. 
 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a giant, powerful organisation of nearly 
130,000 specialised personnel and parallel to Iran's military, which specifically aims to 
ensure the compatibility of all the regime's general endeavours with the 'core principles' of 
Shiite Islam. 
 
Majlis is Iran's equivalent of a Western parliament. 
 
Mobile Phone Jamming is a technique used to disrupt cell phone signals across a given 
geographical area. 
 
National Innovation System (NIS) refers to the flow of technological information among 
people, enterprises and institutions, the collaboration among which reflects a given country's 
innovation robustness and powers. 
 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a government-owned corporation run (and owned 
by) Iran's Oil and Petroleum Ministry. 
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Netizen, or cyber-citizen, is a term referring to any individual or community keenly involved 
in online activities particularly those favouring human rights and free speech. 
 
Network Society is a broad term referring to any changes made to social, political, economic, 
cultural, etc. trends in relation with the development of the ICTs. 
 
Online Community is an unconventional kind of neighbourhood consisting of online citizens 
who share a specific (often socio-political) cause. 
 
Online Ethnography, or virtual ethnography, refers to a set of qualitative, social research 
methods which aim to combine ethnography with progressive, online communication 
techniques. 
 
Orange Revolution refers to an internet-reliant civil disobedience taken place in Ukraine 
from November 2004 to January 2005, which was ignited by an alleged fraud in the run-off 
stage of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election. 
 
Political Economy is a term rooted in 18
th
-century philosophy, concerned with the study of a 
given state's economy. 
 
Press TV is a 24-hour rolling news network broadcast only in English and owned by the 
state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). The channel has recently been taken 
off the air by various European satellite companies due to a number of professional 
misconducts. 
 
Quds Force is a special unit of the IRGC, mainly focused on the organisation's foreign 
endeavours. 
 
Radio Jamming refers to the intentional disruption of satellite communications through the 
broadcast of illegitimate signals also known as noise. 
 
Samizdat is a term referring a form of subversive and dissident communication in the Soviet 
Union, involving the reproduction and circulation of the regime-censored publications 
through manual (as opposed to digital) techniques. It is often seen as equivalent to today's 
cyber-activism. 
 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) is the study of the interplay between socio-political 
(and sometimes cultural) values and technological innovations across one or more 
geographical regions. 
 
Slacktivism is a phrase rooted in words 'slacker' and 'activism,' referring to a set of feel-good 
(but not necessarily effective) measures known to be taken by (less dedicated) cyber-activists 
worldwide. 
 
Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) is an STS theory arguing against technological 
determinism, introducing technology as the ultimate product of human choices/actions. 
 
Social Determinism of Technology is a school of thought considering technological 
innovations to be an outcome of the sociological environment, in which they are developed. 
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Social Networking Services (SNSs) are online platforms aiming to enable conventional 
social relations among people favouring the same causes/interests. 
 
Social Shaping of Technology (SST) is an STS model developed by MacKenzie and 
Wajcman in 1985 with a strong criticism for technological determinism, underlining the 
socio-political contexts influencing a nation's technological choices. 
 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) is the study of the relationship between social 
processes and scientific activity. 
 
Socio-technical Systems is an inter-disciplinary concept mainly referring to the interaction 
between existing technological infrastructure and human behaviour across a given society. 
 
Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution (SCCR) is a hard-line assembly based in the holy 
city of Qom, the main duty of which is ensuring full alignment of all cultural and educational 
productions and services with the core teachings of Islam and free from any Western 
influences. 
 
Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) is an assembly chaired by the Iranian president and 
responsible for regulating the online sphere. 
 
Supreme Leader of Iran is the Islamic Republic's most senior authority directly in charge of 
the armed forces and the judiciary, and with extra-judicial powers to modify or overrule any 
decisions made by the regime's lower-ranking officials, including the president. 
 
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is a security-oriented, policy-focused assembly 
as demanded by the Islamic Republic's s constitution, which aims to safeguard the regime in 
the matters of national security, defence and inland or foreign threats. 
 
Technological Convergence is a term mainly referring to the union of formerly detached 
concepts such as sounds, images, text, etc., in a way that they closely interact and due to 
technological advancements made in the field of ICTs. 
 
Technological Dystopianism is the belief that views technology as inherently evil and 
inevitably harmful to moral, humanistic principles. 
 
Technological Realism refers to some STS scholars' efforts to establish a constructive 
balance between radical, deterministic (utopian and dystopian) insights to the relationship 
between technological innovations and society. 
 
Technological Utopianism is the philosophy that technological innovations will ultimately 
result in an ideal world, where there will be no (or very little) pain and suffering left, and 
where human living standards will be extremely high. 
 
Ukrayinska Pravda is a popular, pro-democracy Ukrainian online news website published in 
Ukrainian, Russian and English, which was launched by Georgiy Gongadze in April 2000. 
 
Web 1.0 refers to the initial, static and non-interactive phase in the development of the web, 
where the webmaster held all the editorial powers and the reader was a merely passive 
consumer of the information and news. 
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Web 2.0 is a term coined by Darcy DiNucci in 1999, which refers to the later, dynamic, 
highly interactive and frequently improving version of the web designed with the aim to put 
the power in the hands of the users, transforming them from passive consumers to active, 
influential participants. 
